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Abstract
This dissertation proposes that a robust, serious treatment of Southern conservatism
can provide readers with effective ways to interpret works of Southern literature.
Southern writers have always dealt with issues we might identify as “conservative,”
and scholars have shown us three typical ways of Southern writers approaching conservatism. First, some writers have treated conservatism as one of many characteristics
of the South; their treatments of conservatism have been part of their descriptive
project. Other writers have used conservatism for more didactic, political purposes,
whether that be showing the South’s sins or arguing that the South’s conservative
character makes it a distinct, and superior, part of the modern American Republic. I argue that we can see a fourth means for how some writers utilize Southern
conservatism. Some writers feel a sense of deep and significant alienation from the
South, yet they recognize something in it that keeps them from flatly decrying or
repudiating it. Many of these writers find in the Southern conservative tradition a
means for making sense of how to live in this alienating, disorienting world. But
to find the good in the Southern tradition, these writers must critically engage and
reinterpret the Southern conservative tradition, taking lessons from its core tenets
and applying them to particular exigencies, challenges, and situations in which they
find themselves. Ultimately, because these authors are arguing not for a return to
the past, but for a critical reappraisal of the usefulness of the past in terms of present
exigencies, they must face the possibility of their project’s failure. Further, because
Southern conservatism represents a way of thinking so radically at odds with the
American vision of progress and infinite possibility, these writers must also face an-
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other reality—even if they can succeed in re-interpreting the Southern conservative
tradition for the exigencies of their current moment, they are inevitably superfluous,
vis-à-vis the culture in which they live.
This project examines three such writers: William Alexander Percy, Walker Percy,
and Peter Taylor. These writers navigate their own sense of superfluity and their own
idiosyncratic reinterpretations of the Southern conservative tradition in order to find
spaces of existential stability and meaning in a changed and changing South. I set up
the terms of the argument in the introduction, including providing a brief overview
of what “Southern conservatism” is. I then proceed to analyze William Alexander
Percy’s memoir, Lanterns on the Levee; works from both Peter Taylor’s early and late
periods (including his Pulitzer Prize-winning novel, A Summons to Memphis); and
two of Walker Percy’s novels, The Last Gentleman and Love in the Ruins, in terms
of how these writers reinterpretations of the Southern conservative tradition allows
them to arrive at what intellectual historian and rhetorician Richard Weaver calls a
“theory for living” within the contexts of a changed and changing South that marks
individuals like these writers as increasingly superfluous.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1

“. . . a hall hung with splendid tapestries in which no one would care to
live; but from them we can learn something of how to live.” Richard
Weaver, The Southern Tradition at Bay
In the second decade of the 21st century, the history of the American South continues to be written, at least in part, in terms of its distinctiveness vis-à-vis the rest
of United States. A significant portion of this distinctiveness is connected to the
South’s conservatism. Despite immense demographic and economic changes over the
past forty years, changes that have made Southern states look and work in ways
that are more similar to their Midwestern and Eastern counterparts than not, our
national punditry still regards Virginia and North Carolina’s recent emergence as
“purple” states an intriguing, and even surprising, electoral phenomenon. Yet on
the local and state levels, even these two states are often as politically conservative
as their neighbors in the Deep South. Even such simplistic analysis illustrates that
the South, even in the second decade of the 21st century, continues to be “conservative,” and to be a Southerner continues to demand contending with the effects of
conservatism on a person’s own life, no matter her or his individual beliefs.
To say that Southerners contend with conservatism in their own lives is not a
particularly insightful or original thought, yet the ways in which Southern artists have
dealt with the conservatism of their native section forms one of the most intriguing
aspects of their work. This is especially true if we understand that conservatism
is not merely a political phenomenon, but rather representative of a broad range
of socio-cultural thinking. Contending with Southern conservatism has long been
a feature of Southern literature, finding real significance after the Civil War. That
conflict’s undoing of the old order produced a South that necessarily had to question
the direction of its social, cultural, and economic development. As liberalization of
some sort was almost a certain, the central questions for the South after the Civil
War were what, if any, aspects of the old conservative order would be retained. While
2

no subsequent event had an effect as profound as the Civil War, a steady series of
challenges to the South’s economic, social, and political orders would continue to
cause Southerners to ask questions about how to deal with what remained of the
region’s conservative heritage. The literary artist plays a paramount role in both
examining these questions and investigating the consequences of the answers.
Treatments of conservatism have appeared in three major ways in Southern literature since Reconstruction, ways that critics have long recognized and dealt with
through a variety of sophisticated approaches. First, Southern writers have examined the South’s conservatism as one of the many features that makes up the region’s
(often ironic) character. This descriptive approach seems to be the primary mode
through which the majority of Southern writers explore the South’s conservatism,
and is seen in the work of its central literary figures—writers like Faulkner, Welty,
and O’Connor. Secondly, some authors have approached Southern conservatism by
clearly articulating and caustically attacking its connections to social injustice; this
progressive approach results in the politically-charged work of Lillian Smith, Richard
Wright, and others. Thirdly, some writers have produced works that fully embrace
the conservative aspects of the South, dogmatically putting Dixie, and its ideas, into
stark contrast with what they see as Yankee ideologies: finance capitalism, centralized
governmental power, and quixotic “social engineering” experiments, amongst others.
This ideologically conservative approach is seen in the work of writers like Thomas
Dixon and Donald Davidson.
This dissertation presents a fourth possibility for how Southern writers can and
have dealt with the South’s conservative aspects in their work: in some cases, authors have engaged Southern conservatism not as something epiphenomenal to the
experience of Southern life or as something with primarily political consequences,
but rather as a robust and multifaceted tradition that, when approached with sober
and critical assessment, can positively shape how individual Southerners understand
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their often precarious placement within their communities. For these writers, Southern conservatism provides a means for creating a space of existential stability and
meaning—that is, by engaging Southern conservatism, they are able to find ways of
making sense of their places within a South from which they often feel a deep sense
of alienation. The sources and manifestations of these writers’ senses of alienation
are largely idiosyncratic. But despite this, they all show a thoughtful, critical connection with the foundational tenets of Southern conservatism—and not a passive
acceptance of some particular iteration of the tradition tied to a particular moment
in the South’s history—as a way of resisting the existentially destructive consequences
of their alienation.
To be clear, I am not arguing that theirs is necessarily conservative literature,
work that attempts to promote partisan values or ideological purity. Their work
may ultimately present Southern conservatism as something untenable in light of
new and ever-changing circumstances. Nevertheless, works of this sort examine the
South’s conservative tradition as a primary, central concern—precisely because of
its critical power, something I’ll treat shortly. This differentiates them from writers
of the descriptive mode, who treat conservatism as simply one of many features of
Southern life. For these same authors, Southern conservatism is not foregrounded so
as to show its very real evils and act as a means to calling for social justice; in this,
they differ from those who take the progressive approach. And finally, unlike authors
who demonstrate a more straightforwardly ideological engagement with conservatism,
the writers I’m considering here are concerned with how the foundational logics of
Southern conservatism show the tradition to be dynamic and useful in ever-changing
circumstances, rather than something that advocates for return of various aspects
of the ancien régime. This project deals with three authors who produce work that
examines the existentially-useful foundations of Southern conservatism through this
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radical1 approach: William Alexander Percy, whose memoir Lanterns on the Levee
is a standard text of the conservative South; Walker Percy, whose work is generally
considered in terms of science, Roman Catholicism, and existentialist philosophy,
rather than cultural conservatism; and Peter Taylor, whose fiction has often been
problematically dismissed as merely presenting the decline of the Southern aristocracy
in an overly-romanticized, politically disengaged manner.
In some ways, associating both Percys and Peter Taylor with the South’s conservative tradition is an unsurprising critical move. After all, these three men came from
large, established families of wealth and privilege, with ancestors who were officers
in the Confederate army and powerful and influential political figures in the states
of Mississippi and Tennessee. Further, all three writers were not far removed from
these ancestors, and connected to them through living memory—either of the writers
themselves or of members of their immediate families. As such, the influence of these
ancestors upon the cultural worlds that produced the authors was robust and vital.
It was inevitable that these three writers would have been deeply affected by the
conservative tradition represented by their ancestors, and while they certainly could
have chosen to not engage it in their work, or to treat it in ways similar to writers
in the other three aforementioned categories, Taylor and the Percys directly engaged
Southern conservatism in attempts at making sense of the effects of this tradition on
both their own lives and the lives of others living in a rapidly-changing South.
There are clear and important rationales behind a desire to engage this tradition
critically, instead of participating in an outright rejection or embrace of it. On the
one hand, the Southern conservative tradition provides these men with some utility
and value—existential, societal, political, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or spiritual—
that they find worth defending and preserving. Yet, all three writers are also faced
1

I here use “radical” in its appropriately most fundamental sense, of something that is at the
root (radix in Latin).
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with circumstances that make the unquestioned, continued, and stable existence of
this tradition—or at least the particular instances of the tradition their individual
Souths would have made readily available to them—exceptionally difficult. William
Alexander Percy was a mature adult during the between-the-world-wars decline of
the aristocracy and rise of the middle class. This phenomenon made traditionalism
increasingly untenable as a force for shaping political, economic, and cultural change;
such a situation was profoundly at odds with the world of his youth and young
manhood. Further, his sexuality was in stark contrast with the prescriptions for
manhood allowed by the Southern conservative tradition. For him to be both a
conservative Southerner and a gay man, the author of Lanterns on the Levee would
need to redefine aspects of Southern conservatism, especially in terms of high-class
masculinity. Similarly, Walker Percy and Peter Taylor were faced with the appearance
of a postmodern, and post-Southern, America, as well as a host of challenges to the
traditional ethics of the South. For them to continue positing that the Southern
tradition held value, they would have to reinterpret it in terms of these new conditions.
Of course, to understand how these writers utilize and engage this tradition, we
must first have some sense of what Southern conservatism actually is. Thus, before
moving any further, I will provide a broad definition of Southern conservatism and
identify its most salient features. After sketching these, I return to examining the
consequences of this tradition for writers like Taylor and the Percys, and explore how
their uses of it provide us with a means for understanding their work and their roles
as men of letters in the 20th -century South.

Theorizing Southern Conservatism
Obviously, a full treatment of Southern conservatism is beyond the scope of
the current project. As a tradition, as opposed to a political platform or clearlyarticulated ideology, Southern conservatism has many different facets and a diverse
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set of perspectives, making it difficult to create a universally-applicable definition for
the tradition. Nevertheless, there are key ideals and presuppositions at the core of any
Southern conservative perspective, whether it be political, artistic, or cultural. Drawing primarily on the work of three 20th -century American thinkers—Russell Kirk, the
post-War popularizer of Edmund Burke; Richard Weaver, a rhetorician, student of
the Agrarians, and Southern cultural critic; and Eugene Genovese, a Marxist historian who studied the South and the plantation economy extensively—I here sketch
out the broad contours of the Southern conservative tradition and identify its key
features.
As with any political or socio-cultural perspective, a precise definition of Southern conservatism is difficult to produce. This difficulty is exacerbated by the significant changes in the meaning of the term “conservatism” throughout the twentieth
century, especially the late-century rise of Ronald Reagan’s free-market oriented,
bourgeois variant, which forms the most readily available example of conservative
thought in our day. Reagan’s political program differs immensely from that of writers and thinkers traditionally associated with southern conservatism, such as Allen
Tate, Richard Weaver, and M.E. Bradford, among others2 . Despite the difficulty
in defining Southern conservatism, we can usefully understand it as a variant of a
broader Anglophone traditionalism, shaped by the South’s socioeconomic and political history.
English historian Michael Oakeshott provides a useful starting point for understanding the Anglophone traditionalism out of which Southern conservatism grows.
In “On Being Conservative,” a 1956 University of Swansea lecture that later appeared
in his essay collection, Rationalism in Politics, Oakeshott insists that conservatism
2

This difference is expressed by Bradford himself, who, in the preface to Remembering Who We
Are: Observations of a Southern Conservative, notes that the “distinction between a conservative
who is also a Southerner and a Southern conservative is. . . a very serious distinction” (Bradford,
"Preface" xiv).
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“is not a creed or a doctrine, but a disposition” (Oakeshott 407), a manner of thinking
about the world and acting within it. At the base of conservatism is a fundamental
awareness of human frailty, and consequently, a deep-seeded skepticism of systematic
change, as changes are always initiated by flawed human beings. Despite this skepticism, the same belief in human frailty nevertheless suggests that change is necessary
to correct social, cultural, and personal failings. Change, however, must always be
evaluated, questioned, and critically examined. In this, the conservative is neither the
reactionary, who desires a return to an idealized status quo ante, nor the progressive,
who envisions and works to bring about some abstract social and political end.3
Oakeshott refers to change as “innovation,” and brings several significant observations to bear on conservative considerations of it:
First, innovation entails certain loss and possible gain, therefore, the
onus of proof, to show that the proposed change may be expected to
be on the whole beneficial, rests with the would-be innovator. Secondly,
[the conservative] believes that the more closely an innovation resembles
growth. . . the less likely it is to result in a preponderance of loss. Thirdly,
he thinks that an innovation which is a response to some specific defect. . . is more desirable than one which springs from a notion of a generally improved condition of human circumstances, and is far more desirable
than one generated by a vision of perfection. . . Fourthly, he favours a slow
rather than a rapid pace, and pauses to observe current consequences and
make appropriate adjustments. And lastly, he believes the occasion to be
important. . . (411-412)
This description suggests that the Oakeshottian vision of conservatism is marked by
a sober analysis of the gains that will result from “innovations” against the losses
3

Traditionalist conservatism understands both the reactionary and the progressive to be operating from an essentially gnostic teleology, about which more will be said momentarily.
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that are the inevitable result of abandoning the status quo. Further, it sees changes
that respond to specific problems in particular contexts, and not those that seek to
effect change at the level of abstract principles, as the most desirable and useful sorts
of innovations—and the only really compelling reasons to pursue change.
Oakeshott’s intellectual sibling, the American writer Russell Kirk, reasons that
conservatism “offers no universal pattern of politics for adoption everywhere. . . social
institutions must differ considerably from nation to nation, since any land’s politics must be the product of that country’s dominant religion, ancient customs, and
historic experience.” As such, conservatism “is no ideology” (Kirk, “Introduction”
xiv-xv). In the words W. Wesley McDonald, Kirk’s former research assistant, conservatism replaces ideology with a “highly developed sense of historical consciousness.”
This is in contrast with the thought of liberals and reactionaries, whose thinking is
fundamentally ideological, particularly with respect to the past. McDonald notes
that, for liberals, “the past consists only of the hoary old days of socially inequitable
institutions, injustice, superstition, and ignorance. Traditions are regarded merely
as obstatcles to be overcome in the march of mankind toward ever greater technical, scientific, and social achievements.” The reactionary, who “opposes all change,”
is simply the other side of the same ideological coin. In McDonald’s thinking, the
historical consciousness that informs conservative thought recognizes the inevitability, and sometimes necessity, of change, and counsels the conservative in supporting
or resisting it. McDonald explains that whether “the conservative should be an advocate of reform or an opponent of change depends on the specific circumstances.
Change can either renew a society or bring about its ruination” (McDonald 86-87).
Believing this, the conservative insists that those who enact social, cultural, political,
and economic changes—Oakeshott’s “innovations”—must recognize the great variety
in human societies, cultures, and political and economic systems. Innovations built
with regard for what Kirk labels the “principle of variety” thus avoid “the narrowing
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uniformity and deadening egalitarianism of radical systems” (Kirk, “Introduction”
xvii).
This “principle of variety” is necessary for understanding how conservative individuals understand both their respective societies and their relationships to them.
Kirk notes that all the conservative “reasonably can expect is a tolerably ordered, just,
and free society, in which some evils, maladjustments, and suffering continue to lurk”
(xviii). This statement suggests that, for Kirk, a just society is not one in which all
individuals have equal access to all forms of political and economic opportunity, and
where steps are taken to remedy the unequal access experienced by certain groups.
Kirk would interpret a society that programmatically attempts to rectify inequalities
as unjust, as programmatic remedies almost certainly necessitate coercive actions to
be taken against certain individuals. In this way of thinking, justice is inseparable
from freedom and order. A “just” society is one in which all individuals are treated
with a minimum of coercion, thus securing freedom, and with equality before the
law—meaning that individuals have legal judgments and frameworks applied to them
identically, despite differences in their backgrounds or circumstances—to ensure the
sustainability of social order and harmony.
Of course, this thinking about the principle of variety can have profoundly negative consequences—students of the American South will recognize “tradition” and
appeals to southern particularity as concepts used to justify black disenfranchisement,
for instance. Nevertheless, Kirk’s description of the conservative understanding of
society effectively presents a recognition that all forms of social or political order
are inevitably flawed. After all, any such system is as necessarily imperfect as the
flawed humans who create it. Recognizing this, adherence to the principle of variety
Kirk describes could very well provide conditions for resolving issues of evil, maladjustment, and suffering by examining the contexts that produce these issues, and
understanding them as rooted in particular social, political, and economic realities. If
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we understand the “principle of variety” in this pragmatic way, we see the flaw in interpreting conservatism as monolithic and lacking dynamism. Nevertheless, that this
same conservative pragmatism often excuses a fair amount of inertia in permitting
the existence of social ills is undeniable, and many of Kirk’s critics argue against his
traditionalist version of conservatism precisely because it may do too little to respond
to changing circumstances.
In other words, the conservative adherence to tradition—the broad set of beliefs, norms, and historical circumstances which define societies in a particularistic
manner—is both its most promising and limiting feature. Tradition both allows conservatism to engage the specificities and contexts of a moment in a dynamic fashion,
while simultaneously creating conditions that can produce ossified, and even morally
corrupt, perspectives. McDonald explores this tension:
Maintaining this delicate balance between tradition and modernity creates especially complex and bewildering problems for the thoughtful conservative. The traditions venerated by conservatives, as [the late Cornell University professor of government] Clinton Rossiter rightly pointed
out, are continually being overthrown by the intrusion of new institutions and arrangements. . . [Conservative axioms] reflect a predisposition
against change [but] do not qualify as philosophical arguments. By themselves, they provide no standard, other than to caution against change, by
which the statesman can discriminate between what must be preserved
and what must be reformed. If the conservative position toward the problem of modernity amounts to no more than blind resistance to change, as
Rossiter suggests, then conservatism truly is, despite Kirk’s disclaimers,
an ideology—a set of rigidly held, a priori abstractions. (McDonald 87,
88-89)
McDonald goes on to describe various criticisms of Kirk and Anglophone tradition11

alism from both the Left and Right. While there are clear and inevitable differences
between these various critiques, all share trepidations over the axiomatic nature of
the perspective of traditionalist conservative thinkers like Kirk. Lacking a coherent
philosophical viewpoint—other than a pragmatic suspicion of change—traditionalism,
McDonald notes, may very well be thought to conceal “its own form of ethical relativism” (93).
Much of the tension in Kirk’s presentation of Anglo-American traditionalism can
be explained by noting that he is providing a broad and general view of a perspective
that has specificity and context at its core. Kirk’s most significant work, The Conservative Mind, features explorations of how figures as disparate as both Presidents
Adams, John C. Calhoun, Benjamin Disraeli, Nathaniel Hawthorne and John Henry
Cardinal Newman are all representatives of the book’s eponymous subject. This variety perhaps makes much more than axiomatic coherence in conservative thought
all but impossible. To understand the conservative mind, it seems, it is necessary to
understand the mind of a particular conservative, in his or her particular contexts. It
seems preposterous to imagine John Adams and John C. Calhoun as political allies.
Nevertheless, both exhibit clear propensities for valuing tradition, and its implications
for the development of their particular societies. In this, Kirk would have us understand these two very different political thinkers as both conservatives, in that each
is opposed to liberal notions of teleological progress and reactionary, unconditional
resistance to change, and that such opposition is based in each man’s understanding
of how the past may be consequential for their individual presents and futures.
This particularlist, contextualized vision of conservatism has significant corollaries in the arguments the German political philosopher Eric Voegelin puts forth in a
1951 series of lectures, later collected and published as The New Science of Politics.
Voegelin’s thinking in these lectures bears significant consequences on this project; as
it is quite difficult, a brief summation of Voegelin’s argument here, and its ramifica-
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tions for our understanding of Southern conservatism, is in order. In these lectures,
Voegelin asserts that we cannot understand the political—the ways in which societies
are organized—without understanding man as situated within particular contexts,
especially metaphysical contexts that illustrate his connection to transcendent principles of order that exist throughout human history. Voegelin is here obviously echoing
Aristotle’s notion of man as ζῷον πολιτικόν (zoon polticon), the political animal, and
is further asserting that a true politics—a science of man—must take into account
the transcendent standards by which the zoon politicon comes to understand himself
and his placement within an orderly universe outside of his own self. Voegelin thus
describes his project as following the “Aristotelian procedure of examining symbols
as they occur in reality” (Voegelin 114). By “symbols,” he means abstract concepts
(like freedom, liberty, democracy, “the people,” etc.) that have particular references
and meanings within the myriad historical realities of man and society throughout
history. While Voegelin argues that such a project is the only means by which one can
construct a truly neutral, methodological science of politics, he recognizes that such
a metaphysical anthropology is difficult to articulate in modernity. For Voegelin, this
difficulty is the result of a thousand-year progression away from understanding man
as part of a transcendent order outside of and beyond himself, and rather towards a
vision of man as self-sufficiently atomistic.
Borrowing the language of an early Christian heresy, Voegelin suggests that the
rise of modernity—at least in the West—is the long transition from man as zoon
politicon to man as Gnostic. His use of the theological term is based in two critical
recognitions. First, theological Gnosticism was based on the idea of the innate goodness of the self, and the need of the individual to recover that innate goodness through
the cultivation of secret knowledge—γνῶσις (gnosis)—that revealed the cruelty and
wickedness of the demonic Creator of the universe. The theological Gnostic desires to
divorce himself from the metaphysical orderliness of orthodox faith, which he sees as
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necessarily restrictive and oppressive. Modern man engages in a similar project when
his idealism, and his own abstracted vision of the good, become the sole basis for his
political thought. Secondly, Voegelin identifies the work of the 12th -century Christian
mystic Joachim of Fiore as the source of this move towards gnostic modernity. For
Voegelin, “Joachim broke with the Augustinian conception of a Christian society” in
which man understood himself in orderly relation with both the state and God by
applying
the symbol of the Trinity to the course of history. In his speculation the
history of mankind had three periods corresponding to the three persons
of the Trinity. The first period of the world was the age of the Father;
with the appearance of Christ began the age of the Son. But the age of
the Son will not be the last one; it will be followed by a third age, of
the Spirit. The three ages were characterized as intelligible increases of
spiritual fulfillment. The first age unfolded the life of the layman; the
second age brought the active contemplation of the priest; the third age
would bring the perfect spiritual life of the monk. (178)
Joachim’s tripartite structure of history gives us our familiar conception of Ancient,
Medieval, and Modern; we will also recognize other familiar “variations of this symbol” like “Turgot’s and Comte’s theory of a sequence of theological, metaphysical, and
scientific phases; Hegel’s dialectic of the three stages of freedom and self-reflective spiritual fulfillment; the Marxian dialectic of the three stages of primitive communism,
class society, and final communism,” among others (ibid.).
Importantly, the Joachimite Age of the Spirit represents a time when the individual will have such direct contact with the Godhead that the orderly structures
that have always governed such contact will become superfluous; each individual will
become not only his own priest, but his own Church, and (adapting the language
of Thomas Cranmer in the Book of Common Prayer) his own Mediator and Ad14

vocate. For Voegelin, such a project is nothing more than Gnosticism by another
name. In its post-Enlightenment political version, the individual replaces this transcendent metaphysical order with his own abstract, idealized vision of society. For
Voegelin, such an abstracted, essentially gnostic view of social order finds its most
definitive articulation in mid-20th century totalitarianism. Rather than being a result
of totalitarianism, Gnosticism is the natural end of a modernity that has exchanged
transcendent visions of metaphysical order, with a solid grounding in the particulars
of historical contexts, for the allure of abstract idealism—Gnosticism, in other words,
produces totalitarianism.
As a variant of the traditionalist conservatism espoused by Kirk and Oakeshott,
Southern conservatism necessarily resists the gnostic impulses of modernity; indeed it
is feasible—and even productive—to think of Southern conservatism as anti- (or even
ante-) modern. In this, it differentiates itself from the abstracted goods of both the
American Left and Right, whether it be “social justice” or “individual liberty” and
“the market.” In the analysis of Southern conservatism, both of these perspectives
are attempts at what Voegelin famously identifies as “immanentizing the eschaton;”
that is, making the final, perfected stage of history something to be realized in the
here and now, making real an idealized vision of society that the traditionalist sees as
impossible outside of the finished work of God. For the Southern conservative, such
work does not to consider the symbols which constitute a society, and thus fails to
examine them as they appear in reality.
Having considered the abstract logic and conceptual underpinnings of Southern
conservatism, I now turn to a rehearsal of its practical features. Kirk provides an
excellent point to this consideration, as he devotes an entire chapter of The Conservative Mind to Southern conservatism. Through exploring the thought of his exemplary
Southern conservatives, John Randolph of Roanoke—an individual who is of great
importance for this present study—and John C. Calhoun, Kirk attempts to define
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conservative “political policy in the Southern states.” At the outset, Kirk identifies
Southern conservatism as “rooted in four impulses: a half-indolent distaste for alteration; a determination to preserve an agricultural society; a love of local rights;
and a sensitivity about the negro question—the ‘peculiar institution’ before the Civil
War, and the color-line thereafter.” While this fourth “impulse” is the most infamous feature of Southern conservatism, Kirk immediately makes clear that all four
are inseparable:
During the early years of the Republic, the former three problems much
overshadowed the last; but by 1806, the dilemma of negro slavery began
to creep into the foreground of national politics, and by 1824, John Randolph demonstrated that the problem of slavery was linked inescapably
with loose or strict construction of the constitution, state powers, and
internal improvements. From the latter year onward, therefore, the slavery controversy confuses and blurs any analysis of political principle in
the South: the historian can hardly discern where, for instance, real love
for state rights leaves off and interested pleading for slave-propery commences. (Kirk, Conservative Mind 131)
Antebellum Southern conservatives were obviously concerned about their economic
investment in the perpetuation of the slave system, and this figures into their defense
of it. But as Kirk argues, we cannot isolate the economic interests of these individuals
from their broader political and social principles.
Interestingly, the work of Richard Weaver, whom McDonald acknowledges as one
of Kirk’s most significant critics, provides a useful expansion of Kirk’s definition of
Southern conservatism.4 This is especially useful as Kirk seemingly eulogizes South4

In discussing Kirk’s critics, McDonald notes that criticisms leveled at Kirk’s intellectual
polestar, the Irish parliamentarian Edmund Burke, can be inferred as implicitly critiquing the American writer’s presentation of conservatism as traditionalism enmeshed in modern contexts. Weaver
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ern conservatism as more or less dying in 1865—“No political philosophy has had
a briefer span of triumph than that accorded Randolph’s and Calhoun’s.” (Kirk,
Conservative Mind 160)—and sees it as by-and-large replaced by reactionary demagoguery.5 Weaver’s work, however, provides a means for understanding Southern
conservatism as a vital political philosophy even after Appomattox, a fact largely
due to his more precise treatment of tradition. By placing Weaver’s work alongside
provides a serious attack on Burke’s status as a conservative icon. While he is perhaps best remembered as a student of the South and its tradition, Weaver’s academic work was primarily in rhetoric,
and arguably his most significant contribution to this field was his 1953 The Ethics of Rhetoric.
This book’s discussion of Edmund Burke and the shortcomings of traditionalism provide a basis for
understanding the limitations of Kirk’s assessment of southern conservatism. In reviewing the “chief
sources of argument recognized by the classical rhetoricians,” Weaver identifies three: argument from
genus, argument from similitude, and argument from circumstance. This last type is the hallmark of
Burkean rhetoric (Weaver, Rhetoric 56-67). Weaver describes argument from circumstance as “the
nearest of all arguments to purest expediency. This argument merely reads the circumstances—the
‘facts standing around’—and accepts them as coercive, or allows them to dictate the decision” (57).
For him, this kind of argumentation is essentially flawed, as it holds to neither clear philosophical
underpinnings nor promotes some idea of the good. The argument from circumstance thus invites
against itself the charge of mere pragmatism at best, and crass relativism at worst.
This recognition causes Weaver to question Burke’s status as the fountainhead of modern conservative thought:
Burke is widely respected as a conservative who was intelligent enough to provide a
solid philosophical foundations for his conservatism. It is perfectly true that many of
his observations upon society have a conservative basis; but if one studies the kind
of argument which Burke regularly employed when at grips with concrete policies,
one discovers a strong addiction to the argument from circumstance. . . [which is] the
argument philosophically appropriate to the liberal. Indeed, one can go much further
and say that it is the argument fatal to conservatism. However much Burke eulogized
tradition and fulminated against the French Revolution, he was, when judged by what
we are calling aspect of argument, very far from being a conservative; and we suggest
here that a man’s method of argument is a truer index of his beliefs that his explicit
profession of principles. (58)
Weaver’s general purpose in The Ethics of Rhetoric is not to evaluate conservative policies or ideas.
But in exploring the structure of Burke’s argumentation, Weaver damningly undermines Burke’s
status as the father of modern Anglophone conservatism. While crediting the “conservative basis”
of many of Burke’s ideas and positions, that his perspectives lack principle—other than a looselydefined adherence to “tradition”—leads Weaver to conclude that Burke’s thought is only consequentially, and not fundamentally, conservative. In his concluding remarks about Burke, Weaver notes
that while Burke “has left many wonderful materials which [conservatives] should assimilate,” these
are the results not of conservative principles, but rather are merely “auxiliary rhetorical appeals”
(83). For Weaver, Burke indeed takes conservative positions, and argues for them admirably—but
that he substitutes pragmatism for principle makes the basis of his conservatism fundamentally
suspect.
5
Kirk lists the infamous Mississippi senator Theodore Bilbo as his exemplar of race-baiting
Southern reactionary-ism, which Kirk seemingly sees as the lamentable norm in Southern thought
in the 20th century.
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the general conservative principles posited by Oakeshott and Kirk, their particularistic, context-oriented description of how these principles manifest in the South, and the
idea of Southern conservative resistance to gnostic modernity suggested by Voegelin’s
thought, we arrive at a solid understanding of both the features and conceptual underpinnings of Southern conservatism.
Few works describe the social, political, and cultural history of the South as well
as Weaver’s The Southern Tradition at Bay. While this book makes overtures toward
understanding the experiences of liberals and African Americans in the South, Weaver
is by and large thinking through the “tradition” of the conservative white South, both
before and after the Civil War. In the first chapter of this work, Weaver asserts that
traditional Southern thought derives from a “fourfold root,” and spends much of
that opening chapter exploring this root in detail. Weaver’s description is lengthy;
fortunately, historian John J. Langdale provides us with a useful and tidy summary:
The first [aspect of this fourfold root] was a feudal theory of society that
was patterned after European models and which enabled the South to
maintain a stable social order. The second was a code of chivalry which
enforced distinctions and established a hierarchy of rulers and ruled. The
third was the southern adaptation of the ancient concept of the gentleman
which cultivated both the ‘gentleman scholar’ and the ‘political soldier.’
The fourth was the South’s ‘older religiousness,’ which Weaver described
as an orthodox pre-modern religious orientation marked by an acceptance
of the mystery of existence and a resistance to rational inquiry into matters
of faith. (Langdale 90-91)
Throughout the remainder of The Southern Tradition at Bay, Weaver expands upon
his initial description of this fourfold root, and explores the practical, historical,
and intellectual ramifications of it for southern culture. While this book is nearly
unparalleled in its perceptive explorations of the conservative South, it is too large
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and complex to be treated sufficiently in the present context. Fortunately, many of
Weaver’s central ideas from that work also appear in his essays; 1964’s “The Southern
Tradition” is especially useful.
In that essay, Weaver neither enumerates nor restates the “fourfold root.” He
does, however, explore various aspects of the “southern tradition” that reveal this
root in useful detail. He describes the South as a “determinate thing,” defined by
a complex “unity” that forms the South into a “nation within a nation” (Weaver,
“The Southern Tradition” 210). Perhaps the foremost aspect of this unity is what
Weaver identifies as the persistence of European cultural norms in the South; these
norms include pre-Enlightenment beliefs in hierarchy, order, duty, honor, mystery, and
human imperfectability. The persistence of these traditional norms also helps explain
the differences and antipathies between North and South: “The South retained an
outlook which was characteristically European while the North was developing in a
direction away from this—was becoming more American, you might say” (212), that
is, more democratic, individualistic, and optimistic.
As it is presented in this essay, the South’s European outlook is at the core of its
other characteristics, and this fact is reinforced by the southern experience in the Civil
War. After describing the South’s “martial pride” both before and after Appomattox,
Weaver notes that the experience of war and Reconstruction made Southerners
the first Americans ever to be subject to invasion, conquest, and military
dictation. In estimating the Southern mind it is most important to realize
that no other section of America has been through this kind of experience.
In fact it is not supposed to be part of the American story. The American
presents himself to the world as ever progressing, ever victorious, and
irresistible. The American of the South cannot do this. He has tasted
what no good American is supposed to ever have tasted, namely the cup
of defeat. . . This circumstance has the effect of making the mentality of
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the Southerner again a foreign mentality—or a mentality which he shares
in respect to this experience with most of the peoples of the world but
does not share with the victorious American of the North and West. He
is an outsider in his own country. (217-18)
In this account, Southerners know deprivation and human frailty in a way antithetical
to the American mythos; of course, it should be noted that Weaver’s concern here is
largely with the experience of the conservative, white South—Southern blacks, as well
as the various native peoples who first populated the South, experienced humiliation.
Despite this caveat, the fact remains that the experience of Southerners of all races
has been fundamentally different than the American ideal of endless opportunity,
progress, prosperity, and cultural and military invincibility.
Weaver makes clear that, as a result of this difference, the South presents an
alternate ideal of what it means to be American, based in the South’s understanding
of human nature and epistemology. This understanding also has consequences for
how the individual Southerner makes sense of his place in the natural world:
The Southerner tends to look upon nature as something which is given
and something which is finally inscrutable. This is equivalent to saying
that he looks upon it as the creation of a Creator. There follows from
this attitude an important deduction, which is that man has a duty of
veneration toward nature and the natural. Nature is not something to
be fought, conquered and changed according to human whims. To some
extent, of course, it has to be used. But what man should seek in regard
to nature is not a complete dominion but a modus vivendi. . . man is not
the lord of creation, with an omnipotent will, but a part of creation, with
limitations, who ought to observe a decent humility in the face of the
inscrutable. (221)
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While there is certainly a connection to a belief in the Divine in this statement, Weaver
does not claim that the southerner needs a clearly articulated religious belief system,
or even to profess any sort of “faith” outside of a belief in man being necessarily
limited. At issue here is a sense of man’s weakness and finiteness in an awesome and
inscrutable universe; this forms the core of what Weaver terms “the South’s older
religiousness” in The Southern Tradition at Bay.6
A consequence of man understanding his place in this manner is how he makes
sense of progress. The Southerner questions progress, and is thus connected to the
broader skepticism put forth by traditionalist conservative thinkers like Oakeshott
and Kirk, as well as Voegelin’s anti-gnostic vision of society. While the positions of
Kirk and Oakeshott can be understood as pragmatic deference to the “principle of
variety” or calculated responses to the gain and loss that result from any “innovation,” Weaver follows Voegelin in taking a more abstract approach, insisting that the
Southern suspicion of progress “stems from a different conception of man’s proper role
in life” (222). Quoting Ransom, Weaver summarizes the Southern view of progress:
Southerners are suspicious of progress precisely because “it can never define its end.
It never sits down to contemplate, and ask, what is the good life?” Progress is “activity for the sake of activity. . . making things so that you will be able to make more
things. And regardless of how much of it you have, you are never any nearer your
goal, because there is no goal” (223). Progress is a tautology that does not take
into account man’s proper—and properly limited—place in the universe. For the
Southerner, progress is only to be embraced if it supports the pursuit of the “good
life,” the Classical summum bonum. This, in turn, is necessarily connected to the
broader conservative epistemology of the Southerner. Limited both by man’s finitude
and, consequentially, by his flawed ability to perfectly conceive of his place in the
6

In this, Weaver shows the influence of his mentor John Crowe Ransom, whose God Without
Thunder: An Unorthodox Defense of Orthodoxy promotes the necessity of man understanding his
place in the universe austerely, whatever his individual religious (un)belief.
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world, the good life must be contextualized in a particular individual’s or society’s
contexts. The Southern conservative sees progress as arrested by this fact, in that he
sees an essentially flawed and impossibly broken human nature at the center of all
social, political, and economic systems and structures. Stated differently, Southern
conservatives see man’s total depravity—to co-opt an apt theological term—as the
underlying truth of all human systems and interactions. In the end, Weaver thus
helps us to see the Southern adherence to tradition, and the features of Southern
conservatism Kirk describes, as consequences of this belief.
Weaver’s thinking makes it clear that traditional Southern conceptions of the good
differ significantly from their more broadly American counterparts, and suggests that
conservative, Southern examinations often reveal the short-sightedness of American
political, social, and cultural pieties. In this, the South’s adherence to tradition
gives southern conservatism a real critical power; interpreting this critical utility
of the South’s conservative tradition is at the core of a series of lectures given by
the late historian Eugene Genovese. Delivered at Harvard in 1993, and collected
and published as The Southern Tradition: The Achievement and Limitations of an
American Conservatism in 1994, these lectures present a clear articulation of the
conservative tradition of the South, and how it provides an alternative understanding
of the American project.
For Genovese, Southern conservatism exists “as an embodiment of ‘givens’ that
must constantly be fought for, recovered in each generation, and adjusted to new
conditions. . . Southern conservatives, as ‘traditionalists,’ have espoused a ‘tradition’
that must be fought for, not a ‘traditionalism’ cast in stone and worshipped as an
idol” (4-5). These “givens” are thus significant in that they provide Southerners with
a set of beliefs about reality, but not necessarily with a set of rigid ideals. This
distinction is important. In the Southern mind, rigidity results in ideology, which,
according to Genovese, the Southerner understands “as a demagogic invitation to
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tyranny and mass murder”7 (22). We can thus make sense of these “givens” as
broadly understood cultural norms and general principles that define a worldview
to be conserved—but not specific policies nor clearly-articulated, specifically-desired
social or political outcomes. Importantly, Southern conservatives apply these norms
and principles to specific contexts and problems; in their thinking, this differentiates
them from ideologues who destructively attempt to match specific policies and some
clearly-defined telos to general, broadly-defined situations and contexts.
Of all the various norms that inform Southern conservatism, one of the most significant for the South’s alternative version of the American project is its notion of
community, which is defined through the traditionalist Southern notion of equality.
Genovese notes that “southern [sic] conservatives, like other transatlantic traditionalists, strongly prefer a society of orders based on a hierarchy that recognizes human
inequality—that is, inequality of human beings as individuals, not as members of a
race.” But whereas European traditionalists have cited this preference as a defense
of monarchy, Southern conservatives have been republicans, and have “accepted the
principle of the sovereignty of the people and associated themselves with the democratic insistence that any regime, to claim legitimacy, must rest on popular support”
(27-28). Obviously, belief in popular sovereignty is at the core of all forms of American
political thought. But unlike how they figured in the liberal, Hamiltonian mainstream
of American thought, Southern conservative understandings of popular sovereignty
and republicanism are marked by resistance to centralized authority, based in particularly Southern understandings of equality and natural law. According to Genovese,
“Southern conservatives have tried to salvage a core Christian doctrine of equality
while trying their best to smash its modern heresies.” Genovese argues that this effort
is understandable through reading the “contrasting yet complementary analyses” of
community provided by Voegelin and the radical Marxist writer Roberto Mangabeira
7

Again, we hear echoes of Voegelin’s project in these articulations of Southern conservatism
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Unger (30).
Genovese describes Voegelin’s ideas as working through “premodern doctrines of
equality,” which were rooted in “the matriarchal idea of sons of a common mother and
in the patriarchal idea of spiritual sons of the father.” This view is limited, and rejects the “hopeless quest for an equality of condition among all people” that Southern
conservatives understand as generating “ever more insidious manipulation of society
by elites that pretend to be other than privileged groups” (30). For its part, Unger’s
radical thought sees centralized power as a deterrent to democratic participation, by
replacing “the promise of self-regulating community” with “the imperatives of industrial organization and political centralization” (Unger, Law in Modern Society, qtd
Genovese 31). In Genovese’s presentation, the Southern conservative understanding
of equality is thus based in the very modern notion of individual determination and a
concomitant belief in the morality of the self-regulating community, which responds
to its own exigencies, needs, and historical contexts. Importantly, this modern notion of community is filtered through the premodern notions of kinship described by
Voegelin.
We thus see the Southern conservative views of both community and equality as
inseparable. All individuals within a community are viewed as kin, and thus containing inherent worth. However, in such premodern notions of kinship, these individuals
are clearly stratified: the role of the father is clearly defined and necessarily different
from the role of the mother, and the position of the parents is similarly distinct from
the that of children. Further, there are clear differences between the positions, roles,
and influences of various families within a community; in the place of family, we may
substitute any other number of groups, whether they be economic, political, vocational, or otherwise. But whatever their differences—their inequalities—individuals
and groups linked in such a way have clearly defined duties and responsibilities to
others in that community.
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Southern conservatism, then, is marked by a tension between premodern notions
of hierarchy and duty on the one hand, and modern notions of individualism and selfdetermination on the other. As a result of this tension, Southern conservatism rejects
atomized individualism, believing that man is an individual only in the context of
a community. Such a fact may create a coercive version of community—and in the
South, the paternalistic ideal that defended slavery, Jim Crow, and the sharecropping
system that disenfranchised both blacks and poor whites is clearly a coercive version
of community. Yet, this fact also explains and allows for Southern conservative critiques of the excesses of capitalism, of the dehumanizing, instrumentalist features of
modernity, and the possibilities for abuses of power inherent in government consolidation. This last feature is seen in the Southern insistence on states’ rights. As
Genovese notes, there are both clear vices and virtues in this traditional Southern
doctrine. “Twice in American history, state rights became enmeshed in unpalatable causes—namely, slavery and racial segregation—both of which have properly
been judged enormities and sent down to well-deserved defeats. Logically, however,
the cause of state rights stands without them. Less obviously, state rights has also
been enmeshed in the morally defensible cause of resistance to the concentration of
power. . . At the least, southern [sic] doctrine invites careful reevaluation of the structure, functions, and proper limits of a bureaucratic organization. . . ” (29). Genovese
thus provides us with an insightful analysis of the broad and general beliefs about society undergirding Southern conservative thinking, as well as positing ways in which
Southern conservatism has a critical utility in (post)modern America.
While certainly far from exhaustive, this brief examination of Southern conservatism provides us with the most pertinent details for understanding how this tradition is utilized in the work of writers like the Percys and Peter Taylor. In sum,
Southern conservatism is not defined by a set of exterior policy goals or a clearlydefined telos, but rather by a group of beliefs about man and his place in the world.
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The most significant of these beliefs is that man is essentially depraved. As a result,
responsible expression of individualism must occur from within an organized, stratified community. The presumptions contained in such thinking cannot be defended in
the same manner in all circumstances. Yet, for individuals wrestling with Southern
conservatism, these beliefs are inescapable. Further, for Southern conservatism to
exist, it must enact a reflective dynamism that takes into account both the cultural
norms the conservative society wishes to sustain and recover, and the ever-shifting
conditions, exigencies, and possibilities it encounters. Yet because it is presupposed
on transcendent beliefs about human nature and community, Southern conservatism
has a stable basis from which to criticize an unstable, ever-evolving American progressivism. Ultimately, it is these two aspects of Southern conservatism, its critical utility
and its reflective dynamism, that make it an attractive and necessary part of the work
of writers like William Alexander Percy, Walker Percy, and Peter Taylor—individuals
who find themselves in a largely superfluous social, cultural, and existential position
in the 20th -century South.

The Southern Conservative Man of Letters as Superfluous Hero
The attractiveness of the Southern conservative tradition for writers like Taylor
and the Percys is that it allows them to create a place in which they can exist as
existentially stable and whole persons. In attempting to create such a place, these
writers are admitting the almost certain futility of their position. Neither simply
progressive nor reactionary, these writers do not present a political program, nor
even a cogent political diagnosis of the South. Rather, they provide a presentation
of the difficulty of belonging. Their work dramatizes the experiences of individuals
who are clearly bewildered by the world, but who nevertheless either refuse, or find
themselves unable, to abandon the complex, disruptive situation in which they live.
By exploring the possibilities contained in the foundations of the South’s conservative
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tradition, these authors are admitting that they are neither the type of Southerner
who wishes that Lee would have gone to the mountains, nor are they type that is
willing simply to abandon the Southern past in the name of progress. Rather, they
take seriously the sentiment contained in Richard Weaver’s closing statement in The
Southern Tradition at Bay, that the eponymous tradition is like “a hall hung with
splendid tapestries in which no one would care to live; but from them we can learn
something of how to live.” The works of Taylor and the Percys profoundly illustrate
Weaver’s idea: while no sensible person would ever want to live in the past, the
South’s past and tradition might, nevertheless, provide some knowledge and wisdom
for how to live. Despite their superfluity, these writers see the likely impossibility of
using the Southern tradition as a corrective not as a discouragement, but as something
that makes their task all the more necessary and important. Their task is that the
Scottish writer Thomas Carlyle assigns to the man of letters: they are “not heroic
bringers of the light, but heroic seekers of it” (Carlyle 136).
To label these writers superfluous is to bring to bear several related observations.
In Superfluous Southerners, historian John Langdale explores Carlyle’s description
of the heroic man of letters: “despite being, [Carlyle] noted, ‘a product of these new
ages,’ [the man of letters] was ‘a singular phenomenon,’ destined to ‘continue as one
of the main forms of Heroism for all future ages.’ In view of his capacity to reassert
that ‘the spiritual always determines the material,’ the man of letters, Carlyle insisted, ‘must be regarded as our most important modern person’ and, furthermore,
as a contemporary surrogate for ‘Prophets’ and ‘Priests’ ” (Langdale 3). While Carlyle’s man of letters is a product of modernity, he is also, as Langdale notes, critical
and suspicious of modernity’s logic and consequences. Langdale observes that this
differentiates the Carlylean archetype from the “man of letters” Ralph Waldo Emerson puts forth in his speech of that name: “Though inspired by Carlyle, Emerson’s
speech betrayed a radical rather than an instinctually conservative view of the man
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of letters. Indeed, Carlyle had, in his lecture on the heroic qualities of the man of
letters, notably cautioned against what he described as the ‘windy sentimentalism’ of
‘saving the world,’ which he declared should be entrusted ‘confidently to the Maker
of the world’ ” (4). The writers I’m considering here are the “instinctually conservative” men of letters of the type Carlyle posits, in that they recognize the necessity
of engaging the world as it is, and ask after the spiritual consequences of modernity.
Nevertheless, they also do not fool themselves into thinking that they could actually
save the world, and thus resist the “windy sentimentalism” of the Emersonian scholar.
Writers like Taylor and Percys surely recognize that they stand little chance of
showing both the fantasy of the Southern past and the promises of progress both
to be empty. Their literary output shows a keen awareness of the fact that both of
these positions are myopic, a stance that lacks the ready adherence of more straightforwardly ideological stances. As their work is marked by such awareness while nevertheless avoiding the jeremiad and pedantry, these writers understand themselves
as largely incapable of enacting actual social change, providing them with only one
recourse that is still informed by their essentially critical and “instinctually conservative” stance: to find idiosyncratic, highly personal ways of existing in the South’s
present. In that, Walker Percy, Peter Taylor, and William Alexander Percy are enacting a Carlylean superfluity that allows them to engage the world as it is and critique
it in the service of searching for a means of existence.
The heroism of the Carlylean man of letters is tied to his superfluity. Their heroism
derives not from their guiding mankind toward solutions; to the contrary, it is founded
in resistance to systematic attempts at theorizing and positing rational, mechanistic
solutions to human problems. For Carlyle, this was the goal of the 18th century, a
world in which heroism “was gone forever; Triviality, Formulism and Commonplace
were come forever. The ‘age of miracle’ had been, or perhaps had not been; but it
was not any longer. An effete world; wherein Wonder, Greatness, Godhood could
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not now dwell;—in one word, a godless world!” (Carlyle 147) The man of letters’
very existence is founded in the need to push back against this spiritual paralysis, to
resist the mechanistic, overly rationalistic world modernity produces, and to reinsert
sincerity back into the world.8 The genuine, and therefore heroic, man of letters is
the individual “uttering forth, in such way as he has, the inspired soul of him; all
that a man, in any case, can do . . . The hero is he who lives in the inward sphere of
things, in the True, Divine and Eternal, which exists always, unseen to most, under
the Temporary, Trivial: his being is in that” (134).
Stated differently, the heroic man of letters is not defending a disappearing past,
but working to illuminate those “True, Divine and Eternal” things that hold sway and
provide meaning throughout time. The South, and its conservative tradition, provides clear opportunities and means for illuminating these “True, Divine and Eternal”
things, while criticizing those who fashion themselves as “heroic bringers of the light.”
However, the Southern tradition presents its own substantial limitations and problems, phenomena that exacerbate the precarious and superfluous position of the man
of letters in the South. These include the South’s complex and perplexing history of
racism and anti-intellectualism, the successes of progressive, “New South”-type social
and economic reforms in the late 19th century, and the rise of a bourgeois, suburbanized “No South” in the late 20th century. The South’s history of racism presents the
Southern man of letters with substantial moral issues, while the South’s (stereotypical) suspicion of intellectuals makes his place as a Southerner and a man of letters
precarious. Further, the economic successes provided by aspects of the “New South”
and “No South” limit the utility of this individual’s critiques of those societies, as
for many (and perhaps most) individuals, material comfort understandably trumps
8

The author of the article on Carlyle in the still-fascinating 1911 edition of the Encyclopædia
Britannica summarizes this aspect of Carlyle’s thought, as well as its inherent recognition of the
necessity of progress: Carlyle adored Goethe, we are told, as the Scotsman “seems to have seen in
Goethe a proof that it was possible to reject outworn dogmas without sinking into materialism.”
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pursuit of the “True, Divine and Eternal.”
In short, these writers face a distinctly Southern version of the American superfluity described by the conservative philosopher George Santayana.9 In “Materialism
and Idealism,” an essay from his Character and Opinion in the United States, Santayana notes that the “luckless American who is born a conservative, or who is drawn
to poetic subtlety, pious retreats, or gay passions, nevertheless has the categorical excellence of work, growth, enterprise, reform, and prosperity dinned into his ears: every
door is open in this direction and shut in the other; so that he either folds up his
heart and withers away in a corner—in remote places you sometimes find such a solitary gaunt idealist—or else he flies to Oxford or Florence or Montmartre to save his
soul—or perhaps not to save it” (Santayana 67-68). Yet in Santayana’s description
of this “luckless American,” we see a clear difference between men like Santayana
and the superfluous Southern writers I’m examining here; the conservative tradition
of the South presents a site of real resistance to the American gospel of “growth,
enterprise, reform and prosperity” that is largely absent in other American regions.
As such, while the American Santayana describes must flee to “Oxford or Florence
or Montmarte,” the Southerner who fits this description can just as well fight back
against the American doctrine of progress in Mississippi, Tennessee, or Carolina as
he can in the Old World.
However, as suggested a moment ago, a significant set of complications arise from
the Southerner using his native tradition to resist the American ideal Santayana describes. The South’s tradition does, indeed, differ from that of America generally.
Langdale notes that “the ordeal of human bondage and the anguish of defeat rendered
9

I base Santayana’s inclusion as a fellow “superfluous” conservative on how Robert M. Crunden,
editor of The Superfluous Men, describes the philosopher’s thought in the opening essay of that
collection, Santayana’s “A Brief History of My Opinions.” Crunden describes Santayana as marked
by a “sense of displacement and noncomformity,” something which “marks a major theme of cultural
conservatism in the twentieth century” (Crunden 4). A “sense of displacement and noncomformity”
seems to describe acurately the way in which Taylor and the Percys understood their respective
places in both American and the South in the 20th century.
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[the South] and its intellectuals decidedly more skeptical of human perfectibility than
their Northern counterparts. Consequently, conservative voices, rather than pragmatic liberal ones, played the primary role in the South’s cultural and intellectual
reconstruction.” He continues by suggesting that Southern conservatism, despite being rooted in a response to modernity, is also decidedly anti-modern.10 Specifically,
Southern conservatism is an “anti-modern rebuke of the pragmatist’s gnostic project
to accommodate modernity by resisting ‘certitude’ in the name of ‘tolerance”’ (Langdale 14). The Southern tradition insists on certitude and objective reality; even if
these are ultimately unknowable, their existence is nevertheless trusted. There are
several ways in which the Southern man of letters if affected by this insistence on
certitude and objective reality.
First, as Carlyle notes, the man of letters is a product of modernity. While he is a
critical figure, he is nevertheless formed by the Enlightenment, and is thus not totally
divorced from its values and methods. The anti-modern (ante-modern?) Southern
tradition stands in contrast to these values and methods, valorizing the ancient model
of the Roman statesman over the example of a Dr. Johnson or a Robert Burns, two
of Carlyle’s exemplary men of letters. Consequently, significant antebellum Southern
men of letters were like Thomas Jefferson and John Randolph of Roanoke, individuals
who were able to combine that figure with the statesman. A more unequivocally
literary figure like William Gilmore Simms, who arguably spent his entire career trying
to prove his vocation’s worth to the antebellum elite, was much less valorized and
largely forgotten by the 19th century’s end.11 Southern conservatism, then, provides
10

The South’s fraught relationship with “modernity” has been a feature of the region since its
beginnings. As Lewis P. Simpson shows in The Dispossessed Garden and other works, the modern,
capitalistic impulse that founded Walter Raleigh’s Virginia was never sloughed off by the South,
even after it has begun to present itself as a latter-day feudal society; its most vile form of capital—
slavery—was a constant and ready reminder of its modern, capitalistic beginnings.
11

That Simms, who understood himself almost exclusively as a man of letters, nevertheless had
a short-lived and largely insignificant political career reveals the importance the antebellum South
placed on politics and statesmanship for legitimizing intellectual labor.
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little room for the man of letters qua man of letters, the individual who attempts to
illuminate the “True, Divine and Eternal.”
Southern conservatism presents a second problem. While the tradition enables individuals to enact the project Santayana proposes in Charleston rather than “Oxford
or Florence or Montmarte,” its commitment to certitude and objective reality permits a host of ethical and moral issues, especially with regard to race. The stable and
certain world is properly ordered, and thus not far removed from the Stoic worldview
of gods-ordained hierarchies. In large part, the conservative South was built upon
such hierarchies, and its politics and culture worked to sustain the proper ordering of
and relationships between wealthy whites, African-Americans, and poor whites. In
engaging the Southern conservative tradition, individuals had always been required
to face the existential consequences of their own placement within this structure.
This was exacerbated by the Civil War’s end, as from the defeat of the Confederacy
forward, the stability of the traditional structures was compromised. The political
and economic uncertainties of the post-War period posed two distinct threats to the
traditional structure. First, political pressures from northern liberals and Southern
reactionaries threatened a reordering of the South’s racial structures. Later, the economic chaos of the 1890s saw the emergence of populism and a nascent class-based
consciousness that would join blacks and poor whites in solidarity. While obviously
distinct, both of these threats posited a destruction of the traditional Southern order, and upset the certainty, stability, and hierarchy on which so much of Southern
conservatism rests.
C. Vann Woodward’s classic The Strange Career of Jim Crow illustrates the consequences of these two distinct threats to the stability and hierarchy of the South
in the last third of the 19th century. First, when Southern conservatives saw threats
to racial order and social harmony coming from both northern liberals and Southern
“Negrophobe fanatics,” Woodward asserts that
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conservatives reminded the Negro that he had something to lose as well
as something to gain and that his Northern champions’ exclusive preoccupation with gains for the Negro had evoked the danger of losing
all he had so fair gained.. . . Like other conservatives of the period, the
Southern conservatives believed that every properly regulated society had
superiors and subordinates, and that each class should acknowledge its
responsibilities and obligations, and that each should be guaranteed its
status and protected in its rights. The conservatives acknowledged that
the Negroes belonged in a subordinate role, but denied that subordinates
had to be ostracized; they believed that the Negro was inferior, but denied
that it followed that inferiors must be segregated or publicly humiliated.
(Woodward 48)
Woodward’s assertion makes clear that the perspective of what the South Carolina
governor Wade Hampton called “the better class of whites” sought to continue the antebellum racial hierarchies, clearly repudiating and resisting the hierarchy-threatening
goals northern liberalism. But at the same time, by denying that blacks “must be
segregated or publicly humiliated,” this same perspective decried the threats to social
harmony presented by the violence of Southern reactionary fanaticism.
But the threats of economic chaos and class-based social disruptions that arose in
the 1880s and 90s ultimately caused this same “better class of whites” to view racial
politics quite differently. In the post-War South, the conservative vision of order,
propriety, and hierarchy came into tension with changing economic and political realities that put Southern conservatives—largely drawn from the old plantocracy—into
vexing positions with regards to their poor white and black fellow Southerners. Woodward notes that radical segregation depended on granting widespread “permissions-tohate” blacks, and as the century closed, these permissions finally “came from sources
that had formerly denied such permission,” including “Southern conservatives who
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had abandoned their race policy of moderation in their struggle against the Populists”
(81). Thus, the worldview of late-19th -century Southern conservatives needed both
racial and class hierarchies that ultimately required them to give tacit permission
to the flourishing of “Negrophobe fanaticism,” and its codification in the Jim Crow
laws. The 20th century would continue to bring economic, social, and demographic
changes that made clear the moral emptiness of this aspect of the South’s conservative character; these changes also challenged the conservative South’s conception of
an objective social order. As a result, 20th -century Southerners who drew on their
region’s conservative tradition would have to deal with the ramifications of both the
moral emptiness and waning significance of key aspects of this tradition.
Thus, if he is to draw on this tradition, the 20th -century Southern man of letters
must face three distinct problems with Southern conservatism: its moral and ethical
shortcomings, its basis in an increasingly difficult-to-maintain social order, and its
overall suspicion of the existence of the man of letters himself. Despite these real
concerns, the Southern conservative tradition continued to provide these individuals
with a means to resist what Santayana derisively labels the “categorical excellence of
work, growth, enterprise, reform, and prosperity” after the Civil War and throughout
the 20th century. Richard Weaver reminds us of Santayana’s suggestion that all men
could be split into Don Quixotes and Sancho Panzas, with the first group, “because
they serve ideals only, seem mad to men who take counsel of their circumstances”
(Weaver, Southern Tradition 129). While they see the progressive’s tilting at windmills as idealistic madness, these Sancho Panzas—Southern conservatives—faced the
wrong way in the stream of time. Langdale observes that “whereas the pragmatic
musings of [northern progressives like Oliver Wendell] Holmes and [William] James
were anticipating and encouraging a world that was becoming, conservatives are invoking a past that is in the process of dissolving and which no longer encompasses
a linear experience of time” (Langdale 14). In this, Southern conservatives were an-
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nouncing their superfluity; all such rearguard actions did for the conservative was
“forestall the extinction of his mode of thought” (ibid).
While Sancho Panza was not Cervantes’ hero, for Carlyle, the man of letters,
acting as a Sancho Panza, is the heroic figure of modernity. Yet, in order to act heroically, writers like William Alexander Percy, Walker Percy, and Peter Taylor could
not simply utilize Southern conservatism illustratively in order to forestall its death
and extinction. Invoking a dissolving past is not enough; this past’s tradition must
be integrated into the present and brought into contact with it. To do so successfully and responsibly demands critically examining the South’s conservative tradition
and bringing its essential, core ideals into conversations with emerging sets of circumstances. To understand how they did this, we must note that such actions are
precipitated by these writers being precariously positioned within their own communities, and engaged in a complex personal relationship with the tradition that gives
credence, existence, and order to these communities and to the South. To illustrate
how these authors understood the relationship of themselves, the Southern tradition,
and their communities, I draw on the work of the late cultural historian of the South,
Lewis P. Simpson.
Simpson asserts that the move of Southern literature is perhaps best illustrated
in the personal fable. For a significant number of Southern writers, the South is
defined both historically and autobiographically; to Simpson, there is a significant relationship in “the Southern literary imagination between history and self-biography,”
a relationship he analyzes throughout the essays in his 1994 collection, The Fable
of the Southern Writer (Simpson xv). In that collection’s opening essay, Simpson
explores the career of John Randolph of Roanoke, whom Simpson identifies as “an
archetypal version of the politics of the self in America, in which the self has lost any
way to discriminate between its being a private entity on the one hand and a public
entity on the other.” Simpson further notes that in “manners, dress, and general de-
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meanor,” Randolph “sought to incarnate a lost ideal of public order” (8). As Simpson
presents it, Randolph’s career exhibits a recognition of the self as being intimately
involved with one’s society.
There are two consequences of this recognition. First, an individual like Randolph
withdraws into himself when the social order becomes unaccommodating. Randolph
cannot abandon himself, cannot be anyone other than who he is. Yet, as Simpson notes, “Randolph, in certain moments of shrewd political insight, transcended
self-dramatization,” exactly because he was “sensitized by his historical awareness
of the complex interactions of self, slavery, and liberty in America” (9). In other
words, precisely because he requires fidelity to his own self and his own beliefs, an
autochthonous individual—one who is profoundly aware of his being produced by the
contexts and particularities of his place—like Randolph must also be socially responsive.12 After all, his autochthony derives precisely from the interaction of his own
selfhood with both the social conditions of his day and their historical precedents.
The second consequence of Randolph recognizing his intimate involvement with his
society is in how he reacts should the social order become unaccommodating. For
Randolph, or an individual like him, the withdrawal into the self is accompanied by
a pervasive desire to find ways to reinsert himself into society, and to bring aspects
of the past, tradition, and older versions of the social order to bear on his society. To
accomplish this, an act of reinterpretation must take place, in which Randolph, or
an individual like him, reinterprets both the social order and his own position within
12

My use of autochthony is thus distinct from the Agrarian writer Donald Davidson’s famous
articulation of the “autochthonous ideal.” Fred Hobson provides us with a brief, critical explanation
of the term, explaining Davidsonian autochthony as “a condition in which the writer was in certain harmony with his social and cultural environment, was nearly unconscious of it as a ‘special’
environment, quaint or rustic or backward, and thus was not motivated by any urge to interpret
or explain. . . Davidson was essentially calling for a lack of social tension between the literary artist
and his social and cultural environment, and it is out of tension, not harmony, that great art often
arises” (Hobson 80). Men of letters like Randolph and the three writers under examination here are
aware of their superfluity and, as a consequence, must contend with the tension inherent in their
autochthonous nature.
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it. This is the only way for Randolph to “transcend self-dramatization” and engage
a changing society honestly, while still displaying a fidelity to his own self. Similarly,
authors who engage the Southern conservative tradition in the manner I am proposing must also “transcend self-dramatization” and actively re-engage tradition so as
to re-situate themselves in society with respect to tradition.
Writers like William Alexander Percy, Walker Percy, and Peter Taylor must, like
Randolph, contend with their autochthony. Throughout their work, whether in fiction, drama, essay, memoir, or poetry, these three authors are exploring the consequences of their relationship with a society—the (post)modern South—from which
they are both deeply alienated and inescapably connected. By drawing on the Southern conservative tradition, a worldview that men like Randolph largely contributed
to codifying, these writers also themselves to be sensitive to the complex interplay
of the self, community, and social, economic, and historical forces. In this, they too
“transcend self-dramatization,” and are able to find ways to be existentially whole
individuals, loyal to their selves and their historical sensitivity, who nevertheless exist
as members of their communities.
While each of these writers enact a process of “transcending self-dramatization,”
the consequences of this project are different for each writer. William Alexander
Percy, the writer whose work I will consider first, is primarily known for his memoir,
Lanterns on the Levee. Over the last several years, many scholars have revisited this
work, and are seriously considering how it is more than merely a nostalgic paean to
the waning days of Southern aristocracy. Instead, this recent work seriously considers
Percy’s discussion of class relationships, and how his memoir points to what Robert
Brinkmeyer calls the “transgressive mobility [of poor whites] and the powerlessness
of Southern culture to stop their movement” (Brinkmeyer, “Marginalization” 228),
as well as its evocation of Southern intellectualism, race, and sexuality.
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Percy’s poetry, on the other hand, has been lightly studied.13 Though it is often
quite powerful and aesthetically realized, this dearth of critical attention is perhaps
due to its overt traditionalism. Writing during the period of poetic high modernism,
Percy’s poetry lacks the features seen in work of the best of his contemporaries: it
lacks the abstraction and intellectualism of Eliot, Pound, or Stevens, the distinctly
American voice of Frost, or William Carlos Williams’ marriage of the two. Instead,
Percy’s poetry often imitates European styles of previous centuries, often staying
comfortably within traditional formal poetic constraints. While I’m not interested
in arguing that Percy’s “Sappho in Levkas” be seen as the equal of Eliot’s “Ash
Wednesday,” I do argue that his poetry needs serious reconsideration, and that understanding its interpretation of the Southern conservative tradition provides a means
for enacting that reconsideration.
If we read William Alexander Percy’s poetry in the context of both the presentation of Southern conservatism in Lanterns on the Levee and his biography, we
come to a robust understanding of how his writing expresses his struggles with autochthony, superfluity, and identity. This memoir reveals him attempting to utilize
Southern conservatism to carve out a place for himself in the South—a traditional,
aristocratic, and masculine place. When reading his poetry alongside Lanterns, we
see that Percy is not only exploring the contexts in which his aristocratic self could
find reassurance and actualization, but also those in which his very probable identity
as a gay man could be realized, even if unspoken, in a society where male homosexuality was understood as aberrantly feminine. His poetry, by drawing on early
modern European and Classical poetic forms and tropes, provides him with both sets
of needed contexts. My reading of W.A. Percy is thus a consideration of how the
poetry and memoir compliment and expand our understanding of each. I recognize
13

Benjamin Wise’s 2012 biography of Percy considers the poetry as a valuable resource for making
sense of the writer’s life, especially with regards to his sexuality. Hopefully, this suggests a new wave
of critical consideration for Percy’s poetic output.

38

that both venues insist upon Southern traditionalist conservatism as the central feature of Percy’s overall aesthetic project, a centrality presupposed on his recognition of
the tradition’s dynamism and its ability to accommodate the fullness of his identity
without compromise.
Of the three writers I am considering here, W.A. Percy’s second cousin and adoptive son, Walker, is the best-known. A trained physician whose debut novel, The
Moviegoer, was swiftly canonized, Walker Percy’s novels and essays have long been
sites of rich criticism. While his utilization of existentialist philosophy, his Roman
Catholic faith, science, and the (post-)apocalyptic have long been considered in such
work, scholars have paid less attention to how he draws on social and political conservatism. Nevertheless, Percy’s work expresses an abiding engagement with conservative thought, especially with the conservative tradition of his native region. While
his devout Catholicism certainly integrates conservative perspectives into his writing,
works like The Last Gentleman and Love in the Ruins show Percy engaged in a deep
interrogation of Southern conservatism, its symbols and principles, and the consequences of the postmodern South’s (and postmodern Southerners’) abandonment of
this tradition in all but superficial means. As Gary Ciuba has made clear, Percy’s
apocalyptic perspective is tempered by his “prophetic conviction” and its hope of
“calling the people” away from destruction and meaninglessness (Ciuba 7). The reconsideration of Southern conservatism present in his work shows Percy as a prophet
of the postmodern South, visiting it with apocalyptic damnation and pointing Southerners towards renewed possibilities for meaning-making—and thus clearly enacting
the role of the Carlylean hero.
While Walker Percy’s critical popularity has never seriously waned and William
Alexander Percy is perhaps undergoing a critical renaissance, Peter Taylor has always
been, and remains, more lightly studied than he deserves. Born in January 1917 in
West Tennessee village of Trenton, the scion of two separate, powerful Tennessee
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families named Taylor, and mentored by several of the Nashville Fugitive/Agrarian
group, Peter was a published author before he graduated from Kenyon, where he
studied with John Crowe Ransom and became friends with Robert Lowell and Randall Jarrell. In many ways, Taylor’s work explores the patrician order of the Old
South represented by his family, and readers are presented with a concerted effort at
working through the tensions inherent in various visions of the Southern conservative tradition. Nevertheless, critical assessments like those of critic Walter Sullivan
regard Taylor’s writings as mere re-articulations of the social and cultural projects of
his Fugitive/Agrarian mentors, yet lacking the aesthetic experimentation and general
brilliance of Tate, Ransom, and company. In 1976, Sullivan remarks that “Taylor
seems at once so fresh and so anachronistic that he offers little ground for generalization. His vision resembles that of an old maid aunt endowed with angelic powers of
perception” (Sullivan, Requiem xxii), a sentiment that echoes another, earlier statement, in which Sullivan similarly laments that “Peter Taylor, skillful as he is, no
longer shows us much that is new” (“The Decline of Southern Fiction” 89). This perceived lack of newness is at the core of Sullivan’s most significant critical dismissal
of Taylor, the 1987 essay “The Last Agrarian: Peter Taylor Early and Late.” Here,
Sullivan reads Taylor as a deeply nostalgic writer, whose aristocratic characters—and
ostensibly the author himself—“take their stands and await their defeats” (“The Last
Agrarian” 17).14
Such readings seem to haunt Taylor’s reputation, as many of his books are out
of print and critics pay infrequent attention to his work. I here push back against
Sullivan-esque readings of Taylor as a nostalgic writer, instead insisting that Taylor,
especially in his early work, is deeply critical of the effects of a nostalgia engendered
by the Southern conservative tradition. This early work is a literature of existential
14

The tenor of Sullivan’s criticisms are somewhat ironic considering the similarities in his and
Taylor’s backgrounds, and the fact that Sullivan was mentored by another of the “Twelve Southerners,” Andrew Lytle.
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division, in which his characters attempt to deal with the ramifications of compartmentalizing their everyday existence and their personal, familial, and cultural adherence to the Southern conservative tradition that they cannot quit. But as we trace
the development of Taylor’s work, his characters find a way to undo this compartmentalization. Characters in Taylor’s late works are able to arrive at a unified version
of themselves, in which the Southern conservative tradition becomes not an existentially limiting albatross, but rather a usefully critical resource for making sense of
their existence in late-20th century America. Taylor’s working through Southern conservative nostalgia in order to arrive at an existentially useful version of the Southern
tradition is a fascinating aesthetic arc to trace. His characters at first find themselves
trapped by a recognition of their superfluity in the face of a rapidly-changing South;
yet by the time Taylor’s 1986 novel A Summons to Memphis closes, his protagonist
has found a liberating strength in that same recognition of superfluity.
Coming to terms with and being empowered by this concept—superfluity—is
something I see all three authors enacting, and investigating the consequences of
superfluity for these writers is a central goal of this project. Langdale closes the introduction to Superfluous Southerners by noting that “superfluity” is usefully thought
of as “a posture whereby the man of letters, as a custodian of language, could rebuke, but ultimately stop short of renouncing the world.” (8) Langdale’s suggestion
is vitally important: as Carlylean men of letters, the authors I’m examining here
could not save their world—the South—but they could not turn away from it, either.
Fulfilling the superfluously heroic role of Carlyle’s man of letters, they decry their
communities without abandoning them. Lanterns on the Levee, The Last Gentleman,
and A Summons to Memphis are powerful illustrations of an individual criticizing,
and even repudiating, a community without denying his essential loyalty to that community. This loyalty is absolutely necessary, as it is through their utilization of the
Southern conservative tradition, and its rejection of atomistic gnosticism, its emphasis
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on rhetoric, and its suspicion of systematic, positivist approaches to human societies
and problems, that William Alexander Percy, Walker Percy, and Peter Taylor are
able to perform this “heroic” role as arrestingly as they do. In this, they perhaps cast
themselves in the superfluous role of “the last gentlemen,” who translate the tradition
of an older South for the (post)modern South. Yet to not engage this tradition in
this manner would declare themselves not as last, but lost—lost to their communities
and, perhaps more importantly, themselves.
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Chapter 2
William Alexander Percy, Superfluity, and the
Successes of the Southern Culture of Failure
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“But our world is definitely gone, and I feel superfluous, if not posthumous.”
William Alexander Percy to his cousin, Janet Dana, 28 August 1940
Of the three writers considered in this study, William Alexander Percy is the most
obvious for inclusion. After all, his memoir, Lanterns on the Levee: Reflections of a
Planter’s Son, stands as perhaps the quintessential text of twentieth-century Southern
conservatism. Yet even there, Percy is not merely presenting a simple, wholly affirmative vision of the Southern conservative tradition. Instead, we witness him carefully
nuancing his articulation of Southern conservatism, translating this tradition in ways
that allow him to present the South as a poetic community made intelligible through
the existence and persistence of virtues, especially the Classical, Aristotelian virtues
of justice, prudence, courage, and temperance. This is an important feat for Percy’s
existential wholeness, as this translation allows him to deal with many of the most
significant tensions between this tradition and personal identity: Percy was a gay,
physically small aesthete who lived in a society that prized strong, physically aggressive, and explicitly heterosexual masculinity. In both his South and that of his father
(the “planter” of the book’s subtitle), Percy’s masculinity—a significant part of his
self-identity—is profoundly superfluous. By translating various aspects of the Southern conservative tradition in ways I will explore directly, he overcomes this personal
superfluity, positioning himself as a necessary member of Delta society.
Yet, as the epigraph to this chapter suggests, Will Percy’s feelings of superfluity
were not merely personal, based in his inability to live up to certain standards of
manliness. It was not only his self that seemed lost in 1940, but rather, as he writes
to his cousin and confidante Janet Dana, their entire society—that of high-class,
traditionalist Southerners—that had become superfluous, buffeted by the forces of
industrial modernity and the elevation of masses of poor whites into full democratic
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citizenship. Lanterns on the Levee is a critique of that new world, especially inasmuch
as Percy sees totalitarianism as an inevitable consequence of industrial, democratic
modernity.1
There are real successes in Lanterns on the Levee, such as its indictment of materialism, its insistence on approaching socio-economic problems contextually, its unabashed intellectualism, and its evocation of the value of beauty and myth in making
sense of humans and human communities. Yet many of these same successes can
be used to justify and promote casual indifference or willful blindness to significant
moral failings. Ultimately, does Lanterns on the Levee merely reflect the very sort
of petty nostalgia represented by the book’s original dust jacket illustration (an impressionistic painting of white-columned plantation home surrounded by live oaks),
which Percy himself despised? And if we find the work compelling—as I do—are we
ourselves hoodwinked by this same petty nostalgia, and in need of being indicted of
our own blindness?
To answer such questions, we must recognize that the utility and attractiveness
of William Alexander Percy’s project, both in his memoir and his under-studied
poetry, are not in its critique of modern society. Certainly, there are real problems
with (post)industrial modernity, many of which Percy cogently identifies, even if his
unwillingness (or inability) to engage the irony of his positions nullifies his critical
power.2 Yet, to my reading, nothing in Lanterns suggests that Percy sees his society,
and the Southern conservative tradition on which it is built, as things that can be
brought to bear as correctives to the reactionary excess and increasingly bourgeois
1

For more on Percy’s understanding of totalitarianism, see the chapter on Percy in Robert
Brinkmeyer’s The Fourth Ghost.
2

I’m reminded of Eugene Genovese’s statement about the “finest values of the Southern tradition”: these all require “a total break with its legacy of racism” (Genovese 9). To do so obviously
requires that Southern conservatives are clear about the tradition’s sins and self-defeating ironies.
Genovese, unlike Percy, is profoundly aware of these ironies, going so far as to suggest that a failure
to engage such issues will destroy, “in a single stroke, the republicanism that Southern conservatives
themselves insist is necessary to social order” (ibid.).
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mediocrity of the South between the World Wars. To the contrary, the melancholy
tone of the book suggests a resigned memorialization of defeat, without even the
Lost Cause hope of Deo vindice. But if we view Percy as a version of the Carlylean
man of letters—he who is not a “heroic bringer of the light, but a heroic seeker” of
it—we come to see his project as an exploration of how to make sense of the self in a
society from which one feels “superfluous, if not posthumous,” and how to live as an
existentially whole individual in such a world.
All of this brings us back to perhaps the most significant irony in Will Percy’s
work—that his elegant (if fraught) defenses of the traditionalist South idealize a
society that had no place for men like him. Yet it is this seeming tension, between
his own manhood and his laudatory evocation of the society of his fathers, that
points to why Percy’s work demonstrates such an affinity for Southern conservatism.
For William Alexander Percy, the Southern conservative tradition exists as the warp
upon which the complex woof of his sexuality, sense of familial honor, and aesthetic
interests are interwoven, producing the messy tapestry that is his own self. All of
these various aspects are key to Percy’s identity, and through engaging the Southern
tradition critically, he is able to ensure their coexistence in an existentially stable
manner. Through reading Lanterns on the Levee in detail and giving a few intriguing
glances at his poetry, we see how Percy enacts this process of translation.
Percy’s translation of the Southern conservative tradition draws upon certain
pertinent features of that tradition; chief among these is the Southern conservative
understanding of community. As Eugene Genovese asserts, the Southern tradition
makes sense of community as the modern desire for individual determinism and selfgovernance filtered through premodern notions of kinship, duty, and obligation. The
Stoic philosophy of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus had a profound effect
on the aristocratic South—and particularly the Percy family.3 Stoicism’s conception
3

See Bertram Wyatt-Brown’s excellent The House of Percy for a detailed exploration of the
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of gods-ordained hierarchy emphasizes the order required by premodern notions of
community, while its insistence upon personal honor makes the modern notions of
individual determination feasible within the circumscribed contexts of order. While
it would be inaccurate to say that the Southern conservative notion of community is
necessarily Stoic, it is clear that Stoic honor gave Will Percy a means for responsively
engaging the Southern community’s traditional norms. Percy comes to translate these
Stoic notions into an aesthetic, rather than moral or socioeconomic, vision, allowing
him to articulate an understanding of community that understands the interplay of
hierarchy, order, and individual determination as the working out of personal and
communal tensions in an essentially poetic manner.
Percy also translates the South’s traditional notions of virtue, unraveling the harmonious unity of pagan and Christian that Allen Tate describes in “The New Provincialism” as “a peculiar balance of Greek culture and Christian other-worldliness, both
imposed by Rome upon the northern barbarians. It was this special combination that
made European civilization, and it was this that men communicated in the act of living together” (Tate, “Provincialism” 538). Unsurprisingly, one of the most significant
consequences of this “peculiar balance” was the West’s virtue ethics, especially as
these serve to govern “the act of living together.” The end of Christian ethics is what
St. Paul describes as working out one’s own salvation, achieved through God’s grace
and man’s pursuit of faith, hope, and charity. In contrast, the end of classical ethics
is the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia, achieved through the active cultivation of
prudence, temperance, courage, and justice. These two systems are harmonized in
the thinking of St. Thomas Aquinas, especially in the Prima Secundae Partis of his
mammoth Summa Theologica.4 Percy’s vision of Southern virtue rejects the salvific
aspects of Christianity while holding to its notions of suffering; it seeks to cultivate
connections between Stoicism and the Percys.
4
Whether or not Percy read Aquinas, his familial and cultural setting ensure that he would have
certainly been familiar with the Angelic Doctor’s unity of pagan and Christian virtues.
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exclusively pagan virtues, and thus hopes for eudaimonia, and not Eternal Life, as
the ultimate reward.
While there are other ways in which Percy translates the Southern conservative
tradition—like his presentation of the Delta as a cosmopolitan, rather than provincial,
society that has been undermined by Yankee and poor white interlopers, whom he
lumps together in a rather elegant rhetorical flourish as “Anglo-Saxons”—they grow
out of these two reconfigured aspects. As we will see, Walker Percy and Peter Taylor
also enact their processes of translating the Southern conservative tradition largely
through their reconsidering the South’s notions of community and virtue. Will Percy’s
project is thus important, as it points to the ways through which other, later writers
would also take up the task of engaging Southern conservatism critically, translating
various aspects of it for use in the specific contexts of their lives. Yet it is also powerful
in another way, one that presents us with a means of reading Percy that finds him
to be useful, attractive, and challenging despite his failures as a social critic: it is
through these interconnected acts of translation and representation that Percy is able
to find meaning and existential wholeness.

The Poetic Community of the Plantation
William Alexander Percy’s clearest commentary on community is also one of the
passages for which his critics would likely be quickest to chastise him—“Planters,
Share-Croppers, and Such,” the twenty-first chapter of Lanterns on the Levee. Here,
Percy describes the social, communal, and economic conditions on Trail Lake, the
3,000-acre cotton plantation he managed after his father’s death and for the rest of
his life. In managing a plantation, Will continues a family tradition: his grandfather,
“Fafar,” and later his father Leroy, had managed the old “Percy Place” (another
plantation, not to be confused with Trail Lake), after Emancipation by “offering
[Fafar’s] ex-slaves a partnership,” with “simple” terms:
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I have land which you need, and you have muscle which I need; let’s put
what we’ve got in the same pot and call it ours. I’ll give you all the land
you can work, a house to live in, a garden plot and room to raise chickens,
hogs, and cows if you can come by them, and all the wood you want to
cut for fuel. I’ll direct and oversee you. I’ll get you a doctor when you
are sick. Until the crop comes in I’ll try to keep you from going hungry or
naked in so far as I am able. I’ll pay the taxes and I’ll furnish the mules
and plows and gear and whatever else is necessary to make a crop. This
is what I promise to do. You will plant and cultivate and gather this crop
as I direct. This is what you will promise to do. When the crop is picked,
half of it will be mine and half of it yours. If I have supplied you with
money or food or clothing or anything else during this year, I will charge
it against your half of the crop. . . If the price of cotton is good, we shall
both make something. If it is bad, neither of us will make anything, but I
shall probably lose the place and you will have nothing to lose. It’s a hard
contract. . . but it’s just and self-respecting and if we both do our part and
have a little luck we can prosper under it. (Percy, Lanterns 275-76)
While such a contract is clearly rife with opportunities for abuse (thus the rightfully infamous reputation sharecropping holds in the American historical memory),
Percy focuses on the stated goal of shared risks and shared profits, and of the notion of the plantation as “ours.” In his mind, this ideal forms the foundation of
“the most moral system under which human beings can work together” (278), and
that it seems “to offer as humane, just, self-respecting, and cheerful a method of
earning a living as human beings are likely to devise” (280). Setting aside the problematic economics of Percy’s idealized vision of sharecropping,5 it is nevertheless
5

As the descendant of poor white sharecroppers whose family history records the abuses of
this system, I find Percy’s idealism at best laughably naive, and at worst despicable in its willful
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clear that his description of this system also illustrates his understanding of community. In short, William Alexander Percy understood community as a poetic, rather
than socio-economic, force. The most pertinent aspects of the “simple” terms of
this agreement are its evocations of dignity, duty, and mutual obligation—abstract
notions better understood through art than through economics. Inasmuch as this vision is poetic, Percy shows himself translating the traditional Southern conservative
definition of community: he shifts its central aspect away from considering individuals
in terms of an interplay between premodern notions of kinship and modern notions
of self-determination, instead focusing on a tension between literal and metaphorical
understandings individuals and their roles within communities. The New Critical
thinking of another well-known Southern conservative, Allen Tate, provides a basic
means for understanding Percy’s notion of community.
In “Tension in Poetry,” an essay from 1941’s Reason in Madness, Tate excoriates
what he calls “the fallacy of communication,” an aesthetic flaw that produces confused
relationships between poetic language and poetic objects. Poems that exemplify this
flaw “arouse an affective state in one set of terms, and suddenly an object quite
unrelated to those terms gets the benefit of it” (Tate 131). For Tate, such works
are ultimately merely sentimental, communicating a connection between the poet
and “persons for whom the lines are the occasion of feelings shared by them and the
poet,” and largely empty of meaning for those who do not share the poet’s feelings
(131). This poetic flaw results from “the irresponsible denotations of words,” by which
Tate means an escapist over-reliance on symbol, metaphor, and suggestion. Because
of this stance, the poet, with only “a vague grasp of the ‘real’ world,” is unable to
make sense of existence except by sentimental experience. A corollary poetic fallacy
ignorance. Nevertheless, I must admit that I do find a system of shared responsibility, shared profits,
small-scale ownership, and communitarian dignity—such as the ideal here presented by Percy, as
well as similar ideals presented by the Nashville Agrarians and the Chesterbelloc Distributists—as
profoundly attractive alternatives to the hyper-competitive, atomizing individualism of capitalism.
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is that of what Tate labels “mere denotation,” in which a poet will not or cannot
draw on the metaphorical and symbolic meanings of words that have “been informed
by experience” (134). If poetry of the “fallacy of communication” is banal in its
sentimentality, the brutally literal poetry of this latter variety “contradicts our most
developed human insights” (134) and is equally ill-equipped to explore the fullness of
human life, belief, and memory.
Against these two fallacies, Tate points toward a poetic ideal: a via media in
which there exists a tension between “intensive” (literal and denotative) and “extensive” (symbolic, metaphorical, and generally suggestive) significations in poetic
language. While Tate of course sees it as the task of the poet to produce works that
exemplify this tension, he also understands it as the responsibility of the critic to read
poetry with an eye towards it. For Tate, poor criticism would be like that of the “Platonist” who takes Marvell’s “To His Coy Mistress” as merely indicative of “immoral
behavior,” as this makes sense of the poem only in terms of its “extensive” significations, and thus performs the critical equivalent of the fallacy of communication (135).
Good criticism recognizes the presence of immorality in the poem, but also holds this
“extensive” meaning in tension with the literal significance of the words themselves,
which provide “an insight into one phase of the human predicament—the conflict of
sensuality and asceticism” (135). By recognizing and focusing on this tension, the
successful critic has ignored neither the (very real) moral consequences of the poem
nor its (very powerful) evocation of two inimical, though necessarily linked, human
impulses. Holding these in tension, the critic comes to a fuller understanding of the
poem, seeing how a great poet—like Marvell—asks us to examine the questions posed
by the tension of extensive and intensive meanings.
Percy’s poetry shows an attempt at engaging this sort of tension, and his presentations of community in Lanterns are a critical project much like the one Tate
advocates for poetry. However, instead of making sense of intensive and extensive
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meaning of language, Percy “reads” the roles of individuals within his community,
observing and analyzing the consequences of how individuals live within these roles.
Stated differently, the poetic logic of Percy’s communal ideal sees individuals as having intrinsically-defined social roles; in this, of course, Percy is a typical Southern
conservative. But he also attaches metaphorical and symbolic significance to these
roles—and sees the tension between the symbolic and literal significance of these roles
as the means by which individuals make sense of their place in a society. In this, we
see Percy doing something atypical for a conservative Southerner. Instead of merely
restating traditional, prescribed notions of community, he puts forth a poetic logic
of conservative Southern community that allows an aesthete to be an arbiter and
interpreter of that community’s conservative norms. Because of this way of positing
the Delta community, Percy is not excluded from membership nor finding himself in
a vexed position within it. To the contrary, he becomes a necessary and normative
member of a poetically conservative Southern community.
To see how this works, we should first consider the ways in which Percy uses poetry
to present his specific community of the Mississippi Delta. While many of his Delta
Sketches at first glance appear to be straightforward and sentimental idylls, a closer
examination reveals a deep feeling of ambivalence about place running throughout
these poems. In thus examining the “tension” of these poems, we see Percy attempting to rectify complex feelings about the Delta. And while the complexity of
Percy’s feelings about his ancestral community should not suprise us, understanding
the way in which he explores this tension helps us make sense of the ways in which
he understands others’ places—both symbolic and literal—within the Delta.
The opening poem from Delta Sketches, “In the Delta,” provides an illustration of
Percy’s use of poetic tension. A cursory glance might see this poem as bad pastoralism, merely describing the Delta in romantic, idealized terms. Consider the opening
stanzas:
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The river country’s wide and flat
And blurred ash-blue with sun,
And there all work is dreams come true.
All dreams are work begun.
The silted river made for us
The black and mellow soil
And taught us as we conquered him
Courage and faith and toil.
The river town that water oaks
And myrtles hide and bless
Has broken every law except
The law of kindliness.

(Percy, “In the Delta” 273)

These lines might support the unreflective, cursory reading mentioned a moment ago.
But such an interpretation is flawed, in that it focuses too closely on the first two
lines in each stanza. While these initial lines evoke the literal, physical characteristics
of the Delta (and do so in language that is perhaps overly romantic), the final lines
of each point to the effect of this place upon its people. This poem suggests that the
people of the Delta are produced by the land and its demands; theirs is a character
created by toil, virtue, and the sort of benevolent harshness that permits breaking
“every law except/The law of kindliness.” Percy joins place and people through the
use of a simple abcb rhyme scheme, suggesting the inseparability of this union and
emphasizing the unavoidable ways in which place works to define and proscribe individuals; in the first stanza, for example, dreams are connected to the harsh Southern
sun. Such connections are unsurprising in what is essentially a pastoral poem, but
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Percy rejects the rhapsodic evocations of pastoral leisure and beauty we might expect.
The Delta is not a place of leisure and comfort, but rather a place of labor, conquest,
and “dreams” not of rest, but of the chance to begin toiling yet again. If “In the
Delta” is a pastoral poem, it is one that recalls the “Et in Arcadia ego” of Vergil,
reminding us that even in the most beautiful of places, the harshness of existence is
inescapable, a part of the beauty of the landscape, and a defining aspect of the lives
of those who people a place.
If the opening stanzas of the poem point out the painful tension between beauty
and the reality of human existence within a pastoral landscape, the final stanzas
express a curious invitation:
O friend, who loves not much indoors
Or lamp-lit, peopled ways,
What of a field and house to pass
Our residue of days?
We’d learn of fret and labor there
A patience that we miss
And be content content to be
Nor wish nor hope for bliss.
With the immense untrammelled sun
For brother in the fields,
And every night the stars’ crusade
Flashing to us their shields,
We’d meet, perhaps, some dusk as we
Turned home to well-earned rest,
Unhurried Wisdom, tender-eyed,
A pilgrim and our guest.
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(274)

Here, the poem calls to those who are outside of the Delta, who presumably exist
within urban modernity. The Delta offers them a place of escape, but an escape from
the “indoors” and its connotations of leisure, comfort, and security, heading instead
toward fretting, labor, and the harshness and companionship of the South’s “immense
untrammelled sun.” The latter half of “In the Delta” thus suggests that “hope for
bliss” is something naive, and perhaps even an expression of vice. Contentment, born
of the reality of toil and an acceptance of human finiteness (“Our residue of days”),
is the only responsible desire, and the only one that brings us to “Wisdom,” the chief
and source of all virtues.
Thus, we have a poem that points extensively towards what Percy understands as
the flawed promises and abstract ideals of modernity, that pushes against its creature
comforts, and indicts it for lacking virtues like wisdom and courage. Yet intrinsically,
the poem makes clear the harshness, struggle, and pain that are inherent to the Delta,
where virtue is attached to difficult, concrete means of existence. Percy’s poem
transcends the limitations of the minor idyll it originally appears to be, and demands
its readers consider the ways in which their own visions of life are sentimental, seeking
to ignore the harshness of existence and the ways in which place helps to determine
how we interpret our lives.
This poem thus presents a vision of place that helps us make sense of how Percy
understands the Delta, and particularly the Delta plantation, as a community. Before
recounting the “terms” of Fafar’s agreement, Percy describes the conditions that
produced it:
After the first fine frenzy of emancipation, although Negro politicians and
carpetbaggers were riding high and making prosperity look like sin, the
rank and file of ex-slaves, the simple country Negroes, found themselves
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farring exceedingly ill. They had freedom, but nothing else. It’s a precious possession, but worthless commerically. The former slave-holders
had land, but nothing else. It’s as precious, nearly, as freedom, but without plow and plowmen equally worthless. On ex-slave and ex-master it
dawned gradually that they were in great need of one another–and not
only economically, but, curiously enough, emotionally. . . To each plantation drifted back puzzled, unhappy freedmen who had once worked it as
slaves and who were discovering that though slaves couldn’t go hungry,
freedmen could and did. (Lanterns 275)
Set where it is before the rehearsal of the compact that defines Percy’s ideal economic
community, this description suggests that he understands the post-War plantation
community as built upon individuals navigating a series of tensions. These tensions
are especially pronounced for the freedmen. Percy implicitly recognizes that they
have achieved something long desired—freedom, and the accompanying power of
individual self-determination. However, the achievement of this interior goal is very
quickly placed into tension with an acute, exterior need to return to a relationship
largely resembling the status quo ante, wherein self-determination was circumscribed
and freedom was non-existent. Percy’s interpretation of these historical circumstances
is blunt, and even simplistic: these ex-slaves must eat, and the economic conditions
of the Delta in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War have placed a fundamental
limit on their ability to do so. As a result, an external economic reality forces these
individuals into a reconsideration of the value of their long-awaited achievement, and
the freedmen must consider and navigate their newfound identity in light of this
tension.
Importantly, Percy notes that these considerations are not only economic, but also
emotional. Emotions need the contexts of human interactions to be coherent, and
are thus only comprehensible inside communities. Obviously, it would be a mistake
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to completely ignore how the particular emotionality Percy references points to his
comfort with a paternalist notion of race. But there is also something more complex
at play here, involving not only Percy justifying his racial views, but also an implied
evaluation of his own fraught place within his community. As noted earlier, the facts
of Percy’s self-identity place him outside the norms of the Delta community; logically,
he would be better served living outside of the Delta, in a community where a queer
aesthete could thrive. And while Percy does, indeed, often visit such places—New
York, Samoa, and some European communities—he always returns to the Delta. In
this, he is much like the speaker of “In the Delta,” an individual who wishes to give
up comfort—perhaps both physical and existential—in order to gain something both
more profound and more poetic. As Fafar’s ex-slaves gave up certain aspects of selfdetermination to live with some level of economic (and, in Percy’s mind, emotional)
stability, Percy chooses to live in a way that places his internal self in tension with
the external norms of his community. This essentially poetic approach to his place
within the community allows him to emotionally justify his continuing to live in
the Delta, just as he posits an emotional need for the freedmen to return to the
plantation. As an aesthete, Percy cannot simply accept a socioeconomic rationale for
his decision, nor for that of the freedmen. Percy’s conception of community allows
him to position himself—a gay aesthete—with stability inside of a society that rejects
the worth of this identity. His poetic logic presents a vision of community governed
not by considerations of the external factors of power, economics, and kinship, but
rather by individuals engaged in an internal struggle for personal meaning that is
proscribed by and in conflict with those features. It allows him to ignore those things
that would exclude him from the conservative Delta community, and instead permits
him to understand himself as a full member of it, and also to regard this community
as an essential shaper of his own self.
Rightly or wrongly, the Stoic Percy seems to see such external features of com-
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munity as inescapable, and perhaps even immutable. For him, the factors of real
importance for living in a community are the ways in which these inescapable, immutable features allow for the individual to explore his own internal worth and value,
both to himself and his community, something discovered through the tension between extrinsic and intrinsic forces. Of course, Percy’s poetic vision of the plantation
allows him to justify black disenfranchisement and romantically idealize an economic
system rife with abuses, however noble its stated foundations. We should not ignore
or attempt to explain away these real issues with his vision of community. But at
the same time, we also must not ignore the ways in which Percy re-figures Southern
conservative community to make sense of his own self, and the virtues he possessed
and valued. These virtues make community life possible, and are based in a religious
perspective that Percy similarly reconfigures from the typical Southern conservative
vision.

Die Götter, Virtue, and the Pagan South
Despite his devout youth, the adult Will Percy is, at best, an agnostic believer
whose faith seems more pagan that Christian. Nevertheless, he holds onto perhaps
the central aspect of traditional Abrahamic faith—the reality of evil and the inescapability of human sinfulness—though he articulates it in essentially pagan terms.
Percy also relies on the “inscrutability of nature” upon which Richard Weaver asserts
“Southern piety is basically an acceptance” (Weaver, “Aspects” 196), especially as
it suggests the need for virtuous suffering, an ethical position that permits him to
assert the need for myth and the importance of aesthetics in everyday life.
As intimated by “In the Delta” and developed in Lanterns on the Levee, Percy
sees suffering and self-denial as virtuous, inasmuch as they allow us to resist evil and
form our characters. While he never defines “evil” in a philosophical, abstract sense,
the content of his memoir makes clear his notion of evil. For Percy, evil encompasses
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things which undermine community, destroy reciprocity and prevent the realization of
mutual obligations within a community, and contribute to the existential degradation
that results from atomistic notions of the self. While it may be inaccurate to say that
Percy sees post-Enlightenment modernity as ipso facto evil6 , he clearly sees many
actions produced as a consequence of this worldview as evil. In Lanterns, Percy
criticizes versions of evil that he understands as logical outgrowths of the zeitgeist of
modernty. The Ku Klux Klan and James K. Vardaman are evil because their virulent
race-hatred denies what Percy sees as the mutual obligations of white and black
Southerners to one another, obligations that in his mind are ideally achieved by the
sharecropping agreement. Klansmen and Vardaman’s poor white supporters care only
for the white race—and more specifically, for the lives of individual white men, whose
primary obligations are to themselves. Whites of this sort are products of modernity’s
atomistic conception of the self. Totalitarianism and Yankee industrial capitalism
are evil, as they dissolve all meaningful existential agency, either by subsuming the
individual self to the collective or breaking men into hyper-individualized selves whose
exercise of control is little more than choosing what to buy next. Both of these systems
result from modernity’s worship of rationality and leveling efficiency. Percy recognizes
that there may be a perverse sort happiness that accompanies these modern notions;
but because they are evil, and contribute to the destruction of the truest parts of a
man’s self, they must be resisted, even if that results in suffering under the “immense,
untrammeled sun.”
To assert and attend to the truest part of the self, evil must be resisted, even
if such resistance is marked by Quixotic futility. For the Stoic Percy, suffering and
failure are parts of character-formation and, ultimately, the performance of duty. This
is virtuous suffering, and its various aspects are mutually reinforcing—the character
6

Whether or not he does is a question that cannot be answered by the works Percy left to
posterity.
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that allows us to perform our duty insists that we resist evil, and the act of resisting
evil is part of our performance of duty. Virtuous suffering also permits opportunities
for edification, as “In the Delta” also suggests. We learn through suffering, are made
better by it, and use it to approach human flourishing. Percy presents us with a neat
calculus: endurance of suffering is the key to acquiring virtue, virtue is necessary for
performing duty, and through the performance of duty, the individual finds fulfillment.
Percy holds to a notion of the inescapability of sin (which I’ve suggested is at the
core of much Southern conservative thought), but it is a decidedly pagan vision of sin.
As a result, he has no place for Christian virtues like St. Paul’s faith, hope, and charity. Instead, Aristotle’s prudence, temperance, courage, and justice are the primary
means of salvation, and his saints—“die Götter” (the gods) is, as we will see, perhaps the more appropriate, decidedly pagan term than “saints”—demonstrate these
virtues. Percy thus unravels the harmoniously dual character of the traditionalist
South, presenting the Delta as pagan; where he does show us traditional Abrahamic
faith, it is to illustrate the limitations of faith for overcoming evil, or of virtue being
demonstrated in spite of the restrictions religion places on its exercise. If we can
say that Percy retains a Christian faith at all, its signal event would be Crucifixion,
rather than Resurrection and Ascension. It is in the battle itself, and not in victory,
that he finds peace. Percy sees as die Götter those who fight principled battles while
being cognizant of the inevitability of defeat, and he emulates these and their acts of
principled, though superfluous, resistance. That he enacts such attempts, despite an
almost-certain awareness that success is impossible, is significant for understanding
Percy’s greater project: his casting himself as a necessary part of the Delta community from which he is doubly superfluous, but that he cannot (or at least will not)
abandon.
Percy presents us with his gods in the sixth chapter of Lanterns, “A Side-Show
Götterdämmerung.” The chapter opens with the statement that the “most moving
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book ever written” is not some great tragic classic, but rather a forgotten pulp novel,
In Silken Chains. Percy admits that the novel was desperately obscure in his own
day:
No one ever read it except Aunt Nana and me, and we never finished
it. The heroine’s beauty—raven hair, magnolia skin, purple eyes—made
you feel like the string section of the orchestra, and she was in deep
trouble, I don’t remember what about, but it was not her fault. Aunt Nana
had been reading this gem to me for weeks and we had just reached an
unspeakably poignant climax when Father appeared in our midst. “Nana,
what in the world do you mean by reading such trash to that child?”
Aunt Nana was crushed, I was desolated, he was adamant. We asked
wearily what please could we substitute, and he unhesitatingly answered:
“Ivanhoe.” He did not often lay down the law, but then and there he ruled
as authoritatively as Moses. . . Aunt Nana and I dutifully settled down to
Ivanhoe. It produced unpredictable results: Aunt Nana wept herself into
an illness over Rebecca, and I, far from being inspired to knightly heroism,
grew infatuated with the monastic life, if it could be pursued in a cave
opening on a desert. (Percy, Lanterns 56-57).
Shocked that his son is being exposed to a salacious—and decidedly feminine—
romance, LeRoy Percy foists upon Will the masculine romance that Twain wryly
insists started the Civil War. By opening this chapter with a juxtaposition between
masculine and feminine characteristics, Percy is foregrounding the conflict between
traditional notions of manliness and femininity as an important aspect of his selfformation; this conflict points to a thematic tension that runs throughout both the
memoir and Percy’s life (he is, after all, an aesthete and a war hero). The comment
about his boyish fascination with becoming a monk is also quite pregnant with significance, as he is not interested in the monasticism of intentional religious community,
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but instead in being a solitary desert anchorite. In this, we hear subtle echoes of the
loneliness and recognition of superfluity that permeates Lanterns on the Levee.7
Percy directly proceeds to add another layer of complexity to this already-rich
passage, and presents us with another important juxtaposition. Though he leaves
readers room to understand his fascination with anchoritic life as a flight of childish
imagination, Percy makes the following quite interesting statement in the subsequent
paragraph: “No one ever made the mistake of thinking [Father] wasn’t dangerous,
and to the day of his death he was beautiful, a cross between Phœbus Apollo and the
Archangel Michael. It was hard having such a dazzling father; no wonder I longed
to be a hermit” (57). Percy then proceeds to list his father’s virtuous qualities, insisting that LeRoy Percy was “the best pistol-shot and the best bird-shot, he made
the best speeches, he was the fairest thinker and the wisest, he could laugh like the
Elizabethans, he could brood and pity till sweat covered his brow and you could feel
him bleed inside. He loved life, and never forgot it was unbearably tragic” (57). In
this list of virtues, we see Will praise his father’s physical courage (a cornerstone of
Greco-Roman virtue and citizenship), his gracious, heartfelt pity for others (arguably
the central moral principle of the Gospels), and his wisdom and joy (qualities encouraged and valued by both Classical paganism and Christianity). Percy is making
clear that his father’s masculinity—those aspects of himself that, in an appropriately
Aristotelian sense, made him a necessary member of his community—is thus an exemplary harmony of Christian and Classical virtues (thus the beautiful description
“a cross between Phœbus Apollo and the Archangel Michael”). Through his juxtaposing this against his boyish attraction to the ermetic life—something explicitly
un-communal, though nevertheless virtuous in the Christian sense—Percy admits his
7

Though Percy’s silence about his sexuality in Lanterns makes any interpolation of his queerness
into the book a vexing undertaking, this passage also seems to serve as a subtle commentary on
his awareness of, and his sexuality’s contributing to, his superfluity; after all, traditional discourse
around male homosexuality posits it as an essentially feminized, “inverted” version of manhood.
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initial lack of the Classical virtues.
However, a later comment complicates this presentation, and forces us to reconsider what, exactly, Percy is doing in presenting LeRoy Percy in this way. In a later
chapter, Will Percy remarks that, as a boy, he had “resented [his father’s] unchurchliness” (141). The indication is that LeRoy Percy was himself not an orthodox believer.
In this light, the description of LeRoy as “a cross between Phœbus Apollo and the
Archangel Michael” takes on different significance. St. Michael the Archangel is a
celestial warrior and protector of the people of God, whose icon traditionally places
him in armor, sword in hand, warring against evil. Of all the familiar figures of the
Catholicism that produced Will Percy, St. Michael is perhaps the one most amenable
to pagan virtues like strength and courage. As defender of the people of God, he
is a paternalistic figure, tirelessly defending his charges in adherence to duty and
obligation. When understood from this perspective, St. Micheal appears as much a
member of a pagan pantheon as a Christian figure; LeRoy Percy resembles Michael in
his courage and sense of communal duty, just as he resembles Apollo in his knowledge,
wit, and other martial qualities. In presenting his father, an exemplar of the traditionalist South’s virtues, as a pagan hero, Percy subtly undoes the unity of Christian
and Classical that Tate described as the central feature of Western civilization. The
adult Will Percy thus understands his youthful attraction to Christian virtues, especially those represented by ermetic life, as a character flaw. As a boy, he lacked
the Classical virtues, and it is exactly those that need cultivation for Percy to lessen
the existential burden of of his doubly superfluous existence and become a necessary
member of the Delta’s poetic community. To learn how to cultivate these, he must
look to his Götter.
In the next chapter, “A Small Boy’s Heroes,” Percy recounts stories of the men of
his father’s social circle, and provides multiple anecdotes that illustrate the qualities
that include them in his pantheon. While many of these passages are the most
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plainly nostalgic in the entire memoir, the chapter’s ending posits an intriguing further
reflection on aristocratic virtue. Recalling a regular occurrence during childhood
summers, Percy makes the following declaration:
Sipping the dregs of a julep among the patriarchs of Chartres with the
Queen of Sheba in her summer dress shedding immortal grace—in what
better way could a little boy learn that the austerities of living are not incompatible with the courtesy and sweetness of life?. . . Perhaps [the Southern pattern of life] is all contained in a remark of Father’s when he was
thinking aloud one night and I sat at his feet eavesdropping eagerly:
“I guess a man’s job is to make the world a better place to live in, so far
as he is able—always remembering the results will be infinitesimal—and
to attend to his own soul.”
I’ve found in those words directions enough for any life. Maybe they
contain the steady simple wisdom of the South. (75)
Several things are noteworthy here. First, Percy reminds us of the productive coexistence of “sweetness” and toil in life, as we saw in “In the Delta,” further evidencing
his ideal of virtuous suffering. Secondly, LeRoy Percy’s description of “a man’s job”
is itself an evocation of the Aristotelian notion of mindfully living for the polis (“make
the world a better place”). The task of a man attending “to his own soul” sounds
broadly Christian, but does not align with any particular adherence to dogma; a man
may very well attend to his own soul in the manner of the Stoic or the Aristotelian
just as well as in the manner of the Christian. The lesson here is threefold: “a man’s
job” is contained in his duty, primarily expressed in the contexts of community; he
must accept the inevitable persistence of evil, as “the results” of his performed duty
“will be infinitesimal;” and as a result, he must craft a vision of his own self governed by duty and limitations. Percy’s virtue ethics and self-conception are based in
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his desire to do this “man’s job,” and cultivating the virtues that empower him to
resist evil in spite of his superfluity. Both of these find realization in his elevation of
paganism over the South’s Christian traditions.
By presenting the aristocratic South as a pagan, rather than harmoniously
Classical-Christian, society, Percy is positing a virtue ethic that allows for him to
practice the “steady simple wisdom of the South” in a manner that does not compromise his complex self-identity. In Percy’s mind, Classical, pagan virtues empower
individuals to contest evil while recognizing that it cannot be defeated. They thus
provide a means for improving the world, however infinitesimally such improvements
may be. These virtues also provide a means for the individual to attend to his own
soul: while he recognizes evil’s persistence in the world, he is able to prevent himself
from being spoiled by it because of the virtues he has cultivated. Pagan virtues provide Percy with a means for living decisively in the world; his pursuit of Christian
virtue would have divorced him from his world.
The utility of pagan virtues for living in the world is sharply contrasted with the
ineffectiveness of the Christian faith for doing “a man’s job.” While Christian doctrine
posits the defeat of sin and death through the work of Christ, Percy presents the faith
itself as fundamentally lacking in its ability to effect a practical defeat of evil. To his
mind, the useful virtues provided by Christianity are not faith, hope, and charity, but
rather courage and endurance. For Percy, Christianity provides us with an example
of virtuous suffering, and not much else. By presenting the faith in this way, Percy
translates Christianity itself into a form of paganism, similarly to how he posits St.
Michael the Archangel as a pagan god. We see this translation illustrated by two key
moments from the education narrative of Lanterns—by which I mean Chs. VI–XI,
“A Sideshow Götterdämmerung” through “At the Harvard Law School”—in which
he presents two of his teachers, Sister Evangelist and Father Koestenbrock.
Sister Evangelist was Percy’s first formal teacher. She was the mother superior at
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the local convent school, to which he was sent not to learn some body of knowledge
or group of doctrines, but to overcome his various weaknesses: Percy admits that he
was “a sickly youngster who never had illnesses. . . who was sensitive but hard-headed,
docile but given to the balks, day-dreamy but uncommunicative, friendly but not
intimate—a frail problem-child, a pain the neck” (76-77). His parents recognized
that formal schooling would act as the proper corrective, not because of teaching,
but rather because of the productive, virtuous suffering young Will would encounter
within the supervised, controlled community that defines a school. Unable to afford
boarding school, and recognizing that “though [he] needed the rough and tumble of
a public school, [he] didn’t need as much as [he’d] get,” his parents chose the Sisters
of Mercy convent school as the last desperate option.
The logic Percy provides here further reflects his general move to regard the aristocratic, traditionalist South as pagan. In suggesting that his parents sent him to
school because he needed to improve through suffering, Will Percy presents his parents as electing to put him through an initiation ritual (at least superficially) similar
to that of ancient Sparta; a boy, lacking discipline, purpose, and toughness, must be
made useful to his community by having those qualities—the cornerstones of pagan
manhood—cultivated in him. Obviously, a convent school is not a military academy,
much less the obscenely demanding education of Sparta. Nevertheless, Percy explicitly describes his parents’ choice of his schooling in terms of his weaknesses—both
his physical frailness and his sensitive nature—and their trust that the “rough and
tumble” of schooling will correct these. Importantly, no religious considerations are
mentioned in the choice to send him to the convent school, even though all indications are that his mother, like her mother, was a devout Catholic. Thus, in Percy’s
presentation, his parents’ choices about his education involve his need to cultivate
pagan virtues, a logic he makes all the more powerful by the specific silence about
religious instruction, despite his attending a Catholic school.
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Despite her vocation, Percy’s initial description of Sister Evangelist posits her
as an instructor in courage, justice, and prudence rather than faith, hope and charity. She is “a midget of a nun with the valor and will-power of an Amazon, who
taught every class, held prayers, occasionally larruped the wayward with the thin
cane pointer she always carried, bullied, cajoled, and beguiled us unflaggingly and
devotedly" (77). Obviously, Sister Evangelist’s possession of these cardinal virtues
does not mean that she holds them in exclusion from her Christian virtues; after all,
St. Thomas had formally married these two sets of virtues in the Summa more than
six centuries earlier. Yet Percy chooses to present Sister Evangelist as an "Amazon,"
a fierce female exemplar of the virtue he needed to do the “man’s job” he learned
about at his father’s feet, at the exclusion of presenting her as a woman religious.
Sister Evangelist is also an example of an individual warring against evil, despite
its inevitable persistence; in this, she, too, is one of die Götter that Percy looks to
emulate. “The first thing” Percy learned at school was “the existence of evil,” with
evil constituted by the “oldest and biggest boy in the school. . . a monster of evil—
cruel, nasty, bullying—with face and body so like Mansfield’s Richard III that they
published his qualities. All of us knew what he was and feared him" (77). And even
though Sister Evangelist was herself afraid of this boy and the “obscene pantomime[s]”
he would make behind her back, she would nevertheless “whirl into him dauntlessly
and whip him until he whined” (ibid.). Sister Evangelist is herself fearful of this boy,
and cognizant of the inevitable persistence of his evil; nevertheless, she resists him,
and thus proves a powerful example to Percy and others “with third-rate bodies who
insist on living uncowed in a world of evil” (ibid.). Percy suggests that her example of
resistance against the boy’s evil served to show him “[s]urvival virtues” and “defense
weapons” to be employed in the service of such uncowed living (78).
Immediately after his initial description of Sister Evangelist’s Amazon-like pagan
qualities, Percy provides an intriguing discussion of the more directly religious aspects
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of her life. Yet the way in which he presents Sister Evangelist’s religiosity further
illustrates his articulation of the traditional South as an essentially pagan community
marked by individuals taking principled—if inevitably superfluous—stands, however
impossible the odds. “Determination,” Percy tells us, “ranked high among Sister’s
virtues, and among other things she determined that mine was a likely soul and she
was going to save it” (78). Sister Evangelist’s name suits her, and Percy notes that he
goes as far as to begin imagining becoming a priest. However, Percy makes clear that
he “shouldn’t blame Sister Evangelist for my unbridled mystic fervor at this time;
evidently my ground was plowed and harrowed waiting for her sowing.” Percy’s was
eager for something to be sown in him, and Sister’s was the message that reached him.
He makes clear, however, that it wasn’t some particular doctrine or religious truth
he was looking to grow into: “I wanted to be completely and utterly a saint; heaven
and hell didn’t matter, but perfection did” (79). Even at a young age, “the Satan of
[his] disbelief was at [his] elbow scoffing, insinuating, arguing, day and night,” and his
youthful piety—his desire to be “perfect”—was not based in religious conviction, but
rather born out of an instinctual drive toward virtuous suffering. When he mentions
“determination” as one of Sister Evangelist’s chief virtues, he is positing her not
as one who spreads the Gospel, but rather as being an evangelist for determined,
purposeful struggle, and for endurance in the face of impossible odds; the Amazon
is also a Spartan. This quality continues into her old age, and Percy describes later
meeting with Sister Evangelist who, even at 100 years old, was still determined to
save his soul and still exhibited the “Machiavellian heroism and saintly mendacity”
she felt she needed to accomplish this feat (80).
Father Koestenbrock, who privately tutors the teenaged Percy, presents us with
an interesting parallel to Sister Evangelist. Like her, Father Koestenbrock’s vocation
would lead us to anticipate traditional Christian virtues as his most definitive moral
dimension. However, Percy’s presentation of Koestenbrock shows that his, too, is a
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virtue ethic that exemplifies virtuous suffering and the performance of duty. However,
unlike Sister Evangelist, Father Koestenbrock’s virtue ethic is in spite of his faith,
rather than a result of it—he does not try to save Percy’s soul. To the contrary,
Koestenbrock seems to be the very antithesis of the piety one would expect from a
priest: “He was not a saint and nothing shocked him. I used to peep at him through
the confessional grille and he seemed half asleep. . . He never was interested in my
sins” (86). Percy postulates that Father Koestenbrock’s attitude toward sin, and
his general nature, perhaps “came from his being Dutch, a Dutch nobleman” (8687). Koestenbrock’s aristocratic heritage makes him deeply attractive to Percy as a
teacher and authority figure, especially as the priest provides the young Percy with
an aristocratic example significantly different than that provided by his father. Like
Percy himself, Father Koestenbrock was an aesthete and a man of profound loneliness.
Both of these aspects of the priest’s character suggests that his, too, is an essentially
pagan form of virtue.
Percy describes how his teacher could be easily “led to analyze Ruben’s Descent
from the Cross and Raphael’s Christ and Saint Veronica. . . I don’t understand how
his love of Haydn taught him to sing high mass, but something did, and more understandingly and moving than ever I heard it sung. The magical melodic line of his
Pater Noster with its earnestness and pleading could keep you holy for a week” (87).
Through talk of analyzing religious paintings and tying the Pater Noster to Haydn,
Percy suggests that Father Koestenbrock’s piety forms an extension of his aesthetic
interests, rather than a result of simple faith. As an aristocratic aesthete, Father
Koestenbrock provides Percy with an example not provided to him by his other Götter, one that allows him to affirm a significant part of his identity that his father, for
instance, cannot understand. Importantly, Koestenbrock’s aesthetic interests do not
stand in the way of him performing his “man’s job.” To the contrary, they actually
help him do his duty, inasmuch as they provide him with a means of serving his
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community, evan as his religious vocation tends to stand in the way of communal
obligations.
These obligations take the form of a felt need: the priest feels that his congregation
needs a new church building, and ensuring that they have one will be the way in
which he makes the world a little better, thus performing his “man’s job.” But the
congregation is poor, and Percy implies that the Church hierarchy will not pay for the
new building; for many years, “the building fund remained stationary.” The Church
hierarchy, then, fails to perform its duty of providing for those in its charge, while
Father Koestenbrock lives up to the paternalistic duty implied in his ecclesiastical
title. Koestenbrock pays for the building of a new church himself, using “every nickel”
of the patrimony his “prudent Dutch father” had “hoarded” to “protect the old age
of his son” (90). Koestenbrock’s decision makes an old age of penury certain; while
this might be a interpreted as a pious act, Percy makes clear that there is also an
aesthetic component of the priest fulfilling this obligation.
Koestenbrock, as “gay as Papa Haydn and busy, busy from morning to
night. . . [selected an elderly German contractor] with a fiendish temper and an unquenchable thirst. Then began two years of heroic battle: the two old gentlemen
fought all over the place, about every item and detail, they throve and battened on
the conflict, you could hear them high up in the scaffolding in outbursts of bilingual
denunciation that would have done credit to Michelangelo and the Pope. At last
the building was completed. . . a little Dutch Gothic church, well built, homey, and
in good taste” (ibid.). The goal was not simply to provide his congregation with a
new building, but with something beautiful and well-crafted. His love of beauty—an
ostensibly pagan sensibility that the poor whites of the Delta would certainly view
with virulent, iconoclastic suspicion—empowers his performance of duty. This was
surely a powerful revelation for the young Percy.
Father Koestenbrock is inspiring to young Will Percy in another way as well—
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he feels an intense loneliness and alienation from his community. Percy discusses
discovering that Koestenbrock was an alcoholic, and how this forced him into a reconsideration of the notion of morality: “Drunkenness was bad and Father wasn’t
bad—my first lesson in reconciling the irreconcilable. . . Father was not immoral, he
was good. Suddenly, I experienced the beginning of wisdom. Father was lonely, he
never would be or could be anything else. Realizing that hurt me a lot. But I thought
Father was single and unique in his loneliness: it was only the beginning of wisdom”
(89). Simplistic, legalistic notions of sin and morality must be discarded, and the
alienated suffering felt by those like the Dutch priest and, by the obvious implication
of the “only the beginning of wisdom” line, Percy himself, must be gleaned for their
hard-earned wisdom. In such loneliness, there are lessons to be learned, like those
the speaker of “In the Delta” invites us to experience. Beyond this, there is even a
strangely Quixotic sort of hope; in the last time he sees Father Koestenbrock, Percy
asks him his opinion of the Klan:
“I do not think of it,” he replied. “The Church has been here a long time;
it will be here a much longer time, after all these klans and foolish things
are forgotten. And it is good for the Church. . . The Knights of Columbus,
worthy souls, became filled with their own importance during [World War
I] and did a great deal of foolish bragging. The Klan will bring them to
their senses. It is a very good thing for the Church.” He rose to go. We
knew we should never see each other again. (91)
Suffering is a virtue, as it chastises and improves, burning away our vices while bringing us back to a renewed consideration of our core values. Loneliness is a privileged
position, as it brings us into contact with time and opportunity for the reflections
necessary to come to such significant conclusions. Lanterns on the Levee stands as
a testament to William Alexander Percy’s loneliness, and the complex reflections on
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virtue his loneliness produced.
While his memoir is poor social criticism, it is a masterpiece of reflection on community, virtue, and the complex relationship of these to identity. Individuals like
his father, Sister Evangelist, and Father Koestenbrock are key figures in Percy’s reflections. These individuals fulfill their duties and meet their obligations, struggling
against the reality of evil and the pettiness and mediocrity of modernity. In describing their struggles, Percy emphasizes their virtues; importantly, his emphasis casts
these as essentially pagan. By presenting them as pagan, especially to the exclusion
or minimization of Christian aspects, Percy posits a virtue ethic that re-figures the
Southern conservative tradition in ways that allow him to be loyal to the complexities
of both his identity and his community: a gay, irreligious aesthete can be a leading
member of the inter-World Wars Delta, a community that would seem largely hostile
to such an individual. The pagan virtues he learns and cultivates from his Götter
allow him to do his “man’s job,” especially in his consciously superfluous resistance
to what he sees as the mediocre, bourgeois evils of modernism—the Klan, Vardaman,
totalitarianism, and Yankee industrialism. Without translating the Southern conservative tradition, William Alexander Percy could not fulfil his obligations, and could
not have fought these battles, while remaining true to his own complex identity.

Percy and the “Culture of Failure”
How, then, are we to make sense of Percy’s project—of his remaining true to his
complex identity and his community? Lewis P. Simpson’s comments on John Randolph of Roanoke prove useful here. Recounting arguments made by Robert Dawidoff,
Simpson states that “Randolph became a fateful personification of the union of the
personal and the political. More cogently than Jefferson and Madison and the liberal, cosmopolitan founders of the Republic, he exemplified the inner motivation of
his age” (Simpson 3). Randolph, like Thoreau, “symbolized the injunctive need to
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represent the politics of self implicit in the Declaration of Independence, which, endorsing the political sovereignty of the individual, implies the self-evident right of the
self to determine what kind of order, or nonorder, it wants to be in” (8-9). Thoreau
took up this challenge and became the prophet of American desire to “find yourself,” and to exist free of the supposed existential limitations imposed by tradition
and prescriptive social order. But Randolph “transcended self-dramatization,” and
recognized that the individual can never truly abandon community. As a result, the
self must necessarily be defined against and in terms of the larger social, communal,
and political contexts that surround him.
For Randolph, this played out most forcibly in his recognition of the inescapable
connections between the vicious institution of slavery and the virtuous concept of
liberty, defined corporately in the political doctrine of states’ rights. Randolph recognized that the historical experience and situation of America meant that the wicked
system of chattel slavery was perhaps the only viable defense against the victory of
centralized economic and political power, and its abusive abrogation of liberty and
self-determination. In articulating a resistance to centralized power, Randolph provided much of the logic for the concept of states’ rights, used throughout Southern
history to justify various forms of black disenfranchisement. That Randolph would
provide the logic he surely knew would justify and perpetuate a system he saw as
“the antithesis of the sacred right of the individual to be free” (10) perhaps shows
him, like Percy, as blind to irony. Yet Simpson notes that Randolph was “haunted
by the education in self-failure that inescapably accompanies the peculiarly intense
identification of self and history in America.” If he was blind to irony, he was aware of
this blindness, as well as the ways in which facing these ironies would cause existential
self-division, forcing him to choose between loyalty to the community and loyalty to
his own self. According to Simpson, this forces Randolph to unwittingly initiate a
“Southern culture of failure” that is seen throughout Southern letters (12).
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Will Percy is certainly connected to this culture of failure, and is similarly haunted
by this “education in self-failure,” as the preceding discussion makes clear. Nevertheless, he refuses to retreat into his self, and in his memoir and poetry, he presents
us with a self-consciously superfluous vision of the “union of the personal and the
political” in the South of the inter-World War years, just as Randolph did in the
years of the early Republic. And as Randolph proves, in one significant respect, to
be the superior to Jefferson and Madison, Percy also provides a more cogent example
of the “inner motivation of his age” than perhaps his most significant liberal contemporary, W.J. Cash. Whereas Cash’s The Mind of the South seeks to understand
the foundational logics of the South as a region in order to explain and critique its
myriad systemic flaws, Percy’s work forces us to confront the complex and often
messy interior logic of the individual Southerner. In his case, this interior logic is
derived from a recognition of the very real dangers of the reactionary demagoguery
used to control poor whites, and the connections between this and the dehumanizing,
community-destroying effects of industrial, capitalistic modernity. Like Randolph before him, Will Percy must “transcend self-dramatization.” Whereas Randolph’s act
of transcendence led him to an indirect—though conscious—defense of a practice and
economic system he found wicked, Percy’s leads him to defending a social order that
has no place for men like him, and requires a sophisticated, cosmopolitan individual
to translate a provincial culture in complex, and even unrealistic, ways.
This, then, is how William Alexander Percy presents himself to us in memoir and
poetry: not the simple, nostalgic writer of an encomium for the South’s past, but a
complex individual who recognizes that he is in a doubly superfluous position with
regard to the South’s traditional past and modern present. Unable to exist in the
aristocratic Old Southern order without denying parts of himself, and flatly rejecting
the bourgeois order of the New South, Percy is an outsider to both the society that
produced him and the one that replaced it. Unmoored between these extremes, we
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might have expected Percy to have become a prototype of the existential malaise
demonstrated by a later generation of American of writers, perhaps a Kerouac in
self-willed, wandering exile from Mississippi. Instead, he chooses to remain in the
Delta—perhaps out of a committed Stoicism that says that the gods had immutably
placed him there, perhaps due to the economic advantages that accompany being from
a well-established, propertied family, or perhaps because of simple filial affection—
despite the challenges this choice presents for his fully realizing certain aspects of his
identity, specifically his sexuality and his art. Percy, like all of us, wants to to live as
a unified, existentially whole person, and he knows that to make a Manichean choice
between flatly aligning himself with either the Old or New Southern order is no way
to do so.
From the home he will not abandon, the scion of one of the Delta’s most important
families refuses to capitulate to the crass, bourgeois mendacity of the New South. In
the tradition that produced him, Percy found the best weapons to fight what the
South, and the West in general, was becoming, even if that fight was Quixotic. Critics have long recognized that this is Percy’s goal in Lanterns on the Levee, while
nevertheless questioning his success in this endeavor. I’ve shown that his project is
complicated by the fact that he cannot simply use his critical tool—the Southern
conservative tradition—as he finds it, because of the ways it, too, casts him as superfluous and shows him enmeshed in a Southern “culture of failure.” Percy must
engage in a complex translation of this tradition, especially with regard to its conception of community and its evocations of virtue, while leaving its first principles—those
things that most devastatingly strike at the heart of the New South’s atomism and
materialism—intact.
Percy, of course, knows he cannot win his battle against the New South and
emerging (post)modern American order; like Randolph before him, Percy has received
an education in failure. Thus the appropriateness of the closing scene of “Jackdaw
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in the Garden,” the penultimate chapter of Lanterns. There, he is overcome at
the “piteousness” of New Yorkers, scurrying about Manhattan, made into “lesser
insects” from the vantage point of the top of the Empire State Building: he knows
this is the future, and that his world is truly lost—not just superfluous, but also
posthumous. Like Carlyle’s hero, William Alexander Percy cannot bring the light,
but he simply seeks it. For William Alexander Percy, this was a Sisyphean task;
but through attempting it, he came into the hall Richard Weaver speaks of at the
close of The Southern Tradition at Bay. It seems likely that one of the “splendid
tapestries” Weaver says is found in that hall contains the scene Percy describes in
the chapter’s final sentence: “But the autumn air is tinged with gold, the spotted
sun sleeps in the garden, and the only treasure that’s exempt from tarnish is what
the jackdaw gathers” (343). From this, he has learned Weaver’s elusive “something
of how to live,” and provides us with an example of how to make a self. Whatever
the failures of Percy’s critical project, in this regard his work is resounding success,
and we should be both challenged and edified by it.
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Chapter 3
Early Peter Taylor: Nostalgia and Vice
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History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors/ And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions,/ Guides us by vanities. Think now/
She gives when our attention is distracted/ And what she gives, gives
with such supple confusions/ That the giving famishes the craving. Gives
too late/ What’s not believed in, or if still believed,/ In memory only,
reconsidered passion. Gives too soon/ Into weak hands, what’s thought
can be dispensed with/ Till the refusal propagates a fear. Think/ Neither
fear nor courage saves us. Unnatural vices/ Are fathered by our heroism.
Virtues/ Are forced upon us by our impudent crimes.
T.S. Eliot, “Gerontion”
In “Aspects of the Southern Philosophy,” Richard Weaver remarks that “If the
time ever comes to write the definitive history of the Southern people, it may prove
impossible to find a better epigraph than the line from Gerontion [sic]: ‘Virtues are
forced upon us by our impudent crimes’”(Weaver, “Aspects” 206). This is a keen
observation, and by remembering the preceding line of Eliot’s poem—“Unnatural
vices / Are fathered by our heroism”—we come to a fuller understanding of what
Weaver is pointing out. Throughout his work on the South, Weaver articulates its
peculiar position as both the defeated section of a nation founded on a myth of invincibility, and as the traditional section of a nation built on Enlightenment principles
of progress and human perfectability1 . The South’s vices—its racial history, antiintellectualism, and perhaps too-certain morality—find their basis and justification
in its own heroic myths, while its virtues—loyalty, honor, a distrust of dehumanizing, nihilistic systematization, and a deeply-held sense of ethics and propriety—are
1

One of the great ironies of American history is these very un-southern principles were most
clearly articulated by the ur-southerner, Thomas Jefferson.
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implicated in and complicated by the region’s impudence and bold promotion of its
own cultural superiority.
This awkward marriage—between virtues that often put the South at odds with
the rest of America and vices defended as part of an heroic patrimony—had significant
consequences for the region in the 20th century. Weaver notes that “for the North the
South is too theatrical to be wholly real” (206), an observation that points toward the
logic underpinning a statement from The Southern Tradition at Bay, that the mid20th century South “is damned for its virtues and praised for its faults” (Southern
Tradition at Bay 391). What is true for the South as a region is also true for many of
its individual denizens, and the work of Peter Taylor is a rich site for understanding
the consequences of this confusing interplay of virtue and vice for (post)modern southerners. In his fiction and drama, Taylor presents characters who look to the southern
past, and its tradition and stability, as sources of meaning in a bewildering southern
present. But as many of these characters are unable to approach the southern past
in any way other than nostalgically, its resources are of little utility; their worship
of southern “heroism” casts the southern tradition as a set of existentially limiting
“unnatural vices.” Even so, the southern tradition does contain a set of resources for
affirmative, critically-engaged living, a fact Taylor’s writing also illustrates. But this
work makes clear, access to the virtues of the southern tradition depends on coming
to terms with its “impudent crimes.” I consider the ways in which Taylor explores
the virtues and vices of the southern tradition over the next two chapters.

The Southern Tradition and Peter Taylor, Early and Late
Because of the persistence of certain themes and concerns throughout his entire
corpus—family history, propriety, manners, social decline, the fading of class distinctions, the changing roles of women and African Americans, the social, familial,
and personal consequences of romance and chastity, amongst others—as well as a
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general consistency in narrative technique,2 readers may very well perceive Taylor’s
thinking as relatively stable over the course of his fifty-plus year career. However
understandable, this approach to Taylor’s work is flawed, as there is a clear and
significant evolution in Peter Taylor’s earliest to latest works, something that is especially pronounced with regards to his thinking about the South. While it is true
that many of his most significant themes and aesthetic techniques are consistent
throughout his career, Taylor’s thinking about the South and the southern tradition
changes. By breaking Taylor’s work into periods, we are able to trace this evolution
and how it interacts with his other primary concerns, ultimately producing a robust
understanding of the various aspects of Taylor’s project. This is especially true for
his exploration of the southern tradition, its virtues, and its constitutive relationship
with his characters’ identities.
A brief example will suffice to illustrate the utility of periodization. Midway
through “In the Miro District,” one of the author’s most important stories, the narrator responds to his grandfather’s interruption of a drinking binge by endlessly interrogating the old man about his experiences with Nathan Bedford Forrest in the
Civil War, as well as the grandfather’s witnessing of a group of nightriders killing
his law partner in the early 20th century.3 The narrator, reflecting on this pivotal
moment in his youth, recalls his grandfather sitting silently, refusing to respond to
any questions. The narrator then reflects on the meaning of this memory:
I hear myself going on and on that Sunday night. As I babbled away,
it was not just that night but every night I had ever been alone in that
2

I say general, as I recognize that there is some experimentation in Taylor, and his development
of a digressive narrative technique at the height of his career in the late 1970s is real. But even then,
even a casual reader would recognize the writer of 1994’s In the Tennessee Country as the writer of
1940’s “A Spinster’s Tale”
3

This moment recalls the experiences of Taylor’s paternal grandfather, Col. Robert Zachary
Taylor, who fought with Nathan Bedford Forrest and was later nearly killed by a group of nightriders.
Taylor biographer Hubert H. McAlexander notes that this experience “assumed a central place in
the Taylor [family] annals” (McAlexander, Peter Taylor 9)
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house with him. I had the sensation of retching or actually vomiting, not
the whiskey I had in my stomach but all the words about the nightriders
I had ever heard from him and not known how to digest—words I had not
ever wanted to hear. (Taylor, “In the Miro District” 166)
This passage presents what seems to be a central move of much of Taylor’s fiction
with regards to the South: many of his characters find themselves necessarily unable
to digest the words and stories of the South, its patrician past, and the attendant
social and political complexities that grow out this aristocratic world. This moment
from “In the Miro District” reveals a clear tension between the unavoidable nature
of such knowing and, simultaneously, not wanting to know these stories, a tension
that appears over and again in Taylor’s work. It is also vital to point out that
these stories, these rhetorical moments, are complex and nuanced explorations of the
South’s virtues and vices, concepts an increasingly abstract and dialectical America—
the world in which characters like the narrator of “In the Miro District” live—find to
be alien impediments to social progress and self-fulfillment.
It is interesting to pair the psychic vomiting of the narrator of “Miro District” with
the physical vomiting of Landon “Lanny” Tolliver, arguably the central character in
Taylor’s mid-1950s drama, Tennessee Day in St. Louis.4 Here, Lanny’s 15th birthday
falls on “Tennessee Day,” an unofficial day of remembrance and celebration put on by
the Tennessee expatriate community of St. Louis, Missouri, in honor of their native
state’s culture and history. Though Lanny has lived his entire life in St. Louis, he
is acutely aware of his family’s roots in the west Tennessee village of Thornton, and
has turned this awareness into a boyish obsession with the history of his ancestral
town, the roots of the Tolliver family, and, most significantly, with the legends of the
Old South and the Lost Cause of its Confederacy. When the nonagenarian “Cousin”
4
The book version of the play was published by Random House in 1957; this volume lists the
copyright “as an unpublished work” as being 1955. Act I of the play was originally published in the
Winter 1956 number of the Kenyon Review.
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Cameron Caswell, retired US Senator from Tennessee, visits with the Tollivers in
advance of the celebration, Lanny is overjoyed at the chance talk with a man whose
boyhood was spent on an antebellum plantation, and who wore the Gray as a teen.5
Ignored by Senator Caswell and the other adults, Lanny, late in Act II, takes his leave
of the family to go up to his room, ostensibly to continue his reading the history of
“Sam Davis. . . the boy-hero of the Confederacy [who] was hanged for spying, near
Nashville” (Taylor, Tennessee Day 81). As Act II closes, Lanny is found in his room,
having attempted to kill himself by overdosing on an elderly aunt’s sleeping pills; the
suicide is prevented only by Lanny’s older brother forcing him to vomit. While Taylor
presents the causes of Lanny’s attempted suicide as appropriately complex (including
suggestions that the bewildering psychosexual drama of puberty is partially to blame,
as Lanny is confused by his lust for his brother’s female companion), it is clear Senator
Caswell’s reluctance to engage Lanny in exploring southern myths, as well as his
family’s inability to connect with Lanny over southern history in any but the most
cursory ways, have exacerbated the boy’s feeling of intense alienation from his family
and ancestry. Rather than live with such confusion and alienation, he choses death.
Expressing a personalized version of the Lost Cause, Lanny’s attempt to kill himself
effectively brings him into communion with Sam Davis, Tennessee, and the southern
tradition in ways his family will not or cannot.
In these two important moments, Taylor provides us with two young men, both
working through the consequences of “ingesting” the narratives of the South. One
of these characters is sickened by these stories, while the other nostalgically craves
the legends of a place and time that seem more real and satisfying than his present.
5

Again, Taylor deftly weaves his own family history into his work, as Cousin Cameron’s life
before, during, and after the War combines the real experiences of both his maternal and paternal
grandfathers. Further, Lanny’s hyper-awareness of his Tennessee heritage is a likely reflection of the
experience of the young Taylor himself; as noted, because of the efforts of his mother, the author
spent his formative childhood years as a self-consciously southern scion of Tennessee landed gentry,
confusingly relocated to the steadfastly industrial and Midwestern city of St. Louis.
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In the case of the narrator of “Miro District,” the resistance to consuming these
words is based in an awareness of the myriad demands on his individual identity that
result from his recognizing the connections between family history, personal history,
and the South’s cultural history. In Lanny, Taylor gives us a character whose nearlydestructive embrace of the southern tradition results from his feelings of isolation and
estrangement from his present. Whereas the narrator of “Miro District” is sickened by
the stories and legends of the South because they challenge the libertine identity he,
like so many other young adults, has created for himself, Lanny needs the southern
tradition precisely because it provides a way of living that connects him to something
significant, meaningful, and beyond his own self.
While the southern tradition is thus a central element of both works and an
essential factor in defining these two characters, there are profound differences in the
tradition’s ultimate consequences for them. Tennessee Day in St. Louis presents the
southern tradition as existentially poisonous, exemplified both by Lanny’s attempted
suicide and several other moments in the play. In contrast, the traditionalism of
“In the Miro District,” represented both by the grandfather’s stories and his very
existence, is distressing because it acts as a challenging corrective to the shallow
hedonism shown by that story’s narrator, and is thus existentially useful. Thus,
this brief examination of these two stories suffices to illustrate that Taylor’s thinking
about the South and the utility of the southern tradition evolves in significant ways
over the two decades between the publication of Tennessee Day and “Miro District.”
These two works are exemplary of an overall tendency in Taylor’s work, something
that we can more readily understood by breaking his career into three roughly-defined
periods—early, middle, and late.6
6

Breaking Taylor’s work into periods is necessarily imperfect, in large part because the majority
of Taylor’s output consists of short stories originally published in magazines and literary journals
only later collected into books; sometimes decades would pass between the periodical and book
publication of a story. Further, the habit of publishers to reissue stories from previous, out-of-print
collections leads to situations that can further confuse these efforts. For instance, the 1985 collection
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In Taylor’s early period, the South, especially as it represented by the fictional
town of Thornton, is an inescapable and limiting presence. The second, middle period
of Taylor’s career is marked by an overall abandonment of direct engagement with
the South, as Taylor turns instead to deepening his exploration of other important
questions and themes. The fictive center of this middle period is not the rural west
Tennessee village of Thornton, but rather Chatham, “a middle-sized city. . . [that is]
not thoroughly Middle Western and yet not thoroughly Southern either” (Taylor,
“The Other Times” 7-8). By picking up the early period’s examination of various
themes without the messy burden of the South, the middle period allows Taylor to
examine the ramifications of a more general traditionalism for individuals in a modern, increasingly untraditional America. This, in turn, prepares his work for revised
thinking about the South and its conservative traditions in the late works. Unlike the
early period’s palpable feeling of entrapment with regard to the conservative southern
past, the works of the late period investigate how these seemingly limiting aspects
can be reinterpreted into both existentially empowering phenomena and rich sources
of resistance to an otherwise deadening (post)modern, bourgeois American culture.
To analyze the ways in which Taylor reinterprets and translates the southern conservative tradition, I focus on Taylor’s early and late periods, and their analyses of
the personal and social consequences of southern conservatism, in this and the next
chapter respectively.7 Taylor’s early period ranges from his earliest-published works
The Old Forest and Other Stories contains the title story, originally published in 1979, alongside
works from as early as 1945. Finally, within each period, there are (unsurprisingly) individual works
that do not fit neatly into that period’s general characteristics. Despite these difficulties, breaking
Taylor’s long career into identifiable periods is a useful tool for tracing how his thinking about the
existential usefulness of the southern tradition changes.
7

Certainly, the transitional works of Taylor’s middle period, especially stories from his 1959
collection Happy Families are All Alike, provide useful contexts for understanding how his thinking
changes, and the works from his final years, the short-story collection The Oracle at Stoneleigh Court
and the novel In the Tennessee Country, provide a set of intriguing commentaries on Taylor’s final
perspectives on the utility of southern conservatism. Yet, as this is but a single chapter of a larger
work, I have chosen to by-and-large ignore these for the purpose of the present discussion, electing
to focus only on the works that provide us with Taylor’s typical explorations of the limitations and
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and covers his first four published books: A Long Fourth, A Woman of Means, The
Widows of Thornton, and Tennessee Day in St. Louis. These works show Taylor’s
characters holding an uncritically nostalgic understanding of the southern conservative tradition, as they are incapable of seeing any other way of life as possible—
except, of course, for an equally problematic, uncritical embrace of the present, which
posits their history, beliefs, and ultimately these characters themselves as superfluous. Quite understandably, they reject this choice. While such a rejection makes
sense existentially, and is perhaps even necessary, their nostalgic understanding of
southern conservatism is clearly limiting and self-destructive.
The way in which the characters in Taylor’s late period deal with a similarly difficult choice provides an important contrast. I consider the late period to roughly
cover those works published after 1973’s collection of short dramas, Presences. This
period includes Taylor’s arguably most important works, three of which I consider
here: the long stories “In the Miro District” and “The Old Forest,” as well as Taylor’s
Pulitzer Prize-winning 1987 novel, A Summons to Memphis. Much of the drama in
these works deals with characters recognizing that a nostalgic view of the South and
its traditions is untenable, while at the same time finding the pettiness and irreverent
hedonism of the (post)modern, bourgeois present to be morally and aesthetically reprehensible and a profoundly unsatisfying means for investing their lives with meaning.
These characters learn how to view the southern tradition not as merely presenting
a vicious nostalgia that mourns the southern past, but rather as a source for virtue,
a library of various means for understanding and classifying life experiences, and a
set of connections to history and community. In other words, the southern tradition
points to the possibility of depth, nuance, and meaning for their lives, where the lived
present provides them only with shallow mediocrity.
possibilities of the South and its conservative narratives, myths, and traditions.
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Early Taylor and the Vice of Southern Nostalgia
In examining stories from his early period, we see Taylor presenting a nostalgic
view of the southern conservative tradition as problematic, and even vicious, for two
reasons. First, while the characters in these stories may depend on some form of this
tradition as a basic, constitutive element of their lives, their inability to conceive of it
except nostalgically makes them incapable of living affirmatively in the present. For
these individuals, the present in which they live can only be understood negatively,
as a period that is not the southern past and that lacks positive qualities. Secondly,
these characters find themselves without a vocabulary to critique and criticize the
present in any effective manner, a lack that results from their inability to see the tradition they depend on for meaning non-nostalgically. Lacking, or perhaps even being
dispossessed of, critical and affirmative vocabularies makes these individuals loyal
to an unattainable ideal. The impossibility of returning to the time and place they
perceive as properly conducive to living creates an existentially vexing and painful
longing—a destructive nostalgia.
This destructive nostalgia takes multiple forms in these stories, as we see characters drawing on different aspects of the South’s conservative tradition: its notions of
socio-economic principles, of its manners and conceptions of propriety, its notion of
human limitation, and its sense of duty and virtue, or some combination of these. We
see one of the clearest examples of the negative existential consequences of nostalgia
in characters’ reliance on 19th -century socio-economic ideals. Though they live in the
rapidly-industrializing, increasingly (sub)urban era between the two World Wars and
readily engage in the capitalistic economic practices of their time, these characters
still hold to southern conservative social views, visions that have their basis in the
agrarian and planation economies of the previous century. The ruinous personal consequences of this erroneous conflation—that social structures built on the plantation
model continue to be useful in a commercial, (sub)urban socioeconomic period—are
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seen in Taylor’s first novel, 1950’s A Woman of Means, as well as stories like “Their
Losses,” “A Wife of Nashville,” and, perhaps most devastatingly, 1951’s “What You
Hear From ’Em?”
Originally published in The New Yorker and later collected as the second story
in The Widows of Thornton, “What You Hear From ’Em?” tells of Aunt Munsie,
an elderly black woman whose titular question concerns Thad and Will Tolliver,
men whom she helped raise in the West Tennessee village of Thornton. Now in
middle age, Thad and Will are successful businessmen in Memphis and Nashville.
With her question, Aunt Munsie is not simply asking how Thad and Will are, but
whether they have yet made the decision to return to Thornton—and have thus
also decided to abandon their personal and commercial successes in favor of the
intimacy with community, past, and tradition that she understands the town to
represent. The story’s plot vacillates between Munsie’s questioning the Tollivers and
various residents of Thornton, and the gradual revelation of a “conspiracy” to pass an
ordinance against keeping pigs within the town limits. The immediate consequence
of this ordinance would be the elimination of another vestige of a suburbanizing
Thornton’s rural past: Aunt Munsie pulling her slop wagon through the streets of
town. Ostensibly concerned for her safety, the ordinance passes only through the
support of either Thad or Will Tolliver, or perhaps both; Taylor is purposefully
vague on this point. At first unable to believe that such an law exists, Aunt Munsie
is crushed when she learns of its reality, and readers witness an almost instantaneous
metamorphosis in her character at the story’s end, as the independent, morally and
intellectually sophisticated Munsie is reduced to being merely “like other old darkies”
(Taylor, “What You Hear From ’Em?” 251).
While increasingly suburban and removed from the agrarian, plantation-based
economy of the previous century, the ideals of many of the Thornton’s citizens, including Aunt Munsie, are still based in agrarian models. Taylor is clearly drawing on
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two standard tropes of southern literature in this story: the black mammy and her
abiding love of her white “children,” and the bewildering process of socio-economic
change and progress. As a result, this story has often been read as a paean to Agrarian principles, with Aunt Munsie figuring as a victim of industrialization. Ward Scott
provides a typical reading, going so far as stating that this story’s “archetypal conflict” is readily found in “I’ll Take My Stand as the battle between agrarianism and
industrialism,” and goes on to quote from nearly every essay in that volume as a part
of his discussion of “What You Hear From ’Em?” (Scott 27).
While they have their individual merits, such readings have two significant flaws.
First, they too-neatly connect the author’s thought to that of his Nashville Agrarian
mentors. Secondly, these readings glance over the complexities of Aunt Munsie’s
identity, as well as the ways in which the actions of the Tollivers and the citizens of
Thornton are themselves representative of a particular interpretation of the southern
tradition. By examining the story in light of these considerations, we see Taylor doing
something much more sophisticated than providing credence to the critiques present
in I’ll Take My Stand. Rather, we see him investigating the problematic nature of
community and tradition in identity formation. While Aunt Munsie needs a particular
version of the southern tradition to have any identity that is at all self-affirming, the
community’s version of this tradition circumscribes who Aunt Munsie can be. Taylor’s
purpose in this story is thus an exploration of how Thornton, and by extension,
the southern tradition in general, are simultaneously existentially empowering and
limiting, especially when considered nostalgically.
An important aspect of how “What You Hear From ’Em?” deals with tradition
is the story’s blending of race, time, and location in Aunt Munsie. Her character
is largely defined in terms of her relationship to the Tolliver family and, through
them, the town of Thornton’s other white citizens. As Taylor shows these white
characters to be themselves defined by propertied self-interest, we can usefully see
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Aunt Munsie’s character as constructed in terms of her personal appropriation of
the southern conservative tradition. We begin to see this in how Taylor describes
Munsie’s interactions with Thad and Will on their occasional visits. As she regularly
asks the citizens of the town the “what you hear from ’em?,” a question the author
makes clear is both ritualistic and exclusively concerned with when Thad and Will
“were going to pack up their families and come back to Thornton for good” (233), she
asks an even more pointed question whenever Thad and Will visit. In these moments,
Munsie is pointedly direct: “Now, look-a-here. When you comin’ back?” (234). The
two questions, one to the citizens of the town, another directly to Thad and Will
Tolliver, are thus both concerned with the same thing—the permanent return of the
Tolliver boys to Thornton. These questions, and their shared concern, are of central
importance to Munsie’s character, and to her place in the community. When taken
together, they suggest that her connection to Thornton is presupposed upon her
connection to the Tolliver family, and vice-versa. In Munsie’s thinking, to separate
the Tollivers and Thornton is to diminish both and, as a result, ultimately herself.
That Munsie’s thinking takes this form is further evidenced by Taylor’s description
of Thad and Will’s answer to the question, as well as her home, the place where the
questioning occurs. When asked about returning,
whichever it was would tell her he was making definite plans to wind up
his business and that he was going to buy a certain piece of property, ‘a
mile north of town’ or ‘on the old River Road,’ and build a jim-dandy
house there. He would say, too, how good Aunt Munsie’s own house
was looking, and his wife would say how grand the zinnias and the cannas
looked in the yard. . . The visit was almost over then. There remained only
the exchange of presents. One of the children would hand Aunt Munsie
a paper bag containing a pint of whiskey or a carton of cigarettes. Aunt
Munsie would go to her back porch or to the pit in the yard and get a fern
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or a wandering Jew, potted in a rusty lard bucket, and make Mrs. Thad
or Mrs. Will take it along. Then the visit was over, and they would leave.
From the porch Aunt Munsie would wave goodbye with one hand and
lay the other hand, trembling slightly, on the banister rail. . . Often as not
Thad or Will, observing this, would remind his wife that Aunt Munsie’s
porch banisters and pillars had come off a porch of the house where he
had grown up. . . [Thad or Will] would close the gate, resting his hand a
moment on its familiar wrought-iron frame, and wave to her before he
jumped the ditch. If the children had not gone too far ahead, he might
even draw their attention to the iron fence which, with its iron gate, had
been around the yard at the Tolliver place till Dr. Tolliver took it down
and set out a hedge, just a few weeks before he had died. (234-35)
Taylor’s narration provides the questioning with an almost ritualistic air, in which
the question and answers, the exchanged gifts, and the physical characteristics of
Munsie’s home are invested with symbolic meaning. First, Thad and Will’s answer
clearly suggests noncommittal evasion. After all, even if they are “making definite
plans,” there are any number of things that may interfere with these plans ever
coming to fruition, thus insulating them from either having to lie, or needing to
make explicit the painful-yet-obvious truth, that they are not returning to Thornton.
Yet the background behind these noncommittal plans is itself significant. While the
desire to build a “jim-dandy” house on the edge of town clearly resonates with a
desire for a suburbanized “new,” the Tolliver boys would need to build a new home
in order to move back to Thornton, as the old homeplace itself has burned down.
Importantly, the Tolliver house does, in a way, still exist—but only through Aunt
Munsie’s absorbing of its detritus and cast-off parts into her own home. In both her
person and physical surroundings, Aunt Munsie thus exists as the only connection
Thad and Will have with their familial and cultural past.
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In her gifts to Thad and Will, Aunt Munsie subtly condemns their choice to leave
Thornton. The plants are significant: the first is a fern, which reproduces by casting
spores out to be blown by the wind, and the second is a wandering Jew. While
referring non-specifically to any one of a number of creeping perennials, this plant’s
name references a longstanding figure in European legend and art, an individual
distressingly marked as both untrustworthy and perpetually exiled. Both plants can
also be divided, with a parent plant split into sections and re-potted, with one plant
thus becoming two or more. While such rustic gifts are unlikely to be necessary
(or even desired) in the Tollivers’ posh Memphis and Nashville homes, the fact that
Munsie forces the plants on the Tollivers—she has to “make Mrs. Thad or Mrs. Will
take it along”—points to the uncomfortable judgment Aunt Munsie has made about
the Tollivers: in their leaving Thornton, Thad and Will have both divided themselves
and placed themselves into unstable, wind-blown exile.
Aunt Munsie’s view of Thad and Will as exiles reveals much about her social
and economic principles, just as their inability to truthfully admit that they will
never return to Thornton and their nostalgic visits with Aunt Munsie show Thad and
Will’s principles. John Taylor of Caroline’s social vision provides a useful perspective for understanding the differences in these principles. As a member of the early
19th -century “Tertium Quid” or “Old Republican” movement, Taylor of Caroline’s
political thought blends what historian Adam L. Tate identifies as “anti-Federalism,
Virginia’s legal culture, the ‘Principles of ’98’ taken from the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions, and the thought of British conservative Edmund Burke to create a constellation of ideas that has been classified as southern conservatism” (Tate 8). While
sharing these political ideals with other southern conservatives, both antebellum and
later, Taylor of Caroline’s social thought nevertheless posits a relatively liberal view
of human nature, with notions of depravity and man’s imperfectability subsumed by
ideas of freedom and liberty. Taylor of Caroline thus intriguingly presents a social vi-
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sion that seems to share many common features with the classical liberal principles of
Enlightenment thinkers while lacking the radicalism of men like Voltaire and Thomas
Paine. In this, Taylor of Caroline obviously echoes aspects of Thomas Jefferson’s
thought. And while Taylor of Caroline arguably surpasses Jefferson’s commitment
to agrarianism, many of the practical consequences of his thought are largely capitalistic. Differing from the Yankee, Hamiltonian goal of business elites supported
by a centralized bureaucracy, Taylor of Caroline posits a view of capitalism that is
democratic, suspicious of centralized power, fiercely defensive of individual liberty,
and based in the marketing of agricultural commodities. In combining Jeffersonian
politics, agrarianism, and capitalism, Taylor of Caroline puts forth an agrarian, libertarian republicanism; such a vision could prove intriguingly useful for individuals
like Will and Thad Tolliver.
This utility is limited by Thad and Will’s merely nostalgic view of Thornton and
the southern tradition, something we see illustrated by their reaction to the burning
of the old homestead. We are told that Dr. Tolliver’s home burned because it, like
so many other houses of Thornton’s leading families, stood empty and uncared for.
The reasons for their emptiness are not that “nobody wanted to rent them or buy
them but because the heirs who had gone off somewhere making money could never
be got to part with the ‘home place.’” What is true for the Tollivers is true for other
leading Thornton families, as “the Tolliver house had caught fire from the Major
Pettigru house, which had burned two nights before. . . Some even said the Pettigru
house might have caught from the Johnston house, which had burned earlier that
same fall” (Taylor, “What You Hear From ’Em?” 238). Thad and Will, like the
scions of the other prominent families, find Thornton to provide an important source
of meaning as a nostalgic ideal—we are told that Thad “nearly went crazy” when he
heard about the fire, even though he “had hardly put foot in the house since the day
his daddy died.”—even if it does not provide any economic or social fulfillment.
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Taylor of Caroline predictably defended “possession of family, farm, and leisure”
as central to the well-being of a republic, and the “ideal of the independent landowner
retained its prominence in Taylor’s thought because it best secured private happiness.
Happiness, therefore, had a material foundation” (79). In this story, it is clear that
Thad, Will, and others like them have readily embraced the (sub)urban, commercial
economy and its bourgeois values, even as they still hold onto the ideal of “family,
farm, and leisure.” But if Thad and Will Tolliver have predictably abandoned the
realities of “family, farm, and leisure” in favor of a nostalgic ideal of these things and
the realities of materialism and commercial success, Aunt Munsie is an unexpected
champion of a traditional agrarian republicanism. Aware of their real successes in
business, she nevertheless describes Thad and Will as failures: “No matter how rich
they were, what difference did it make; they didn’t own any land, did they? Or at
least none in Cameron County. She had heard the old Doctor tell them—tell his
boys and tell his girls, and tell the old lady, too, in her day—that nobody was rich
who didn’t own land, and nobody stayed rich who didn’t see after his land firsthand”
(242-43). A black woman who was born into slavery, Munsie is an unlikely defender
of this social vision. Nevertheless, she incredibly reconfigures a tradition that seems
to offer her nothing but a subservient, marginalized place in society into a source for
self-determination and existential power, especially as it concerns her relationship to
other whites.
As her use of the southern tradition in her own identify formation is in many ways
tied to how she understands and classifies the white citizens of Thornton, it should
be of little surprise that this, too, has its origins in how Munsie understands her
relationship to the Tollivers. Even though she cannot “be got to reminisce about”
her past, it is clear that a formative moment in her past was when “the old Mizziz had
died and Aunt Munsie’s word had become law in the Tolliver household. Without
being able to book read or even to make numbers, she had finished raising the whole
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pack of towheaded Tollivers just as the Mizziz would have wanted it done. The Doctor
told her she had to—he didn’t ever once think about getting another wife, or taking in
some cousin, not after his ‘Molly darling’—and Aunt Munsie did” (244). While never
anything like a wife to Dr. Tolliver, Munsie becomes a mother to Thad, Will, and the
other Tolliver children, something recognized by her biological daughter, Crecie, who
announces Thad or Will’s arrival by saying “Mama, some of your chillun’s out front”
(240). In her mind, Munsie is a sort of Tolliver, in that she has completely claimed
the maternal role once held by the “old Mizziz.” This role becomes so vital to her own
self-identity, that, in her own heart, “Aunt Munsie knew that even Lucrecie didn’t
matter to her the way a daughter might,” because of the preeminence she places on
her mothering of the Tollivers.
Importantly, this impulse is rooted in Munsie’s experience of marginalization:
“She could never be go to reminisce about her childhood in slavery, or her life with
her husband,” things that marked her as who she is: a poor, illiterate black woman
in a society that affords no real agency to individuals like her (244). Even though,
as previously mentioned, Munsie also refuses to reminisce about how she became the
maternal figure in the Tolliver family, the story makes clear that this role provides her
a sense of identity and existential power. As illustrated by multiple discussions with
her daughter, Munsie classifies Thornton’s whites, and in doing so further reveals her
self-affirming affiliation with the Tolliver family. While there are clearly “quality”
white people, like the Tollivers and Miss Lucille Satterfield, these individuals have
largely been displaced by two other classes of whites: “has-been quality” and those
whites dismissively described as “others.” Importantly, how Munsie understands the
difference between these two classes is based in how they, in turn, understand Munsie:
There was this to be said, though, for the has-been quality: they knew
who Aunt Munsie was, and in a limited, literal way they understood what
she said. But those others—why, they thought Aunt Munsie a beggar,
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and she knew they did. They spoke of her as Old What You Have for
Mom, because that’s what they thought she was saying when she called
out, ‘What you hear from ’em?’ Their ears were not attuned to the soft
‘r’ she put in ‘from’ or the elision that made ‘from ’em’ sound to them like
‘for Mom.’ Many’s the time Aunt Munsie had seen or sensed the presence
of one of those other people, watching from next door, when Miss Leonora
Lovell, say, came down her front walk and handed her a little parcel of
scraps [for Munsie to use to slop her pigs] across the ditch. Aunt Munsie
knew what they thought of her—how they laughed at her and felt sorry
for her and despised her all at once. But, like the has-been quality, they
didn’t matter, never had, never would. Not ever. (239)
Munsie refers to these “other” whites as “‘white trash’ and even ‘radical Republicans’”
(240), terms that illustrate her self-affiliation with the worldview of the elite, “quality”
whites. Even if there is an implicit, subconscious recognition of her selfhood being
intimately connected with maternity, these “other” whites cannot make sense of what
kind of mother Munsie is. To them, she is not the woman who raised their social
betters, the Tolliver children, but rather merely “Old What You Have for Mom,” a
peripatetic beggar, a sort of “wandering Jew” herself. But Munsie knows her self and
her self-worth, and those whites who matter know these things as well.
By attaching herself to the Tollivers and their position in Thornton, Munsie is
able to transcend her “natural” position in the community: a marginalized, elderly,
illiterate black woman who was born into slavery and continues to live in similar
conditions of poverty. Despite this, Munsie, confident in her self-worth, brings herself
in from the margins of Thornton society and literally inserts herself into the center of
town life, as she pulls her wagon “down the very center of [the town’s main street],”
with the ostensible powerlessness of her agedness undermined by her “spry step”
(236). She demonstrates her felt power similarly, stopping all town traffic with merely
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“one hand with the palm turned outward” (238). Though not a Tolliver in name or
condition, Munsie has, in her mind, existentially remade herself into the equivalent of
a Tolliver. Ironically like the Tollivers and the other members of the old plantocracy,
it is Munsie who gets to decide those at the center of society—herself and the “quality”
whites—and those at its periphery—the “white trash” or “radical Republicans” who
do not recognize her worth, power, or authority.
Obviously, all of this is tenuous. The power and existential agency Munsie has
crafted for herself is based upon her astounding reconfiguration of the paternalism
of the southern conservative tradition. Through casting herself as a Tolliver, Aunt
Munsie has been able to transcend the limitations of her objectified position as an
illiterate, poor, elderly black woman, and claim her own existential subjecthood.
Of course, Munsie’s continued success in this endeavor is clearly dependent upon
the “quality” whites’ continued engagement with this tradition. But as is apparent
in the characters of Will and Thad, these whites are abandoning this tradition’s
notions of duty and agrarian stability—Taylor of Caroline’s trio of “family, farm, and
leisure”—and thus turning from republican virtue to the self-love that lurks at the core
of laissez-faire society. Having left behind the agrarian republican vision Thornton
provides in all but the most ineffectual and passively nostalgic ways, these “quality”
whites no longer hold onto the fullness of this version the southern tradition. Forced
to recognize this, Munsie realizes she has lost all the existential power she had created
for herself through reworking this tradition. At the story’s devastating climax, she
tells her dog that “I ain’t nothin’ to ’em in Memphis, and they ain’t nothin’ to me
in Nashville. . . A collie dog’s a collie dog anywhar. But Aunt Munsie, she’s just their
Aunt Munsie here in Thornton. I got mind enough to see that” (249). Munsie is
ultimately dispossessed of her subjecthood, and in the end, she becomes a simple
stereotype: “she even took to tying a bandanna about her head—took to talking
old-nigger foolishness, too, about the Bell Witch, and claiming she remembered the
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day General N. B. Forrest rode into town and saved all the cotton from the Yankees
at the depot” (250).
This story provides several implications for the ways in which Taylor understands
the southern conservative tradition in his early work. Again, the southern conservative vision Taylor puts forth in “What You Hear From ’Em?” is understandable
in terms of John Taylor of Caroline’s libertarian republican social principles. But as
Garrett Ward Sheldon and C. William Hill, Jr. make clear in their excellent study
of these principles, The Liberal Republicanism of John Taylor of Caroline, this libertarianism is manifested through a connection between an “agrarian economy and
liberal-republican polity” that is served by “a free market rewarding talent and industry” (Sheldon and Hill 74). For these principles to be effective in crafting a “good
society,” both the agrarian economy and the liberal-republican polity are of equal
importance. A simply laissez-faire economy divorced from connections to the land
may quickly devolve into petty self-love. As Sheldon and Hill make clear, in this
way of thinking, an agrarian society “provided more than just virtuous, independent
republican citizens; an agricultural society, [in Taylor of Caroline’s] view, enjoyed
psychological and even religious benefits” (77). But what are the consequences for
an increasingly non-agricultural society that continues to depend on this economic
vision—not out of adherence to its virtues and “psychological and even religious benefits,” but rather for the nostalgic indulgence of its most powerful citizens? Peter
Taylor shows us the logical end of such a situation: individuals acting as Thad and
Will Tolliver have, moving to the big cities, pursuing their own interests and making
money, all the while hanging onto nostalgic myths of agrarian virtue through the
passive ownership of “the old homeplace,” whatever the consequences for others.
It is incredible and moving to witness Aunt Munsie reconfiguring the southern
tradition to claim agency over her own self, especially as its most significant historical
feature, slavery, was explicitly and clearly constituted to marginalize individuals like
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her. Nevertheless, she cannot survive the revelation that this tradition continues to
exist only in the anachronistic and nostalgic vision of the “quality” whites. While the
story points out that Thad and Will Tolliver are both disconcerted and emotionally
vexed by a changing Thornton’s challenges to the social, intellectual, and economic
consistency of southern conservatism, Aunt Munsie is totally undone. Ultimately,
Aunt Munsie’s nostalgic reclamation of her own past provides her no way to hold to
her own selfhood, and the tragedy of “What You Hear From ’Em?” results from one
nostalgic fantasy of the southern tradition being undone by another. Though the
realities of southern history make it unsurprising that Aunt Munsie is the one left
broken at the story’s end, Taylor shows us that it is not only his expicitly marginalized
characters who are undermined by such nostalgia in an even earlier story, 1946’s “A
Long Fourth.”
“A Long Fourth” takes place over a Fourth of July weekend in the mid-1940s;
Harriet Wilson’s son, identified only as “Son,” will be enlisting in the Army the
following week, and is returning to Nashville from New York for a final family gathering. Son will be accompanied by a young woman, Ann Prewitt, who is rumored
to be radical in her politics and known to be the editor of a birth-control magazine.
Understanding this as almost certainly a love match, and viewing this gathering as
incredibly important—after all, Son might not return from World War II—Harriet is
anxious to see the long holiday weekend succeed, with success defined by adherence
to the norms of traditional upper-class southern propriety. While her anxieties are
most clearly focused on Son’s impending enlistment, Harriet is also deeply troubled
by possibilities of propriety being violated, whether by a member of her family, her
household staff, Nashville society generally, or perhaps even herself.
Harriet is especially vexed by B.T., a black servant who seems to have been born
and raised on the Wilson property, who has been brought up by Mattie, his aunt, who
has herself spent her entire life in the Wilsons’ service. Despite his talent for working
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around the Wilson property, B.T. shows either no interest or no ability in housework.
Beyond this, the Wilsons find B.T. to stink, a condition Harriet says is “constitutional
with him” (Taylor, “A Long Fourth” 200). As a result, Harriet and her daughters,
Kate and Helena, must do all of the work inside the Wilson home to prepare for Son’s
return. Harriet’s early discussion with her husband, Sweetheart, voices her concerns
about B.T.: “As long as we keep [B.T.] I’m completely deprived of the services of a
houseboy when I need one. When Son and his young lady come I don’t know what I’ll
do. The girls are angels about such things, but next week they should be entertaining
Son and her, and not just picking up after her. It seems unreasonable, Sweetheart,
to keep B.T. when we could have a nice, normal darkie that could do inside when
I need him” (200). Clearly, at the core of Harriet’s complaints are a sense of what
a “normal darkie” should be, and that B.T.’s ostensible abnormality forces Harriet,
Helena, and Kate from their proper social roles. For Harriet, B.T. should behave in
a certain way, because to not do so prevents the Wilson women from acting out their
proper roles, which in turn compromises the experience of “Son and his young lady”
on their visit. In this brief moment, Taylor provides us with a microcosm of Harriet’s
social vision: all individuals have a particular role to play, and an individual’s failure
to perform his or her role properly imperils social structures more generally. Should
anything be out of its right place, nothing can be in the right place.
Harriet’s need for propriety and order is seen throughout “A Long Fourth,” as are
her accompanying confusions when the traditional order of things is violated. She is
perplexed by her daughters, who smoke, drink, and stay out until all hours of the
night. Taylor makes clear Harriet’s confusion, noting that “when [she] and her sister
were [Kate and Helena’s] age they were married and had the responsibilities of their
own families. What a shame it is, she thought, that my girls are not married” (201).
Harriet is even more confused over how to understand and label Ann Prewitt, as
“Harriet felt certain that Son would bring no one who was not a lady, but what real
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lady, she asked herself, would edit a birth-control magazine?” (202) While there are
several other examples of Harriet’s perplexity, a particular violation of her expected
norms forms the central moment of the story. The day before Son’s arrival, Mattie
is visibly upset. B.T. has avoided conscription on condition that he leaves Nashville
to work in a munitions factory; should B.T. refuse to work in this factory, he will
be drafted. Heartbroken that the closest thing to a son she has ever had will be
leaving her on the coming Tuesday—importantly, the same day that Son reports for
enlistment—Mattie turns to “Missie” Harriet for comfort.
At first, Harriet finds this moment to be touching, as it reflects and re-inscribes
the traditional relationship between a black servant and her white mistress, for which
Harriet is deeply nostalgic:
The old-fashioned appellative ‘Missie’ told Harriet a great deal. She
handed Kate her purse and put out her arms to receive Mattie, for she
knew that her old friend was in deep trouble. The Negress was several
inches taller than Harriet but she threw herself into her little mistress’s
arms and by bending her knees slightly and stooping her shoulders she
managed to rest her face on the bosom of the white eyelet dress while she
wept. . . ‘My poor Mattie,’ [Harriet] said (206).
Here, Harriet’s notions of propriety are reinforced, and as a result she is able to hold
to a steady, stable identity. Harriet is able to play the role of “Missie,” comforting her
“old friend” so long as Mattie assumes the child-like role Harriet’s nostalgic version
of the southern tradition assigns her. Mattie soon makes a grave mistake, however,
in daring to insinuate that she and Harriet’s relationship is something other than
mistress and servant. Mattie suggests that Son and B.T., and thus she and Harriet,
are at least circumstantially equal: “Miss Harriet...it’s like you losin’ Mr. Son. B.T.
is gwine too” (208). For Harriet, whose very self is presupposed on stable notions of
propriety based in the southern past, this statement is an unpardonable transgression.
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For readers, Mattie’s suggestion is innocuous enough, and certainly understandable. Overcome by grief and the recognition that she is, for all intents and purposes,
losing the closest thing she has a to a son, she attempts a moment of heartfelt communion with her “Missie.” Despite Mattie’s very human, heartfelt reason for making
this statement, Harriet is nevertheless enraged by what she sees as Mattie’s temerity:
The open comparison of Son’s departure to that of the sullen, stinking,
thieving, fornicating black B.T. was an injury for which Son could not
avenge himself, and [Harriet] felt it her bounden duty to in some way make
that black woman feel the grossness of her wrong and ultimately drive her
off the premises. . . Between the moments when she even pictured Mattie’s
being tied and flogged or thought of Mama’s uncle who shot all of his
niggers before he would free them, and of the Negro governor of North
Carolina and the Negro senate rolling whiskey barrels up the capital steps,
of the rape and uprisings in Memphis and the riots in Chicago, between
these thoughts she would actually consider the virtue of her own wrath.
And recalling her Greek classes as Miss Hood’s school she thought without
a flicker of humor of Achilles’ indignation. (209)
The woman who was a few minutes before Harriet’s “old friend” is now the object
of her violent fantasies, an individual she imagines as being “tied and flogged” and
whom she associates with the anarchy that supposedly results from the elevation of a
“Negro governor” and a “Negro senate.” Mattie’s transgresses the proper order, with
whites as the paternalistic governors of blacks. Should this order be violated, Harriet
makes explicitly clear that the proper and honorable response is the restoration of
this order through violence.
The language of Harriet’s fantasies at this moment provides us with a powerful,
though subtle, statement of her understanding of the southern tradition, the ways
in which it provides her with meaning and self-identity, as well as the limits of this
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tradition. It is necessary to recognize that what Taylor refers to as the “virtue of
[Harriet’s] own wrath” is distinctly masculine, with its insistence upon violence as
a restorative for honor. Importantly, however, these masculine qualities are derived
from “the language and the rhetoric of her mother,” indicating that her mother,
like Harriet, simultaneously defended and undermined the well-ordered, hierarchical
nature of southern traditionalism, as self-conscious “ladies” engaging in distinctly
masculine fantasies and narratives. Harriet is thus taking on the role that should
presumably be occupied by Son or Sweetheart, complicating her seemingly iron-clad
notions of propriety and order.
Cultural historian Ted Ownby provides a useful schema for making sense of this
tension. In Subduing Satan, his study of the role of religion and recreation in the rural
19th -century South, Ownby distinguishes between two competing visions of southern
culture in that society: what can be thought of as a feminine “praying South” and a
masculine “fighting South,” with the first based in evangelical religiosity and the second defined by honorific violence. In describing these two visions of southern culture,
Ownby notes that while “evangelicalism demanded self-control, humility in manner,
and harmony in personal relations, Southern honor demanded self-assertiveness, aggressiveness, and competitiveness” (Ownby 12). Applying this schema to “A Long
Fourth,” the honor-based violence of Harriet’s reaction is clearly undeniable, making clear that “the virtue of her own wrath” is distinctly masculine. But this is
complicated by the immediate appearance of a feminine characteristic, interpersonal
harmony, as Harriet’s anger is directly squelched by a resolution that Son’s “last
visit must not be marred, and she resolved to tell no one—not even Sweetheart—of
what had occurred” (Taylor, “A Long Fourth” 209). As such, we can understand
Harriet’s reaction to Mattie’s transgression as a cyclical processing of competing
facets of a tradition that Harriet has received from her mother and for which she
remains profoundly nostalgic. At first, a self-controlled Harriet embraces Mattie to
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restore personal harmony, only to meet with a perceived slight that threatens to undermine that nostalgically-defined harmony. Her reaction takes the form of violent,
self-assertive aggressiveness, in which she finds herself positioned to play a role that
is not intended for her, but that she nevertheless feels compelled to perform. Finally,
Harriet squelches this aggressiveness in the name of domestic and familial harmony,
returning to her neatly-defined roles as mother, mistress, and lady. Harriet is thus
unwilling to abandon rigidly-defined, gendered and racialized propriety, though she
also finds herself forced exist within a set of contradictions that make such propriety
possible. In short, Harriet, who is dependent on precisely-ordered notions of propriety
for the stability of her own identity, finds herself required to undermine some form
of propriety—here, the division between masculine and feminine characteristics—in
order to maintain another form, the properly subservient place of southern blacks.
While she seems unaware of this tension, its consequences effectively serve to isolate
Harriet by the story’s close. In this, she, like Aunt Munsie, provides another example
of a significant aspect of Taylor’s project in his early work: that a nostalgic, unreflective acceptance of the southern tradition is both an often unavoidable aspect of and
an exceptionally limiting influence over his characters’ lives.
This destructive tension is present from the story’s early moments, when Taylor
informs us that Harriet’s views are informed by three individuals: “Harriet was yet
guided in some matters by well-remembered words of her mother who had been dead
for thirty years. In other matters she was guided by the words of Sweetheart. In still
others she was guided by what Son said. Her two daughters guided her in nothing.
Rather, she was ever inclined to instruct them by quoting Mama, Sweetheart, or
Son” (199). While Harriet’s life and thought being informed by mother, husband,
and eldest son is unsurprising and predictable for a woman convinced of the correctness of the hierarchical, well-ordered southern tradition—an order reflected by
her refusal to learn from her daughters, and her instructing them with these same
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sources of authority—it is also clear that Taylor is pointing out the limitations of
Harriet’s overly-tidy thought. On one hand, she seems to place equal value on all
three sources as authoritative, despite the fact these sources are often in conflict,
something that becomes clear throughout the course of “A Long Fourth.” Harriet’s
need for order blinds her to the essential contradictions between Mama’s legalistic
dicta, Sweetheart’s bored indifference, and Son’s hedonistic, opportunistic solipsism.
With Harriet Wilson, Taylor presents an individual whose tragic flaw is that she
cannot conceive of any means of existence other than the southern tradition she has
received from her mother, that she understands as reinforced in her husband, and
that she hopes to see replicated by her son. She also finds it impossible to engage
the tensions inherent to this tradition in a critical manner. Harriet can only accept
this tradition in totality, and can only accept that totality as static and unchanging.
Stated differently, for Harriet’s worldview to operate in a manner that can provide
meaning for her life, she cannot recognize the inherent tensions and even contradictions in this way of thinking; to the contrary, the southern conservative tradition
must provide a neat and stable system through which Harriet can define propriety
and consistently label herself and others. Consequentially, she experiences deep existential distress in two distinct contexts. First, she is vexed whenever she comes
into contact with situations that force her to inhabit the tensions and contradictions
inherent to the southern tradition. Her interaction with Mattie is a clear example
of this, especially in how Harriet and Mattie’s interaction is revisited at the story’s
close, which will be addressed shortly. Secondly, Harriet is also troubled when she
encounters ways of thinking or modes of living that do not fit into the narrow fetters
of propriety or that resist consistent labeling, both of which we see when examining
Harriet’s interactions with Ann Prewitt.
Harriet meets Ann sometime after her encounter with Mattie, and the mix of
emotions that interaction brought up are exacerbated by Harriet’s reunion with her
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son and meeting his traveling companion: Harriet “met [Son] at the door of the parlor
and as she threw her arms about him she found herself unable to restrain her tears,”
an emotional response obviously linked to her reunion with a child that she knows
will soon be departing, perhaps permanently (210). Harriet is initially attracted to
“Miss Prewitt,” and her first impression of the younger woman leads Harriet back to
a consideration of the graveness of Mattie’s error. “When she saw the ladylike young
woman in a black traveling dress and white gloves (as an example of [Son’s] taste), it
occurred to her that she had even underestimated the grossness of Mattie’s reflection
upon him.” Importantly, Harriet understands the “ladylike” traveling ensemble worn
by Miss Prewitt as revealing nothing about Ann Prewitt herself, but rather provides
an example of Son’s good taste. At first meeting, Ann Prewitt means nothing to
Harriet qua Ann Prewitt. Rather, by presenting evidence of Son’s taste, Ann serves
two purposes. First, she serves to reassure Harriet that her faith in Son’s authority
over her life is not misplaced, as Son here conforms to Harriet’s nostalgic ideals.
Secondly, Harriet sees Son’s “ladylike” companion as diametrically opposed to the
women B.T. brings home, whom Harriet views not as “Negro women who might have
been useful about the place but [as] real prostitutes from Nashville” (207).8 Taken as
a whole in these ways, Harriet Wilson initially sees Ann Prewitt not as a fellow woman
or even merely an autonomous individual, but rather as an embodied justification of
her indefatigable nostalgia. This, in turn, brings the grossness of Mattie’s ostensible
transgression into greater sharpness, producing an outburst of “hysteria. Sweetheart
rushed forward and supported [Harriet], and Son tried to hold one hand which she
was waving about” (211).
Over the course of three pages, Taylor has thus summarily presented the existentially destructive effects of Harriet’s ossified, anachronistic understanding of the
8

Harriet’s division of black women into “useful” and “prostitutes” provides obvious echoes of
other aspects of the 19th -century South’s understanding of black womanhood, namely their abilities
as workers and their sexuality.
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southern conservative tradition. Her anger at Mattie causes Harriet to display stereotypically masculine feelings of violated honor, something that can be repaired only
through violence, whereas her first impression of Ann Prewitt results in being overcome by hysteria,9 which results in her being rescued and “supported” by Son and
Sweetheart. Harriet’s breakdown is thus occasioned by her inability to understand
herself and her relationships to others in any terms other than those permitted by
her narrow conceptions of propriety and order, while she simultaneously finds herself needing to violate the gender differentiation demanded by such notions. Taylor
presents Harriet Wilson as an individual necessarily and tragically divided against
her own self. Her further interactions with Ann Prewitt, Son, and her daughters
exacerbate this division, resulting in Harriet, like Aunt Munsie, being existentially
broken at the story’s end.
Harriet’s first substantial interaction with Ann Prewitt requires her to reconsider
the younger woman. Whereas Ann had initially appeared as the very image of the
“lady,” Harriet now observes that Ann “had extremely crooked teeth which had been
brought more or less into line probably by wearing bands as a child. . . She wore no
makeup and was redolent of no detectable perfume or powder. And before she sat
down in the chair which Sweetheart drew up for her, Harriet perceived that the
girl took no pains with her hair which hung in a half-long bob with some natural
wave” (212). The “ladylike” Miss Prewiit, who had provided evidence of Son’s taste
and justified Harriet’s deference to his authority, is now described in ways that defy
Harriet’s traditional versions of femininity. While this does not make Ann Prewitt
offensive to Harriet, it does complicate Harriet’s understanding of Son’s companion:
For though she found [Ann] extremely agreeable [Harriet] perceived that
9

Taylor’s use of hysteria is a masterful stroke, as the word’s etymological connection to womanhood subtly reiterates Harriet’s notions of propriety; Son’s earlier absence caused her to respond
to Mattie’s statement with masculine violence, while his presence produces an explicitly feminine
reaction that needs the rescue and “support” of men—Sweetheart and Son.
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the possibility of any romantic attachment between her and Son was out
of the question. The tie between them was doubtless what the girls called
an intellectual friendship. In her own girlhood people would have called
it Platonic, but then they would have laughed about it. Mama always
said there could be no such relationship between young men and young
women. Sweetheart always showed the smutty and cynical side to his
nature when such things were discussed. Yet in some matters Son surely
knew better than either Mama or Sweetheart. She had of course, never,
herself, known such a friendship with a man and just now she was really
trying to imagine the feelings that two such friends would have for one
another (212-13).
In this interaction with Ann Prewitt, Harriet is faced with both the insufficiency
of her nostalgic vocabulary for describing human experience and other individuals,
as well as voicing the story’s first recognition of the essential and necessary tension
between her three authorities—“Yet in some matters Son surely knew better than
either Mama or Sweetheart.” While Mattie’s outburst results in Harriet expressing
ever more acute loyalty to a nostalgic version of the southern conservative tradition
in which everyone knows their place and plays their proper role, meeting Ann Prewitt
requires Harriet to face the insufficiency of that tradition.
The result of these two experiences is a retrenchment of the stability of Harriet’s identity; events throughout the rest of the story repeat the existential struggles
brought on by her worldview’s insistence upon narrowly-defined propriety and ossified means of defining and interpreting human experience. Taylor reveals Harriet’s
conviction that the “sorrow over Son’s going into the Army would not be so great if
she could believe that he and Ann were in love,” and that this sorrow is intensified by
her confusion over Son and Ann’s “unnatural and strange relationship” (219). Harriet’s only moment of happiness in the latter half of the story is when she is when
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Helena begs her to “sing us your version—the real Tennessee version” of a traditional
ballad, a nostalgic indulgence that allows Harriet to forget the increasingly unavoidable awareness of her superfluity (220-21). Political arguments between the young
people are taken to imply the climax of the “incomprehensible antagonism” between
Helena, Kate, Son, and Ann Prewitt; it is telling that these are arguments about the
very nature of the South and its future direction (222-25). Finally, Harriet learns
that Ann Prewitt indeed cares for Son romantically; Son, however, does not care for
Ann in this way and brought her to Nashville for manipulative purposes.
Before she leaves to visit her family in Arkansas, Ann informs the Wilsons that
Son
always thinks a person behaves badly who doesn’t amuse him. He cares
nothing for anything I say except when I’m talking theory of some kind.
He was very willing to bring me down here before your friends to express
all manner of opinion which they and you find disagreeable while he behaves with conventional good taste. He even discouraged me bringing the
proper clothes to make any sort of agreeable appearance. Yet see how
smartly he’s turned out. . . And I, alas, have been so vulgar as to fall in
love with him.” She turned to Sweetheart who stood with his hands hanging limp at his sides and his mouth literally wide open. “It’s a sad story,
is it not, Doctor? The doctor tried to smile. (232)
Sweetheart, who has appeared as easy-going and even apathetic throughout the story,
is unsurprisingly mute this revelation, rising to neither defend nor upbraid Son. Harriet, meanwhile, is forced to recognize both Son’s charade and Sweetheart’s indifference. Ann Prewitt’s presence called into question the utility of Mama’s categories
and means of labeling and defining human experience, and Ann’s ultimate revelation
similarly undermines Son and Sweetheart’s authority over Harriet. So long convinced
of the stability of propriety and the categories the southern tradition provided her,
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Harriet is finally presented with their insufficiency. Tellingly, she endures the final
moments of Ann’s revelation counting Sweetheart’s walking sticks. Harriet “counted
them several times over, and each time there were still seven sticks in the rack.” Ultimately, this is the only certain, unchanging, and stable form of order available to
her (233).
After Ann’s departure, Harriet prepares for bed, only to have her nightly prayers
interrupted by screams from B.T.’s cabin. Sweetheart investigates, and finds that
Mattie has run off one of B.T.’s women and refuses to leave the cabin. Sweetheart,
sensing Mattie’s distress, sends out Harriet to comfort the Mattie and convince her
to leave B.T.’s cabin; an unsurprisingly distraught Harriet reluctantly complies. As
she and Mattie sit in silence, Harriet attempts an apology for her earlier anger:
“‘Mattie,’ she said at last, ‘I was unkind to you Saturday. You must not hold it against
me’”(235). Even in this attempted apology, Harriet reiterates the differentiation
between herself and Mattie, merely admitting to being “unkind” and asserting that
Mattie must “not hold it against her,” requests that seem to do little more than
attempt to restore the status quo ante. Taylor’s pathetic presentation of Harriet
throughout the story does not leave readers angry with Harriet for this seeming
arrogance. To the contrary, we are left feeling deeply sad for Harriet. While her
experience with Ann Prewitt has called into question the sufficiency of the southern
tradition, Harriet’s wish to return to this tradition’s boundaries and norms in her
interactions with Mattie reveal the inescapable nature of her nostalgia. This is not
due to Harriet’s arrogance, nor to her disregard for the fullness of Mattie’s tragic
experiences, but rather simply due to the limitations of Harriet’s experience: even
after being made to see the flaws of her nostalgia, she knows of no alternative for
making sense of her own self.
At the story’s close, Harriet is haunted by her last moments with Mattie in B.T.’s
cabin. After her apology, Mattie looked at Harriet with “neither forgiveness nor
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resentment,” but rather with “defiance of the general nature of this world where she
must pass her days, not of Harriet in particular. In her eyes there was something
beyond grief. After a moment she did speak, and she told Harriet that she was going
to sit there all night” (235). While Mattie does not forgive Harriet for her cruel
insensitivity two days prior, Mattie’s response is neither harsh or vindictive. Lying
in bed later, Harriet finds herself unable to recall Mattie’s words or tone. But this
lack of recollection leads to a moment of revelation: “It seemed as though Mattie
had used a special language common to both of them but one they had never before
discovered and could now never recover. . . in Mattie’s eyes there was an unspeakable
loneliness for which she could offer no consolation” (235-36). In the dark of her room,
Harriet finally understands the nature of the connection that she and Mattie mutually
hold—the “language common to them both”—that Harriet’s uncritical traditionalism
prevented her from recognizing as possible heretofore, and also that the events of this
weekend have excluded this connection from ever being expressed again.
Beyond this recognition, Harriet is also confronted with her own “unspeakable
loneliness,” as it seems as if “her children no longer existed; it was as though they
had all died in childhood as people’s children used to do. All the while she kept
remembering that Mattie was sitting out in that shack for the sole purpose of inhaling
the odor in the stifling air of B.T.’s room” (236). Isolated from Mattie, the individual
who could most closely relate to her anxieties, and cut off from those individuals
who formerly provided her with structured meaning, Harriet is ultimately isolated
from everyone, perhaps even God. Fervently in prayer when Sweetheart returns
to their bedroom, she hears him lower himself into bed. When Harriet opens her
eyes—importantly, Taylor does not say whether or not she finishes her prayers—she
is confronted with the fact that “it was dark and there was the chill of autumn night
about the room,” a chill made more ominous when we remember that this is the night
of the Fourth of July (236).
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To be certain, the source of Harriet’s final isolation is not some willful error or
prejudice on her part. As Taylor makes clear throughout “A Long Fourth,” Harriet
is acting out of a sense of propriety and in terms of a set of standards that are
deeply entwined with her sense of self. Her existential vocabulary provides her with
no resources outside of that she has received from Mama, Sweetheart, and Son, that
is, from the southern tradition itself. Harriet has not willfully made an anachronism
of her version of the southern tradition. Rather, her version exists as the default
rhetorical mode that she uses to make meaning for her life; she is either unaware that
there are other versions, or if she does, she has no access to them. This is the tragedy
of “A Long Fourth,” and the source of the deep pathos readers feel for Harriet.
Taylor explores how such nostalgic adherence to the southern tradition demands
self-division in another early-period short story, 1945’s “The Scoutmaster.” Taking
place in the home of a wealthy Nashville family, most likely sometime in the 1930s,10
“The Scoutmaster” is narrated by an unnamed prepubescent boy; his narration is
marked by an increasing awareness of the transition from childhood to adulthood,
and of the recognition that adulthood is presupposed on reactions to and relationships
with the past—not only the individual past of lived experience, but also the communal
and social past of norms, expectations, and ideals. Despite his constant bewilderment
at the adult world, at the story’s close the narrator arrives at a nascent emotional
maturity, which is effected by his recognition of the importance of facing the past
in order to create an adult identity. This recognition grows out of the narrator’s
observation of different means of interacting with the past, especially on the part
of the titular Scoutmaster, his Uncle Jake. These observations also force the young
narrator to recognize his estrangement and alienation from his family members—not
10

While no year is ever named and no definitive evidence of period appears in the story, James
Curry Robison asserts that Virginia Ann, the narrator’s older sister, uses “fad expressions of the
period [the 1930s], three of which appear in the first five paragraphs” (Robison 26). Trusting
Robison’s statement that Virginia Ann is using 1930s expressions, I take that as the story’s setting.
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only the adults, but also his brother and sister, whose transitions to adulthood are
presented here.
“The Scoutmaster” takes place over an unstated period of time, and the plot
largely consists of two moments of estrangement, with a moment of crisis between.
As the story opens, Aunt Grace has divorced Uncle Basil, and is living in Nashville
with the narrator’s family while waiting to hear about work. Eventually, she secures
employment, and as she waits on a taxi that will take her to a train bound for
Birmingham, the narrator is suddenly disconcerted, as he finds Aunt Grace to be a
“stranger,” no longer the “utterly useless if wonderfully ornamental member of the
family,” but rather one who plays a “function” he is yet unable to name (Taylor, “The
Scoutmaster” 271). The second moment of estrangement occurs at the story’s close.
Here, the narrator is attending the Scout meeting led by Uncle Jake, and there he
finds “that it seemed that [Uncle Jake] too was becoming a stranger” (294). Between
these moments is the central crisis, which grows out of Aunt Grace’s absence—Aunt
Grace is presented as a confidant and mentor for her niece—and creates the conditions
for the narrator attending the Scout meeting. While the rest of the family is away at a
Thanksgiving football game, the narrator is tasked with “chaperoning” Virginia Ann
and one of her beaux. With her family expecting her to show up at the game late,
and knowing her brother will provide little in the way of chaperoning, Virginia Ann
takes advantage of this chance for privacy. Naturally uncomfortable and instinctively
aware of his insufficiency for this role, the narrator attempts to ignore Virginia Ann,
holding onto his last moments of childish purity and ignorance of sexuality. When
the family unexpectedly returns returns home and catches Virginia Ann—“they were
only necking,” Brother tells the narrator, “but they sure were at it” (292)—the adult
family members are shocked at her breach of propriety. In order to provide themselves
the privacy to punish Virgina Ann, Mother and Father send the narrator to the Scout
meeting with Brother and Uncle Jake; while too young to be a Scout, the narrator
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will attend as Brother and Uncle Jake’s “visitor” (291).
In both the moments of estrangement and the central crisis, we see the narrator
facing the end of his childish egoism; this is especially apparent in the interactions
with Aunt Grace and Uncle Jake. There, the narrator is faced with the recognition
that both adults are individuals with lives outside of their relationship with the
him. This is straightforward enough, but by explicitly connecting the past to each
moment Taylor insists that we do not see “The Scoutmaster” simply as a story about
maturation. In both of these moments, the narrator is faced with recognizing not
only that Aunt Grace and Uncle Jake are individuals themselves, but also that their
identities arise from a personal, idiosyncratic experience of the past that is inaccessible
to the narrator.
Throughout the story, Aunt Grace is presented as a woman who, in the narrator’s
words, “was wise or old-fashioned enough to sit with Mother and Father and discuss
the things they could not abide in Virginia Ann and yet who was foolish or newfangled
enough to enjoy the very things which Virginia Ann called ‘the last word’”(271). To
exist simultaneously in the traditional world of her own generation and the thoroughly
modern world of her niece seems to be the familial role of Aunt Grace and women like
her; this is the “one reason why there should be one member of a boy’s family” like
her, something that makes Aunt Grace more than “utterly useless but wonderfully
ornamental” (ibid.). Taylor pairs this recognition with the unexpected appearance of
Aunt Grace’s ex-husband, who accompanies her to the railroad depot. As he rides
in a car with them, the narrator witnesses their “pleasant conversation,” and her
“chatter and her excited laughter” (ibid.). Taken alongside his earlier recognition,
the narrator’s observations suggest that the ways in which Aunt Grace fulfills the
role he has recognized has its origins in her own past, especially her relationship with
Uncle Basil and the personal idiosyncrasies produced by that relationship and its
history.
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In the second moment of estrangement, Uncle Jake has assumed the role of the
Scoutmaster, and the narrator’s witnessing of “Uncle Jake’s lips [pronouncing] the
words “‘loyal, brave, trustworthy, clean, reverent ’” is the proximate cause of the his
estrangement from the older man (294). For Uncle Jake, these words from the Boy
Scout Law represent “those honorable things which were left from the golden days
when a race of noble gentlemen and gracious ladies inhabited the land of the South.
[Uncle Jake] was saying that we must preserve them until one day we might stand with
young men from all over the nation to demand a return to the old ways and the old
teachings everywhere” (295). Whereas the narrator comes to realize that Aunt Grace
is a complicated individual whose past, and especially her failed marriage, did much
to influence the roles she assumed in their family, he is here unable to make much
sense of Uncle Jake becoming “more and more another stranger to me,” other than
recognizing that his uncle is “losing himself in the role of the eternal Scoutmaster”
(294). While the narrator is here unable to explain the cause of this transformation,
Taylor makes clear throughout the story that Uncle Jake is deeply affected by his
own personal losses; these losses result in the self-dividing nostalgia that separates
him into Uncle Jake and the Scoutmaster.
As noted, the central drama of “The Scoutmaster” is the narrator’s coming to
terms with the ways in which our relationship to our collective, social, and personal
pasts influences our adult identities. That Uncle Jake’s nostalgia requires him to
divide himself—and thus show himself as a “stranger” to the narrator—posits an
especially problematic example of the relationship between adult identity and the
past. Conversations between Mother and Father reveal significant disagreement over
the causes of Uncle’s Jakes need to self-divide. However, when taken alongside evidence provided by statements of Uncle Jake himself, these discussions point out that
Jake’s nostalgia results from his inability to fully and effectively perform the roles
of brother, father, and husband—roles to which the southern conservative tradition

114

lends significant importance and gravitas—and a desire to recover what he lost when
those roles become no longer available to him. Nostalgia becomes the only way for
Uncle Jake to enact this recovery, and his need to do so is so strong as to necessitate
his dividing himself.
In commenting on the disparity in appearance between Uncle Jake and Aunt
Grace, despite her being only five years younger than him, the narrator notes that
it wasn’t that Uncle Jake’s own sad life told on him. . . but, Father explained, Jake had had a motherless daughter to raise and to nurse through
a fatal illness at the age of nineteen, and that had kept him old-fashioned.
Even if this motherless daughter had not been a prig and a fanatic—His
daughter had died at nineteen from a skin disease she had caught in her
social work. Her name had been Margaret, but he had always called her
‘Presh’ for ‘precious’—even if she had not been such a one, Uncle Jake
would have remained old-fashioned, Father explained, because just raising
a child did that for one. (268)
While Father’s assertion that raising a child keeps one “old-fashioned” has some truth
in it, this does not explain the presence of Uncle Jake’s nostalgia, something both
Mother and Father are aware of and attempt to understand.
While Mother and Father both recognize the existence and results of Jake’s nostalgia, they disagree on whether or not it stems from a sense of loss. Mother’s
interpretation connects Jake’s nostalgia with his daughter’s religious mania, noting
that it “began as very much the same sort of thing as Jake’s nostalgia. It was all
tied up with notions of her mother’s existence in Heaven. Toward the last her social
work consisted mostly of preaching to those wretched poor people in East Nashville
about her mother in Heaven. She could just not be bothered with any real view
of things” (282). Presh’s piety is both zealous and myopic, in that it consumes her
thinking while preventing her from performing her role as a social worker in any real
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capacity. Importantly, this decidedly negative aspect of her piety—and it is this that
transforms it into “religious mania”—is based in the loss of her mother. By connecting Jake’s nostalgia to Presh’s religious mania, Mother affirms that Jake’s nostalgia
divorces him from any “real view of things,” and also seems to imply that it, too, is
rooted in the loss of his wife.
But when Father agrees with this tacit premise, and speculates on “Uncle Jake’s
fate and what it might have been if his wife had not died when Presh was only
half grown,” the narrator’s Mother disagrees. The narrator records Father wondering
aloud: “‘If only Margaret, herself, had lived to make him and Presh a home, he might
not have forever been looking to the past and being so uncritical of things in the
present. He might have taken hold of himself.’ Here Mother would disagree. Men’s
natures weren’t changed by circumstances, she contended” (282, emphasis added).
Mother’s here rejects basing Jake’s nostalgia in the loss of Margaret; while Presh is
unable to relate to the present because of the loss of her mother, Mother sees Jake as
constitutionally nostalgic. Contrarily, Father sees Jake’s nostalgia as based in the loss
of Presh and Margaret, and argues that Mother’s thinking to the contrary illustrates
that “The female is the cynic of the species.”
Taylor implies that the truth of Jake’s nostalgia lies between and beyond the
arguments of Mother and Father. Obviously, Uncle Jake’s nostalgia does separate
him from a critical engagement with the present, which seems to the be one point
on which both Mother and Father agree. However, they fundamentally disagree over
the root cause of the nostalgia, with Mother presuming it is an intrinsic part of Uncle
Jake’s character, and Father presuming that it results from Jake losing his wife and
daughter. But examining Taylor’s presentation of Uncle Jake himself, we see that
neither Mother nor Father understand the full complexity of Jake’s nostalgia. An
examination of the ways in which Uncle Jake thinks about his dead brother, Louis,
brings us a better understanding of Uncle Jake than the one we and the narrator are
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given by Mother and Father.
Louis haunts the entire story, and his absence and centrality to the family are
announced by the narrator at the story’s outset:
In the hall there was a picture of Father at the age of six, still wearing
what he called his kilts but large enough to be holding the reins of a big
walking horse on the back of which was seated Uncle Jake. My Uncle
Louis, too, in his first pants, was in the picture. He was seated on the
grass underneath the horse’s belly with his arms about the neck of a big
airedale. (But Uncle Louis had died of parrot fever when he was only
twelve.) Virginia Ann would show the picture to her beaux as they were
leaving at night. It was always good for a laugh, especially if it was a new
beau that had just met Father or Uncle Jake. . . (267)
Here, we see that the family enshrines the memory of Uncle Louis, and that this
portrait provides a moment of mild, though certainly legitimate, tension between the
older and younger members of the family (Father describes Virginia Ann’s dismissal
of the portrait as one of many things about his daughter that he simply “could not
abide”). But more intriguingly, the photograph indicates a real difference in age
between Louis and Jake; the photograph shows Louis in his “first pants,” and Taylor
describes “the lace on the hem of Uncle Jake’s dress” soon after the initial mention of
the photograph (267). Differences in dress between the brothers suggests a difference
of at least a few years, indicating that Jake was still quite young when Louis died
of parrot fever. This fact makes Jake’s remembrances of Louis become far more
important than simple reminiscence; understanding how Uncle Jake remembers his
dead brother is key to understanding his nostalgia and, through it, his character.
The narrator recalls Jake’s encomia of Louis:
Whenever all the family were at the table Uncle Jake would often talk of
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the saintly nature of Uncle Louis. . . Neither he nor Father could remember
ever having heard Uncle Louis speak an uncivil word or remember his
misbehaving on any occasion. Once their father. . . had come through the
strawberry patch behind the old house on the Nolansville Pike and found
Uncle Jake and Father playing mumble-the-peg while Uncle Louis did all
the berry picking. And when Uncle Louis saw his father stripping off his
belt to give his brothers a whipping he ran to him and told him that he,
the eldest brother, was to blame for not making them work and that he
should receive the punishment. My grandfather had turned and walked
to his house without another word.
. . . Uncle Jake would say that [Grandfather] walked away toward the
house in order that they should not see how moved he was by Uncle
Louis’s brotherly love and spirit of self-sacrifice. (275)
While he certainly may very well remember this event, it is obvious that Jake is interpreting his father’s reaction. Furthermore, Jake’s extreme youth at Louis’s death
suggests that his conception of his late brother’s “saintly nature” is a purely retroactive construct. Other moments in the story corroborate this, and indicate that Louis
has become more a symbol and type to Jake than an actual, remembered brother.
For Jake, Louis is the exemplar of those virtues he recites at the scout meeting, and
those virtues are the corrective to what he describes to the Scouts as “these latter
days when the morals and manners of the country have been corrupted” (295).
By assigning Louis these roles, Jake has made his long-dead eldest brother into the
embodiment of the southern conservative tradition itself and, as a result, the source
of Jake’s nostalgia. A careful reading of “The Scoutmaster” shows that Mother and
Father’s interpretations of Jake’s nostalgia both contain kernels of truth. While Jake’s
nostalgia does have its source in the loss of Margaret and Presh—thus validating
Father’s account—it was not their loss that produced this nostalgia. Rather, Jake
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uses nostalgia as a means of recovering and reenacting the significant roles of father
of husband. Jake’s wife and child were taken from him far too early, and his childish
memories and adult interpretations of his dead brother provide him with a means of
making sense of those losses.
Throughout the story, Uncle Jake shows himself to be uncritical of the present,
counseling Virginia Ann’s parents to be liberal with her at several moments. But even
at even at these times, Jake’s old-fashioned sensibilities are apparent; when Father
complains of a contemporary song being overly suggestive, Jake defends it because
it “had more of the old-time feeling in it” than other new music (273). That Jake
is uncritical of the present is not a result of his accepting its pieties, but because
the deaths of Presh and Margaret left him without a proper, well-defined role to
play in the present. As his thinking is largely governed by the southern conservative
tradition that praises the importance of marriage and fatherhood, Jake as a childless
widower—a role which finds few precedents in the plantation mythos on which Jake’s
worldview is based—is alienated from the present. As a result, to find meaning the
present, Jake must look to the past. With husband and father no longer available to
him, Jake’s nostalgic invocations of Louis and the virtues of the South’s past provide
him with an opportunity to play another meaningful role—that of Scoutmaster.
Jake’s scout-meeting criticism of “the morals and manners of the country” in
“these latter days” makes sense in this context. Just as the narrator realizes that Aunt
Grace needed to play a role more complex than a “merely ornamental” family member,
Uncle Jake needs to be more than a childless widower for his life to meaning. Through
a complex arrangement of his personal past, loss, and reconfiguring memories of his
dead brother into myth, Jake finds a means for creating real and substantial meaning.
At the story’s close, the narrator describes the Scoutmaster as “a gigantic replica of all
the little boys on the benches, half ridiculous and half frightening to me in his girlish
khaki middy,” recalling the androgyny of the clothing worn in the hall photograph,
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along with the uncanniness of seeing an adult as a child, something that also mirrors
the hall photograph. Jake has thus not only become the titular Scoutmaster, but
has also inhabited the ghostly absence of Louis, channeling his dead brother through
a lens colored by traditionalist virtues and pieties. In the end, Jake’s nostalgia is
not caused by his losses, but rather provides him with a means for recovering from
his losses, and their deeply confusing existential consequences. By becoming the
Scoutmaster, Uncle Jake can recover his lost brother Louis, and through him his lost
wife and daughter. As the product of a traditionalist society that seeks to place
all of its members in well-defined roles, channeling an idealized version of his dead
brother provides Jake with a context for existential meaning not available to him as
a childless, widowed uncle.
In “The Scoutmaster,” Taylor provides a robust, if complex, explanation of why
one would cling to a nostalgic version of the southern tradition: because of the
meaning it provides to an individual in the face of real and substantial loss. In these
situations, the southern tradition seems to provide a source of meaning and stability,
a means for recovering what was lost in some way. Because of what it seems to
promise, this tradition is understandably attractive to individuals like Uncle Jake,
characters for whom Taylor desires our pathos and not our derision. But Taylor is
ultimately not presenting Uncle Jake, Harriet Wilson, and Aunt Munsie as merely
pathetic characters. Instead of asking us to pity them, Taylor wants us to see these
characters as tragic individuals, and to recognize that their flaw is not in their desire
to use and engage the southern tradition as an act of recovery for something lost, but
rather that they can only engage this tradition nostalgically. Uncle Jake presents a
clear example of this, as for him, “loyal, brave, trustworthy, clean, reverent” are not
virtues that have critical utility in a flawed present, but rather things merely to be
preserved until the day that “men from all over the nation [demand] a return to the
old ways and the old teachings everywhere” (295).
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The existence of this tragic flaw points toward the profound concern of Taylor’s
early period: the ways in which a flawed reading of the southern conservative tradition limits his characters existentially. Aunt Munsie, Harriet Wilson, and Uncle
Jake provide three examples, and stories like “The Dark Walk,” “Two Ladies in Retirement,” “Their Losses,” “A Spinster’s Tale,” and “A Wife of Nashville,” as well
as the dramas The Death of a Kinsman and Tennessee Day in St. Louis provide
more, presenting nuanced illustrations of both the need to engage this tradition and
the destructive consequences of treating it with ossified nostalgia. It is important
to recognize that Taylor is critiquing this particular, ossified vision of the southern
tradition, and not the tradition itself. In the early period, Taylor’s characters—and
perhaps even the author himself—see the only alternative to the southern tradition
as the bourgeois, capitalistic, self-serving version of modernity the South’s waning
aristocracy embraced between the World Wars. The consequences of this vision are
equally deadening, as we see powerfully in Taylor’s first novel, A Woman of Means,
as well as stories like the three examined here, “Cookie,” and “The Fancy Woman,”
works populated by characters who could benefit from a reintroduction of loyalty,
bravery, trustworthiness, cleanliness, and reverence.
With these recognitions in mind, it is apparent that Taylor spent the first two
decades of his career attempting to make sense of how a southerner—particularly an
upper-class southerner—was to exist in a society increasingly distant and antipathetic
to the South and its traditions, those things that had given their lives meaning. The
characters who populate his early works are left adhering to one vexed worldview
because of the limitations of what seems like the only available alternative. But as
Taylor shows again and again in his early period, the way in which these characters
cling to their past is itself destructive. This is a frustrating conundrum, and it is
no wonder then that Taylor eventually abandons questions of the southerner’s place
in favor of exploring other themes in his middle period. The last work of the early
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period, Tennessee Day in St. Louis, closes with Lanny Tolliver, the Old Southobsessed main character, slowly repeating “Give me time. Give me time,” while a
stage direction tells us that “candles burn on” (Taylor, Tennessee Day in St. Louis
177). This is a fitting close to the early period, as Taylor returns to these questions of
the place of the southerner and the southern tradition some years later; the candles,
it seems, continued to burn on, and in Taylor’s late period we see a return to these
questions—but with an important distinction.
In his late works, Taylor’s characters find themselves required to engage the southern tradition. Yet, unlike Uncle Jake, Aunt Munsie, and Harriet Wilson, these latter
characters often do not want to engage this tradition, but rather turn from it. In the
place of nostalgia, they cling to other vices fathered by other sorts of heroism, most
notably a very American loyalty to the self over the community. As circumstances
require them to recognize self-loyalty as problematic, as what Eliot calls “impudent
crimes,” these characters look for other perspectives to provide them with meaning.
A reassessed version of southern conservatism, in which the tradition itself is distilled down to its core perspective, divorced from nostalgia, and becomes a source of
strength, stability, and meaning for Taylor’s late characters. In short, the southern
tradition becomes a source of existentially and morally useful virtue for these characters, providing them with a means for living as existentially whole and balanced
individuals in an often-bewilderingly postmodern America and often-frustratingly
nostalgic South.
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Chapter 4
Late Taylor and the Southern Tradition’s
Virtuous Individualism
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In the epilogue to The Southern Tradition at Bay, Richard Weaver remarks that
the Southerner possesses a “consciousness of failure,” a recognition of the superfluity
of his worldview vis-à-vis American triumphalism. Weaver observes that such a feeling is so pervasive “that the Southerner, despite efforts at compensation, has been
unable to convince himself” of the usefulness, correctness, or truth of his tradition.
Weaver suggests that this failure results not so much in a South which denies its
tradition, but in a region marked by unreflective retrenchment, producing a “hypersensitivity to criticism” that limits the achievements and utility of its tradition. To
overcome this and engage the real and dynamic possibilities provided by the Southern conservative tradition, Weaver argues that the South needs a “metaphysic of its
position,” something that will provide the Southerner with a place from which “he
could judge his achievements with some assurance that the judgments would be vindicated” (390). Recalling Eugene Genovese, one such “achievement” of the Southern
tradition is a critique of deadening materialism, and an accompanying vision of a
communal society in which individualism is neither myopically atomistic or destructively subsumed by the top-down decrees of the collective. The Southern tradition
posits a society in which individuals understand their roles, the ways in which their
lives affect those of others in the community, and the resultant duties each individual
owes to others.
While this vision of the Southern tradition may, as Genovese argues, have provided 20th century man a means for critiquing and resisting both hyper-individualistic
American worship of the market and collectivist Soviet worship of the state, the practical consequences of the Southern tradition in the 20th century were often profoundly
negative. Peter Taylor’s early works make clear that the Southern tradition too often
clings to nostalgic views of Southern society, making the roles and duties demanded
by that tradition outdated at best, and defenses of cruel injustices at worst. Yet, precisely because they lack the “metaphysic of position” Weaver asserts that Southerners
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need to properly judge the tradition and its achievements, the characters of Taylor’s
early fiction are unable to do anything with the possibilities and perspectives provided
by Southern conservatism. Nostalgic and possessing a “hypersensitivity to criticism,”
the characters of Taylor’s early fiction are defeated by the tradition—either smashed
by their own adherence to it or forced into self-division.
But as noted at the end of the previous chapter, Taylor is not dismissive of the
tradition as a whole. To the contrary, as his late work makes clear, Taylor is largely
concerned with examining the virtues present in the tradition, and exploring why it
is difficult for some of his characters to utilize these virtues. Southern conservatism’s
virtues grow out of the broader philosophical underpinnings of the tradition itself:
a repudiation of atomistic individualism, an emphasis on contexts, and a suspicion
of systematic, abstracted means of understanding and interpreting existence. This
suggests that Uncle Jake’s invocation of loyalty, bravery, trustworthiness, cleanliness,
and reverence in the closing moments of “The Scoutmaster” provide us with a set of
virtues that fit neatly within the philosophical demands of Southern conservatism.
However, in connecting them to “the honorable things” left from the South’s “golden
days,” and arguing that the Scouts must “preserve them until one day we might stand
with young men from all over the nation to demand a return to the old ways and the
old teachings everywhere,” Uncle Jake is making a vice out of these virtues (Taylor,
“The Scoutmaster” 295). By casting them as relics for preservation, and not things
to are available for utilization in the present, Uncle Jake fails to recognize an essential
aspect of the Southern tradition—its rhetorical nature.
Taylor’s late works show characters involved in recognizing this rhetorical nature,
in that these works are concerned with exploring the relationship of the individual
to the community, the various social, economic, and cultural exigencies that govern
life within that community, and the ways in which these, as well as the communal
past, affect an individual life. These concerns are rhetorical in that they are based in
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interactions between community members, the suprapersonal contexts to which these
interactions must respond, and the need of the individual to interpret and navigate
these. Understanding the South’s conservative tradition as useful and existentially
empowering in the face of postmodernism’s promotion of banal, hyper-individualistic
mediocrity, Taylor’s late characters find themselves translating Southern conservatism
to make accessible the virtues at its core. One of these virtues, a traditionalist vision
of individualism, is especially important for Taylor’s characters in what are perhaps
Taylor’s three finest works: “The Old Forest,” “In the Miro District,” and A Summons
to Memphis.
In these works, Taylor contrasts two distinct visions of individualism: the classically liberal vision of the preeminence of the individual self, and a conservative
understanding of the self that Richard Weaver, in “Two Types of American Individualism,” identifies as “[s]ocial bond individualism” (Weaver, “Two Types” 102). In
this essay, Weaver contrasts social bond individualism—exemplified by quintessential
Southern conservative John Randolph of Roanoke—with “anarchic” individualism,
exemplified by Henry David Thoreau. Weaver takes exception to the fundamentally
dialectical nature of Thoreau’s conception of the self, as this way of thinking results
in “an ideal, which is finally offered very winningly, but in complete isolation from the
facts of life” (94). The final, ideal stage of individualism, as presented in “Civil Disobedience” and elsewhere in Thoreau’s corpus, is merely that—an abstracted ideal.
Weaver pushes back against Thoreau’s version of individualism, noting that any
ideal must still respond to
the task of conceiving how this or any ideal is going to be conditioned by
historical existence, and then of saying something helpful about how this
conditioned being can live, cooperate, and compete in civil order. Here,
I am afraid, Thoreau is not so much a philosopher as a philosopher on
a holiday. He is letting his thoughts follow his wishes and turning his
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gaze away from recalcitrant reality. It is characteristic of a dialectic not
respectful of the facts to lead away from the existential world. (95)
Thoreau’s dialectic of individualism leads to an ideal man who is isolated, and who
finds that isolation to be, in and of itself, good. Such isolation is problematic in
that is provides no instruction for making sense of living and human interaction
with a “civil order,” and because individuals can never be truly isolated; even if a
person was able to remove himself from other human contact, he would still find
himself necessarily responding to the inescapability of historical circumstance and
existence. As such, Thoreau’s ideal is not merely impractical, but also dangerous.
Seeing atomism as both the most worthy version of the self and ultimately impossible
insomuch as he cannot escape interacting with others, the individual makes sense of
these unavoidable interactions in terms of himself, and of his own vision of the good.
This is “anarchic” individualism precisely because it cannot provide a means for
making sense of community, and its obligations, duties, and relationships.
Weaver contrasts this with social bond individualism, as exemplified by John
Randolph of Roanoke’s political thought, and his “scorn of what he called dialectic.”
Randolph sees the dialectician—an individual like Thoreau—as a mere “abstract reasoner,” who “ceases to recognize circumstances, which are somewhat determinative
in all historical questions” (88). Randolph, in contrast, approaches existence rhetorically, which causes him to “always [speak] out of historical consciousness because
his problem are always existential ones” (89).1 As Thoreau’s dialectical approach to
the personal self has political consequences,2 so does Randolph’s political rhetoric
1

Of course, this suggests that rhetoric and dialectic are opposed, and not “counterparts” in the
Aristotelian sense. Weaver, ever the Aristotelian, recognizes this and clarifies his point by noting
that there are circumstances in which “rhetoric and dialectic may become dangerously separated,
and then users of them become enemies ceasing to help each other as both strive to go it alone”
(88). This, Weaver suggests, is the American position in the first half of the 19th century, and is
arguably also the position of the circumstances in which Taylor’s late works are set, and perhaps
our time as well.
2

Again, “Civil Disobedience” is the key text here.
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have personal consequences. Weaver contrasts each man’s approach to manumission to point out the differences between rhetorical and dialectical understandings of
individualism:
When Randolph wrote out the emancipation of his slaves, he made economic provision for them. In Thoreau’s anti-slavery papers one looks in
vain for a single syllable about how or on what the freedmen were to live.
The matter for him began and ended with taking a moral stance. (100)
Thus, the essential difference between anarchic and social bond individualisms: the
former proceeds from an abstract notion of what the good is, and what its purposes
are, while the latter begins with a consideration of social and historical contexts, and
the consequential obligations of each individual to another.3 The process of Taylor’s
late fiction, of his characters arriving at a “metaphysic of position” with regard to the
South’s past, is driven by such a rhetorical transition from anarchic to social-bond
invidualism.
“The Old Forest,” a 1979 story later republished in a 1985 collection of the same
name, is one of Taylor’s clearest articulations of how these varying notions of individualism have consequences for making sense of the Southern tradition. This story is
narrated by Nat Ramsey, now a middle-aged college professor, who recalls the events
of four days in December 1937, and their profound consequences on the rest of his
life. Nat, like other young men his age and social class in 1930s Memphis, is expected
to marry a member of the Memphis débutante set. While self-consciously aware that
“to the liberated young people of today this may all seem a corrupting factor in our
old way of life” (Taylor, “The Old Forest” 33), Nat explains that even while seriously
courting their country club girls, young men of his milieu would simultaneously go
3

Of course, this is not to say that social bond individualism is not without its own moral failings.
After all, thinking about “obligations” formed the rationales underlying notions of noblesse oblige
and patriarchal duty that were used to justify slavery and other forms of black disenfranchisement.
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“out on the town with girls of a different sort,” whom Nat and other “well-broughtup young [men]. . . facetiously and somewhat arrogantly referred to as the Memphis
demimonde” (31). These young women, who have normally had some sort of professional, vocational, or secretarial training in place of “finishing school,” are bright,
sometimes artistic, somewhat sophisticated, and perhaps most importantly for Nat
and his cohort, sexually liberated: “you will understand that they certainly weren’t
the innocent, untutored types that we generally took to dances at the Memphis Country Club and whom we eventually looked forward to marrying” (32). During the time
with which the story is concerned, Nat is formally engaged to the débutante Caroline
Braxley, while going “out on the town” with Lee Ann Deehart, a member of the
“Memphis demimonde.”
A week before he is to be married to Caroline, Nat heads to his university to study
for a Latin final; after a brief and flirtatious phone conversation, Lee Ann decides to
accompany him. Along the way, they get into a car accident. While no one is injured,
Lee Ann panics and takes off through the snow into the titular old forest on the edge of
Memphis, not to be seen for several days. Fearing a scandal and a canceled wedding,
Nat unsuccessfully attempts to hide the situation from Caroline while he looks for
Lee Ann. The rest of the narrative concerns Nat’s search for Lee Ann, first with
the police, then with his father and other men of his father’s generation, and finally,
unable to hide the situation any longer, with Caroline. After Caroline and Nat locate
Lee Ann, a confrontation erupts between the couple, serving as the culmination of
Nat’s four-day examination of the Southern tradition’s complexities, failures, and
virtues.
From the opening paragraphs of the story, the self-centered, shallow individualism
of Nat and his fellows is immediately obvious. In contrast to a virtue-laden vision
of individualism that understands interactions with others in terms of duty, Nat
expresses an instrumentalist understanding of others. By dividing the young women
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of Memphis into two distinct classes, young men like Nat are implicitly assigning
these groups of women different roles. He describes how common it was
for a well-brought-up young man like me to keep up his acquaintance,
until the very eve of his wedding, with some member of. . . the Memphis
demimonde. (That was merely to say with a girl who was not in the
Memphis debutante set.) I am not even sure how many of us knew what
the word “demimonde” meant or implied. But once it had been applied
to such girls, it was hard for us to give up. We even learned to speak of
them individually as demimondaines. . . (31)
The immediate implications are obvious. Some of these women exist for marrying,
others exist for dalliances. While Nat’s description of these women, and his later
description of the interactions with them had by young men of his social class, does not
suggest vindictiveness or harsh misogyny, there is clearly an understanding of these
women’s value and purposes not being inherent to the women themselves. Rather,
their value results from the interactions they have with Nat and other men like him.
If there is duty at play here, it is that these women are expected to play the assigned
role of mistress or wife dutifully; what Nat owes to Lee Ann or Caroline is, at the
story’s outset, at best unknown, and perhaps, in his thinking, even nonexistent.
Caroline exhibits a similar attitude. Nat informs us that “Caroline liked any sort
of individualism in men,” a characteristic that results not so much from a positive
valuation of the individualism of others as it does from the room it provides her to
celebrate her own individualism: “She had already said to me before that Saturday
afternoon that a successful marriage depended in part on the two persons’ developing
and maintaining a certain number of separate interests in life. She was all for my
keeping up my golf, my hunting, my fishing. And, unlike my own family, she saw no
reason that I shouldn’t keep up my peculiar interest in Latin. . . ” (36). While such
an attitude is not necessarily selfish, it is immaturely self-focused, as evidenced by
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Caroline’s insistence that “No man is going to set foot in my house this afternoon,
Nat Ramsey! I’m getting married next Saturday, in case the fact has slipped your
mind” (37, emphasis in original). The exclusivity of “I’m getting married,” instead of
the inclusive (and more precise) “We’re getting married” is, when combined with her
insistence on “separate interests,” revelatory about Caroline’s views of individualism.
Lee Ann, too, exhibits a self-focused individualism at the beginning of the story.
When she calls Nat on the telephone, she begins to tell him that
she was bored to death. Couldn’t I think of something fun she and I
could do this dreary winter afternoon? I laughed aloud at her. “What a
shameless wench you are, Lee Ann!” I said.
“Shameless? How so?” she said with pretended innocence.
“As if you weren’t fully aware,” I lectured her, “that I’m getting married
a week from today!”
“What’s that got to do with the price of eggs in Arkansas?” She laughed.
“Do you think, old Nat, I want to marry you?” (37, emphasis in original)
Like Caroline, Lee Ann understands her relationship to Nat in terms of how he fulfills a role for her. Here, she has no concern for his marriage or any other aspect of
his personal life—her only concern is in how he can provide her with an afternoon’s
entertainment. The ways in which both Caroline and Lee Ann dictate Nat’s role to
him exemplifies a kind of selfishness on the part of each woman, paralleling his own
thinking about them. While this selfishness lacks real ugliness, it nevertheless exhibits a shallowness in each character’s understanding of themselves and others. Nat,
Caroline, and Lee Ann are merely pursuing enjoyable experiences and an unreflective
life.
Of course, there is nothing necessarily offensive or morally corrosive in such pursuits. But that Lee Ann’s running away and Nat’s looking for her result in significant
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soul-searching on both of their parts, and that Caroline’s interactions with both Nat
and Lee Ann late in the story—something I will examine in detail shortly—show
a powerful reexamination of her own life suggests that Taylor wants us to see that
these perspectives are existentially deadening, and that “The Old Forest” is largely
a search for an alternative perspective. While deeply concerned with the vexed place
of women in this story (as he is in much of his other work as well), Taylor is here
not writing a progressive critique of instrumentalizing, essentialist misogyny. To the
contrary, Taylor’s criticism here is a deeply traditional, conservative excoriation of
the dehumanizing effects of an atomistic individualism that disconnects individuals
from genuine, human interaction with others—a disconnection that results from uncertainties about individuals’ selves, their place within a society, and the duties and
obligations owed to others.
Over the course of looking for Lee Ann, Nat is presented with three distinct ways
of reconsidering how he understands her. On Monday, the first day of the search, Nat
recognizes the rhetorical problem of the term “demimonde” itself: that it says nothing
about these women, and rather serves only to help him create an abstract ideal of
himself. On Tuesday, he is presented with an example of social bond individualism
looks like, and observes the existential consequences of this different understanding
of the relationship between the self and others. On Wednesday, Nat and Caroline
finally find Lee Ann, and Caroline’s emotional reflection on and explication of the
events of the last several days force Nat to recognize himself as the beneficiary of
social bond individualism, especially on the part of Caroline. Ultimately, Taylor uses
Nat’s experiences to show that the individual freedom is not the result of an anarchic
devotion to the self, but rather through an engagement with others, a willingness to
recognize the limiting circumstances of individuals, and then perform the necessary
duties and obligations to facilitate and aid their lives.
On the first day, Nat goes around in the company of two Memphis police officers
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to meet and interview several of Lee Ann’s friends and acquaintances, women he
recognizes as also part of the Memphis demimonde. This round of searching and
interviewing goes for the entire day, with the only break being an hour for lunch,
in which Nat is left by himself at his father’s office. The description of the office is
telling:
Our offices, like most of the other cotton factors’ offices, were in one of the
plain-faced, three- and four-story buildings put up on Front Street during
the middle years of the last century, just before the Civil War. Cotton
men were very fond of those offices, and the offices did possess a certain
rough beauty that anyone could see. Apparently, there had been few,
if any, improvements or altercations since the time they were built. . . I
was sitting on a cotton trough beside one of those tall windows, eating
my club sandwich, when I heard the telephone ring back in the inner
office. I remember that when it rang my eyes were on a little stretch of
the Arkansas shoreline roughly delineated by its scrubby trees and my
thoughts were on the Arkansas roadhouses where we often went with the
demimonde girls on a Saturday night. (56)
Several things are at work in this passage. First, by commenting on the age of the
buildings, the era in which they were built, and their use by cotton factors, Taylor
is evoking the economic history of west Tennessee and the Mississippi Delta; that
“Cotton men were very fond of those offices,” explicitly built before the Civil War,
suggests reasons other than location or aesthetics for their attractiveness. Rather, it
is precisely because they evoke the South’s past and traditions that these “plain-faced,
three- and four story buildings” are so attractive. Clearly, Taylor is connecting the
South, and its history and contexts, with Nat’s search for Lee Ann. By invoking these
contexts, Taylor suggests Nat’s nascent awareness of social and historical contexts for
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making sense of his relationships with others—that is, of the essentially rhetorical
nature of these relationships.4
The phone call Nat receives is from “one of the city girls,” an anonymous woman
Nat cannot identify, but who nevertheless has a voice that “sounded familiar” (57,
56). Telling Nat that Lee Ann is “all right,” so long as he and the police “lay off
and stop chasing her,” the woman proceeds to excoriate Nat: “Don’t you have any
decency at all? Don’t you have a brain in your head? Don’t you know what this is
like for Lee Ann? We all thought you were her friend” (57). Chastised, the call leads
Nat to reflect on his relationship with Lee Ann; reflecting on these while sitting in the
historically and contextually pregnant space of the cotton factor office, Nat comes to
several vital conclusions.
First, he thinks through the problem of labeling these women demimondaines:
“Possibly, they got called that first by the only member of our generation in Memphis
who had read Marcel Proust, a literary boy who later became a college professor and
who wanted to make his own life in Memphis—and ours—seem more interesting that
it was” (57). While uncertain, that Nat was himself a “literary boy who later became
a college professor” makes it quite possible that he is here referring to himself, and
that he is the originator of the term. If this is so—and it seems likely to me that it
is, and a touch of very Taylorian subtly to present this vital fact in such a manner—
then the context in which he begins these reflections takes on even more significance.
Proust provides Nat with a set of historical circumstances and contexts in which he
can pursue his own abstract ideal of himself, an ideal that is not subject to the actual
circumstances and contexts of life in 1930s Memphis—in other words, a Thoreauvian
identity.
4

This is something that begins to come into focus only after Lee Ann’s disappearance; before
this, the only mentions of historical phenomena are Horace’s Odes—and these are not presented
at all as social or historical contexts that affect communities, but are rather simply one of Nat’s
“anomalies” with which he had “annoyed” his parents (35), and thus simply further evidence of
Nat’s atomistic isolation.
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That he has been crafting such an identity is brought into stark relief when contrasted against the cotton-growing river bottom and “Arkansas roadhouses where we
often went with the demimonde girls” outside of his window, leading Nat to reflect
who, in fact, the “demimondaines” actually were:
. . . those girls came from a variety of backgrounds. We [Nat and the
police] went to the houses of some of their parents, some of whom were
day laborers who spoke in accents of the old Memphis Irish, descendants
of the Irish who were imported to build the railroads in Texas. Today
some of the girls would inevitably have been black. But they were the
daughters of also of bank clerks and salesmen and of professional men, too,
because they made no distinction among themselves. . . The girls were not
interested in such distinctions of origin, were not conscious of them, had
not been made aware of them by their parents. They would have been
highly approved of by the present generation of young people. (58)
Suddenly sensitive to their backgrounds and placement in history—note that Nat also
makes comments about them in relationship to the “present,” that is, the place in the
1970s in which he is telling this story—and the socioeconomic contingencies of their
lives, Taylor shows Nat coming to recognize the contexts that govern his interactions
with the ostensible demimondaines, as well as the robust complexity of who they
actually are.
With these contexts in mind, Nat begins to see the limitations of his defining
these women as demimondes, and arrives at his second conclusion about them—an
awareness of who they actually are, beneath his self-serving, surface-level conceptions
of them. As he and the two policemen ride around and engage women of this social
circle, Nat observes that “in each case I found myself admiring the girl not only for her
boldness in dealing with the situation. . . but also for a personal, feminine beauty that
I had never before been fully aware of.” This beauty is “personal” to each woman, in
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that it reflects something about her more profound than her physical attractiveness.
He notes that “there seemed a contrast between the delicate beauty of their bodies,
their prettily formed arms and legs, their breasts and hips, their small feet and hands,
their soft natural hair. . . a contrast, that is to say, between this physical beauty and
a bookishness and a certain toughness of mind and a boldness of spirit which were
unmistakable in all of them” (59). By recognizing this contrast, and through it,
that these women have characteristics and worth beyond their relationships with
him, Nat shows himself moving closer to an understanding of individuals as existing
within communities, and coming out of particular social and historical contexts. The
members of what Nat has problematically labeled the Memphis demimonde are not
isolated individuals, and in making this observation, Nat finds himself reconsidering
how he understands his own individualism.
This reconsideration is brought into greater perspective on the second day of the
search. On that Tuesday, Nat finds himself “following almost the same routine in
the company of my father and the editor of the morning paper, and, as a matter
of fact, the mayor of Memphis himself” (66) But while Nat is in a car with these
men, it is not only these who are out looking for Lee Ann, but rather close to a
“dozen or so men. . . Caroline’s father, his lawyer, the driver of the other vehicle, his
lawyer, my father’s lawyer, ministers from three church denominations, the editor of
the afternoon newspaper, and still others” (67). In other words, Nat finds himself
accompanied by the previous generation of his own class—the fathers of those boys
who thought of girls like Lee Ann as demimondaines. Nat’s journey with these men
thus represents an opportunity to understand their relationship to girls like Lee Ann,
and thus their own conception of self. Examining the contrast between generations
is inevitable, and leads Nat into a further reconsideration of his own individualism.
The differences are stark. As already discussed, Nat has problematically labeled
these women so that he can create an identity for himself—the exotic demimondaines
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connects Nat and his fellows to “Proust’s Paris,” allowing them to divorce other human beings from specific contexts in order to remake them in the service of an abstract
vision of their own selves. In contrast, men of his father’s generation demonstrate a
perspective that is indicative of social bond individualism. Men like Nat’s father
were a generation of American men who were perhaps the last to grow up
in a world where women were absolutely subjected and under the absolute
protection of men. . . In referring to the character of the life girls like Lee
Ann led—of which they showed a far greater awareness than I would have
supposed the possessed—they agreed that this was the second or third
generation there of women who had lived as independently, as freely as
these girls did. I felt that what they said was in no sense derogatory or
critical as it would have been in the presence of their wives or daughters.
They spoke almost affectionately and with a certain sadness of such girls.
They spoke as if these were daughters of dead brothers of their own or
of dead companions-in-arms during the First World War. And it seemed
to me that they thought of these girls as the daughters of men who had
abdicated their responsibilities as fathers. . . It was a sort of communal
fatherhood they were acting out. Eventually, they seemed to say, fathers
might not be required. (67)
Even though a sense of exactly why these men interact with these women as such is
unclear to Nat, he nevertheless finds himself recognizing that these interactions are
the result of historical and social contexts. The paternalism of Mr. Ramsey and the
specific ways in which it manifests itself result from his recognition of the circumstances of these women’s lives, and the ways in which their lives are interconnected
with and influenced by the lives of Mr. Ramsey and men of his class. Mr. Ramsey’s regard for women like Lee Ann is thus based in a rhetorical awareness of both
his historical influence and power on their lives, and the real prospect of his own
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superfluity—that eventually “fathers might not be required.” In this way, Mr. Ramsey’s paternalist care mirrors the attitude John Randolph of Roanoke has towards
manumission.
In presenting the nature of the relationship between Mr. Ramsey and his ilk
and these young working-and-middle-class women, Taylor is pointing to a virtue
born out of the Southern conservative tradition: that individuals should live in a
manner that regards the effect their lives have on the lives of others, and how various socio-economic contexts influence this interaction. But Taylor also makes clear
the ambivalence Nat feels in this situation, admitting that he finds this relationship
“somewhat difficult to explain,” though on that day, he “came as near as I ever had
or ever would to receiving a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon” (66, 67).
Nat, living in a society in which women’s roles have seen rapid and continual change,
cannot make sense of his father’s traditionalist, and perhaps even problematic, paternalism; his is a different set of rhetorical circumstances. Nevertheless, Nat comes
closest to making sense of this relationship on this day precisely because he recognizes the virtuous core of his father’s attitude: that an individual is defined by his
obligations to others in particular social and historical contexts, not by the abstract
ideal one possesses about these obligations, nor what one can take from others. Nat’s
confusion highlights the lesson learned. As he sees contexts change and paternalistic
attitudes of his father’s generation pass away, he nevertheless recalls that his father
predicted changes would come: “I often think nowadays of Father’s [prediction of his
own superfluity] whenever I see [it] being fulfilled by the students in the university
where I have been teaching for twenty years now, and I wonder if Father really did
believe his prediction would come true” (68). Recognizing that, in a way, fathers
(at least in the way in which men like Mr. Ramsey understood fatherhood), are no
longer required, Nat is confronted with the truth of this older, contextually-aware,
other-focused, and fundamentally rhetorical approach to making sense of ones self.
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Though Mr. Ramsey’s attitude manifests in an ultimately unsustainable and even
ethically problematic paternalism, Nat realizes there is something more significant at
work here. Though Nat may himself be unable to articulate what this more significant thing actually is, Taylor is nevertheless showing us a profound evolution in his
narrator’s understanding of individualism—an evolution facilitated by his encounter
with the the Southern conservative tradition’s notions of duty.
The third and final day of the search forces Nat into a consideration not only of
duty as an abstract virtue enacted by men of his father’s generation, but as something
with significant consequences for his relationships—especially with Lee Ann and Caroline. As Nat and Caroline search for Lee Ann, they eventually present themselves
at the boarding house where Lee Ann lived before her disappearance. There, in order
to convince the landlady to grant them access to Lee Ann’s room, Caroline pretends
to be one of her girlfriends, come to pack a suitcase for her. Standing in that room,
Caroline and Nat see a photograph that reveals Lee Ann’s hiding place:
The only thing in the drawer was a small snapshot. I took it up and
examined it carefully. I said nothing to Caroline, just handed her the
picture. . . She recognized the woman with the goiter who ran The Cellar
[one of the juke joints]. The picture had been taken with Mrs. Power
standing in one of the flower beds against the side of the house. The
big cut stones of the house were unmistakable. After bringing up in the
snapshot close to her face and peering into it for ten seconds or so, Caroline
looked at me and said, “That’s her family.” (78)
This realization sends Caroline and Nat off to The Cellar to find Lee Ann, and
provides Nat with the opportunity to rehearse what he knows of Lee Ann’s past:
that “she had a ‘family’ in Memphis, [but] no one had known her when she was
growing up,” and that she had been to at least three boarding schools during her
childhood (78). Caroline speculates that Lee Ann’s family intentionally “kept her
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away from home,” and as a result, Lee Ann was not “prepared for the kind of ‘family’
she had” after graduation, and thus chose to move to the relative anonymity of a
boarding house (79).
Contained within Caroline’s speculation is a vital recognition for making sense of
Lee Ann’s actions, as well as the broader contexts that caused these actions—contexts
that have consequences for Nat and Caroline as well. Lee Ann was required, by her
family, live apart from them for many years, to exist as a part of that community
only through the accident of birth. When the end of boarding school brings Lee
Ann back into this community, she feels alienated from it, and retreats back into the
familiarity of isolated, atomistic individualism. Caroline eventually meets Lee Ann
at The Cellar and interviews her privately. In that interview, Caroline learns that
Lee Ann was abandoned in infancy by her mother
to her grandmother but had always through the years sent money back for
her education. She had had—the mother—an extremely successful career
as a buyer for a women’s clothing store in Lincoln, Nebraska. But she
had never tried to see her daughter and had never expressed a wish to see
her. The only word she ever sent was that children were not her dish, but
that she didn’t want it on her conscience that, because of her, some little
girl in Memphis, Tennessee, had got no education and was therefore the
domestic slave of some man (81-82).
Lee Ann lives as an isolated individual, incapable of understanding virtuous interaction with others, precisely because her mother pursued an anarchic vision of individualism, in which self-loyalty, and not duty toward others, is the primary good of
human life. While the money she sends back allows Lee Ann’s mother to feel as if
she is doing some good, by making sure her daughter is not “the domestic slave of
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some man,”5 she does nothing that would substantially lead Lee Ann away from such
a life. Rather, in taking the surface-level steps to provide her daughter with personal
freedom, Lee Ann’s mother has only isolated her, not made her free.
Lee Ann’s running is her recognition of her tacit participation in such a form of
individualism and an attempt to reject it in favor of something else. Nat, musing
about Lee Ann standing in the snow in the Old Forest, realizes that she couldn’t go
“back to her room or to her pretty possessions there. That wasn’t the kind of freedom
she wanted any longer. She was going back to her grandmother” (81). In this, the
central moment of the entire story, we see a rejection of an oppressive kind of freedom
and the search for something more viable and existentially useful—a freedom based
in notions of community and duties owed to others. Nat’s search for Lee Ann is an
unconscious mirror of this process, and the car ride he and Caroline take after her
interview with Lee Ann points to the connection between this better, more virtuous
notion of freedom and the Southern tradition itself.
Understandably upset by the events of the previous few days, Caroline’s emotional
dam finally breaks in the aftermath of her interview with Lee Ann. Weeping, she
instructs Nat to simply drive and to go “as far and as fast as you can, so that I can
forget this day and put it forever behind me!” (83) Without intention, Nat finds
himself on the Bristol Highway, a road that
went northeast from Memphis. As its name implied, it was the old road
that shot more or less diagonally across the long hinterland that is the
state of Tennessee. It was the road along which many of our ancestors had
5
Readers should not misinterpret this statement, coming from a character Taylor is leading us
to interpret negatively, as his decrying women’s independence or making an anti-feminist statement.
Rather, as forcing women into domestic slavery is an instrumentalizing move that fails to recognize
the obligations inherent in social bonds, Taylor would find men who do this worthy of criticism as
well. His works, which are full of indictments of men who attempt to make women into “domestic
slaves” and praises of strong women, bear this out. As a result, readers should interpret Taylor’s
negative presentation of Lee Ann’s mother as based in her anarchic individualism, something she
ostensibly recognizes as problematic in some regards, and not in her being something other than a
wife and mother.
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first made their way from Virginia and the Carolinas to Memphis. . . And
it occurred to me now that when Caroline said go as fast and as far as
you can she really meant to take us all the way back into our past and
begin the journey all over again, not merely from a point of four days ago
or from the days of our childhood but from a point in our identity that
would require a much deeper delving and more radical return. (84)
Here, Taylor has Nat figuratively drive into the Southern past. In so doing, Nat and
Caroline are resetting their relationship, returning to a point in time that precedes
the events of the story, as well as both their individual histories and the social history
of Memphis. This is done so that they may enact a “deeper delving and more radical
return” that promises to result in a different notion of themselves as individuals, and
how they are to interact with others.
It is not simply enough to think of Caroline and Nat as returning to the Southern
tradition or Southern past. Caroline, addressing the “freedom” she perceived Lee
Ann as possessing, notes that such freedom has long been available to Southern men:
“They used to write ‘Gone to Texas’ on the front door and leave the house and
the farm to be sold for taxes. They walked out on dependent old parents and on
sweethearts or even on wives and little children. And though they were considered
black sheep for doing so, they were something of heroes, too” (85). This kind of
freedom, an atomistic notion divorced from social bonds and obligations, is the very
thing Taylor has spent “The Old Forest” showing to be deeply flawed, and Caroline
herself ultimately comes to understand this as a false sort of freedom. As they
continue to drive, they go deeper and deeper into the Southern past, going “on and on,
at first north and east through the wintry cotton land and cornland, past the old Orgill
Plantation. . . and now and then another white man’s antebellum house, and always at
the roadside or on the horizon, atop some distant ridge, a variety of black men’s shacks
and cabins” (87). Caroline begins what Nat calls her “second monologue,” in which
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she says she “finally saw there was only one thing for me to do and saw why I had to do
it. I saw that the only power in the world I had for saving myself lay in my saving you.
And I saw that I could only save you by ‘saving’ Lee Ann Deehart” (87). Caroline
has power only in terms of her willingness to relinquish her own freedom in pursuit of
providing for the freedom of others. That she comes to this difficult realization in the
shadow of plantation homes and slave quarters both contextualizes this within the
Southern conservative tradition and declares this tradition problematic. After all, a
tradition that argues for duty and obligation, but then expresses those in terms of
a dehumanizing institution like slavery, is a tradition that fails to make sense of the
consequences of its own beliefs, that lacks the “metaphysic of position” that Weaver
calls for. But “The Old Forest” does end by evoking this sort of freedom-throughobligation as superior to the atomistic sort it decries. The tension between a real
social and individual good and the tradition that produces it suggests that Taylor
is calling on Southerners to not celebrate the Southern tradition, but something
antecedent to it, and in so doing to make the “radical return” to the virtues at its
core, however perverted these have become in the process of making a tradition.
In this manner, the same writer who showed the destructive, vicious nostalgia of
the Southern tradition illustrates how a reinterpretation of this tradition, and an
examination of the contexts and exigencies in which it is articulated, can produce a
means for sophisticated, nuanced, existentially robust virtue.
In contrast to Nat’s search in “The Old Forest,” the hero of “In the Miro District,”
Major Basil Manley, is one of the few characters in Taylor’s fiction who seems to have
arrived at Weaver’s metaphysic of position before his story begins. A Confederate
veteran who refuses to kowtow to his adult daughter’s wishes for him to play the
role of “the Confederate veteran,” and thus become an ornament to her social life in
the Acklen Park section of 1920s Nashville, the Major exemplifies many of Southern
conservatism’s traditional virtues, while actively resisting ossifying, myopic nostalgia.
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However, by this story’s end, he has suffered a fate similar to that of Aunt Munsie from
“What You Hear From ’Em?,” and dutifully performs the pitiful role he has so long
resisted. This change is effected through the Major being rejected by his grandson, the
story’s narrator. This rejection is presupposed upon the grandson defiantly alienating
himself from the challenges his grandfather poses to his adolescent hedonism. The
narrator wants to undermine his grandfather in much the same way that his parents
want to control the Major, both in service of their own desires. That Taylor presents
Major Manley’s undoing with tragic pathos points to the author’s indictment of the
bourgeois values of the narrator and his family; “In the Miro District” thus functions
as a powerful statement on the virtues of the Southern tradition and the consequences
of their loss.
In contrast to the bourgeois desires of his descendants, the Major’s desires—to not
play the noble Confederate veteran and to continue to live on his own in rural Hunt
County, Tennessee— point toward his core virtue and its source. Taylor presents the
Major as exhibiting a strong sense of personal integrity, based in his resistance to being
controlled or ruled by others. This is not an anarchic notion of self-determination, but
rather a version of personal integrity that regards a loyal defense of supra-personal
entities as the chief end of self-determination. While this notion of integrity suggests a
tension between personal and social motives, it makes sense in the context of the logic
of the Southern conservative tradition. We should recall that the Southern tradition
regards a defense of hierarchy and order as of equal importance with republican
self-determination, in that both serve to acknowledge man’s essentially depraved,
un-perfectible state. Remembering this, we understand Major Manley’s integrity
as representing fidelity to both things larger than himself—the South, his ancestral
home of West Tennessee, family, and the manners and propriety that result from all
of these—and his own person and personal rights of self-determination.
In other words, Major Manley’s identity is based in a refusal to be cowed. This re-
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fusal evidences the complexity of his attitude toward the South and his understanding
of himself as a Southerner. He sees South and its traditions—those things that define
who he is—not as some monolithic, inaccessible entity that existed in the past and
that can only be mourned, remembered, and retroactively defended in the present,
but rather something nebulous and always already in flux. To be a Southerner is thus
to be much like the very Southern city of Nashville itself. The narrator records his
grandfather’s understanding of Nashville and its environs, noting that the older man
“did not take Nashville so seriously as [his] parents did,” and
was fond of referring to the city itself as the Miro District (because he
said only an antique Spanish name could do justice to the grandeur which
Nashvillians claimed for themselves.). . . according to this same knowledgeable grandfather of mine, the entire state of Tennessee had once been
claimed to be a rightful part of that province by both the French and the
Spanish, in their day as its rulers. . . And I used to try to imagine why
it was that when he was scouting through the low ground or hill country west of the Tennessee River during the Civil War, it made the War
seem less hateful to him at time and less scary and less boring for him to
know—or to believe—that the Spanish and the French had once held title
to what was by then his own country or that the Indians had once held
that land sacred, or for him to realize whenever he came in to Nashville
that the site of the old citadel itself, Fort Nashborough, had once actually
been known merely as Frenchman’s Lick. (Taylor, “Miro District” 152)
Just as the Major refuses to allow himself to be marked only as a valiant knight
of the Confederacy, he also will not recognize Nashville as simply the august and
genteel Miro District, but must also envision it as the martial Fort Nashborough
and the plebeian Frenchman’s Lick. All of these are of equal importance in defining
Nashville, similarly to how the Major insists his personal identity be understood in
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its own fullness and complexity. One version of a self cannot exclude other, equally
important versions of that self. This truth is perhaps especially important if there
are individuals who would foist simplistic identities on that complex self.
This logic makes Major Manley fundamentally different than his ossifingly nostalgic daughter and son-in-law, who see the Southern tradition as a pretty, and socially
useful, decoration to their “busy, genteel, contented life” (149) in the glamorous world
of Acklen Park (a section of town that conceivably understands Nashville only as “the
Miro District”). While they fixate upon the glory of the Lost Cause and their ancestor’s role in it, the Major rejects his Confederate service as the sole marker of his
status and identity. The narrator implicitly recognizes this rejection. When he sees
his grandfather “at the wheel of his tan touring car, swinging into our driveway, it
wasn’t hard to imagine how he had once looked riding horseback or muleback through
the wilds of West Tennessee when he was a young boy in Forrest’s calvary, or how he
had looked, for that matter, in 1912. . . at the time when he escaped from a band of
hooded nightriders who had kidnapped him” on the shores of Reelfoot Lake in west
Tennessee (153). Taken together, these three moments—riding as a boy in Forrest’s
calvary, escaping from the nightriders as a man, and driving in the tan touring car
in old age—show various aspects of the Major’s personal self-identity. The Major
does not define himself in terms of these three moments from his personal history,
but rather in terms of the thing these three moments point toward: his integrity.
The Major’s integrity originates in his refusal to cede control over his own self
over to others, even those whom he willfully serves. His encounter with Forrest, the
only moment from the Civil War he will discuss, bears this out. On his way “to enlist
in Forrest’s critter company,” the young Manley is passed by “General Forrest and
some other officers” and forced off of the road. Forrest and his cadre “don’t even look
back at him until he yelled out after them every kind of filthy thing he could think
of.” The Major always ends this story by stating that “Likely I’m the onliest man
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or boy who ever called Bedford Forrest a son-of-a-bitch and lived” (164). Though
he was little more than a boy at this point, Manley refused to cede control over his
own self to anyone else, even one of the most feared and imposing figures of the Civil
War. Yet that he was “on his way to enlist,” and was not dissuaded from this purpose
because of his experience with Forrest’s cadre, illustrates Manley’s understanding of
self-determination: it is virtuous insomuch as it is directed to the service of something
beyond ourselves. To curse at Forrest and then refuse to enlist may have shown the
young Basil to be his own man, but he would have been a man lacking integrity.
Even though it takes place many years later, the narrator closely associates his
grandfather’s experience at Reelfoot Lake with the older man’s experience in the Civil
War. Taylor wants us to understand these experiences as explicating one another and
providing further evidence for how the Major understands his own self, and the virtue
at its core. In 1912, the Major and his law partner, Captain Tyree, go to repossess
land near Reelfoot Lake from a group of squatters. Kidnapped from “the Walnut
Log Hotel at Samburg, Tennessee” (165) by a group of hooded nightriders (the very
squatters they have gone to dispossess of the land), the Major and Captain Tyree
are drug out into the swamp, beaten, and tied up. Later that same night, the Major
witnesses Tyree’s hanging. In the aftermath of his friend’s murder, the Major “vowed
to survive” and to “bring to justice those squatters-turned-outlaws,” and daringly
escapes (168). Significantly, both the resolution to survive and the escape are made
in what the narrator identifies as his grandfather’s “rage,” a characteristic not unlike
the fearless pride with which he confronted Forrest’s cadre a half-century before.
This defiant “rage” undermines what it is the nightriders wish to exercise over
Major Manley: control over both his physical and existential person. Through a
sheer act of will that demonstrates his own indefatigable personal integrity, the Major
ensures his own survival, and unmasks and prosecutes the squatters-cum-nightriders,
laying bare their falsehood. These nine men “were proved to be previously convicted
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criminals, not downtrodden backwoodsmen whose livelihood in fishing and hunting
the government and the big landowners of Lake County wished to take away” (169).
For the Major, the petty opportunism of these men is not separate from their attempts
at controlling him, but is rather indicative of a desire to violate the integrity of social
order.6 Both here and in the experience with Forrest’s cadre, the Major’s integrity
is proven by his uncompromising moral courage in the face of challenges by others.
These challenges are based in the other’s own petty vices, whether it be the dismissive
arrogance of Confederate officers, who likely took him from nothing more than “some
local farm boy,” or the avarice of the nightriders. The pathetic tragedy of “In the Miro
District” is that the final violation of the Major’s integrity is based not in something
as grand as either of these first two conflicts, but in a very mundane vice: the petty,
bourgeois aspirationalism of his daughter and son-in-law, and its ultimate success in
controlling the Major.
While the proximate causes of the Major’s undoing are three transgressions of
propriety by his grandson, the root cause is his daughter and son-in-law’s desire for
control. If they can control the Major, they make him into the ultimate ornament
to their upwardly-mobile social lives—a Confederate veteran, a living embodiment
of their nostalgic dreams. But for the veteran to ornament their lives properly, he
must interact with his grandson, telling the boy stories of the old days, while the boy
eagerly asks about the glories of the Lost Cause. The narrator tells us that he asked
for Civil War stories “not because I cared much about the War but because. . . it was
what my parents cared about and were always telling me I ought to get him to talk
about” (164). For these reasons, the narrator’s parents, who “saw everything in terms
of Acklen Park in the city of Nashville in the Nashville Basin in Middle Tennessee
in the old Miro District,” sought to pair off the narrator and the Major. The result,
6
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in their eyes, would be the achievement of what they see in other grandfathers and
grandsons: “When you saw one of those other grandfathers out walking with a little
grandson along West End Avenue, it was apparent at once that the two of them were
made of the same clay or at least that their mutual aim in life was to make it appear
to the world that they were” (155). Envisioning themselves faithful to the glories of
the South’s past and responsibly raising up its future, the narrator’s parents would
show themselves worthy denizens of the Miro District.
Reflecting on the “pairing off young with old so relentlessly and so exclusively”
from the present in which he is telling the story, the narrator makes clear the destructive results of this practice: the “men over fifty whom one meets [in Nashville]
nowadays are likely to seem much too old-fashioned to be believed in almost—much
too stiff in their manner to be taken seriously at all. They seem to be putting on a
act. . . Either that or these grandsons of Confederate veterans are apt to have become
pathetic old roués and alcoholics, outrageously profane, and always willing to talk
your ear off in the Country Club bar—usually late at night—about how far they have
fallen away from their ideals, about how very different they are from the men their
grandfathers were” (156).7 Presciently aware of what awaits him, the narrator wants
to resist this outcome. However, as his youthful myopia prevents him from understanding the vexed position his grandfather would also suffer from such pairing (all
such realizations are made by the adult telling the story, not the teenager in the story
itself) the narrator senses a need to rebel against the Major as well as his parents.
Albert J. Griffith summarizes the tensions at play between grandfather and grandson, calling the Major a “maverick who refuses to conform to any of the expectations
of his daughter and son-in-law. . . The grandson feels he and his grandfather have
‘nothing in common’. . . and that they ‘faced each other across the distasteful present,
7
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across a queer, quaint, world neither. . . felt himself a part of’”(Griffith 129). The
narrator feels that he and his grandfather must predictably “have it out” between
themselves, an inevitable consequence of their being forced into frequent companionship by his parents, though they “possessed very opposite natures” (Taylor, “Miro
District” 149). This having it out does eventually occur, over the course of three moments in the summer the narrator turns 18: first, Major Manley catches the narrator
and some of his friends on a drinking binge; sometime later, he finds them engaging
in sexual dalliances with lower-class girls; and finally, the Major catches the narrator
hiding a naked young woman of his own class in the grandfather’s wardrobe.
Griffith reads the first two of these events as moments that “seem on the verge
of binding the boy and his grandfather together in a new way,” largely because of
the charitable, yet firm-handed, discipline handed down by the Major (Griffith 130).
But in Griffith’s interpretation, the final interaction undoes the Major because of its
class-based implications: “. . . the naked girl hiding in the grandfather’s own goldenoak wardrobe is not a girl of the ‘other sort,’ as before, but a Ward Belmont girl, a
respectable girl of the boy’s own social status. This infraction of deeply ingrained
social mores is to the grandfather the unforgivable sin, the final proof of ‘how bad’
the boy really is in terms of the grandfather’s set of values” (130). Griffith is thus
correctly suggesting “In the Miro District” is a drama of the tensions of generational
interconnection, but is also flawed in arguing that Major Manley’s undoing is merely
the result of his social mores no longer having real impact on the ethical lives of his
family.
Griffith, in other words, mistakenly reads Major Manley as another instantiation
of Aunt Munsie, a character trapped by nostalgia. This reading is flawed, and arises
from a lack of serious consideration of several other factors in the story: how the
Major responds to the first two scandalous events, where the third takes place, and
the grandfather and grandson’s shared recognition of the lack of virtue at the center
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of the parents’ bourgeois life. When we consider these together, we see that the Major
is not undone by his nostalgia, but something much more complex—the fragility of
his own virtue, a profound part of himself that both connects and alienates him from
others.
After the first two infractions, the narrator is disciplined by his grandfather. In
each case, the discipline lacks vitriol, and is instead firm and even jarringly cool.
These are moments wherein the Major does attempt to connect to the narrator,
but not in the nostalgic way desired by his daughter and son-in-law. Rather, these
admonishments provide the Major with opportunities to act with simple integrity,
demonstrating to the narrator both what this virtue looks like and its logic. For instance, when he interrupts the boys’ debauchery, the Major simply opens his pocket
watch and makes a comment about it now being past supper time; after this, the narrator’s two friends, “[d]runk as they assuredly were and difficult as they undoubtedly
found it to rise. . . [did] manage somehow to rise from their chairs and without a word
of farewell went stumbling out through the kitchen and out of the house” (Taylor,
“Miro District” 160). The Major intercepts the narrator trying to pour another drink,
which in turns leads to the younger man dropping and breaking a liquor bottle. The
narrator notes that his grandfather’s command—“Now you get that mess cleaned
up”—had “literally a sobering effect upon me, as probably nothing else could have
done,” and in his new sobriety, the narrator begins to feel “sudden guilty feelings
about my mother and father” (161). Through his correction, the Major symbolically
points to his resistance to being controlled by others; his offhand comment about supper shows that he will not let a group of drunk teenagers change his evening plans.
Further, that this interruption causes the narrator to feel guilt about his parents—his
father is having prostate surgery—suggests that Major Manley’s admonishment is not
directed at the younger man’s being drunk, but rather his violation of filial piety. In
other words, the Major causes the narrator to see how he is violating the connection
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to something greater than himself and his own appetites, the notion at the core of
traditional Southern integrity.
Refusing, or perhaps unable, to learn this lesson, the second challenge results
in the narrator deciding to reject Major Manley’s set of virtues actively. While his
parents are off in Memphis, the narrator plans a party with several of his friends,
each bringing over a girl with whom he will have sex. Like Nat in “The Old Forest,”
the narrator here makes clear that the
girls we had with us were not the kind of girls such a boy as I was would
spend any time with nowadays. . . With one’s real girl, in those days, a girl
who attended Ward Belmont school and who was enrolled in Miss Amy
Lowe’s dancing classes, one might neck in the back seat of a car. The
girl might often respond warmly and want to throw caution to the wind.
But it was one’s own manliness that made one overcome one’s impulse
to possess her and, most of all, overcome her impulse to let herself be
possessed before taking the marraige vow. . . Still, from the time one was
fourteen or fifteen in Nashville, one had to know girls of various sorts and
one had to have a place to take girls of the “other sort.” No one of my
generation would have been shocked by the events of that evening. (178)
The Major’s reaction to finding the young couples in bed the next morning provides
further articulation of his understanding of both personal and social virtue. Using
a walking stick to rip the sheets off of the couples and smack them awake on the
buttocks, the Major gives the his grandson a decisive order: “I want you to get these
bitches out of this house and to do so in one hell of a hurry!” (179-80) He repeats this
order, but shifts the emphasis: “You get those bitches out of your mother’s house and
you do it in one hell of a hurry” (180). Through this repetition and shift in emphasis,
we see the Major decrying his grandson’s lack of integrity.
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The first exclamation, directed only at the narrator for his act of indiscretion,
points to the fact that he has violated the integrity at core of his self, while the
second points to his obligation to someone other than himself—his mother. That the
Major blames the narrator is made clear by how he interacts with the girls. Though he
has told his grandson to get “those bitches” out of the house, the narrator comes upon
his grandfather “reassuring [the girls]. By the time I reached the living-room doorway
he was assisting them in their search [for lost personal items], whereas the three boys
only stood by, watching. It was he himself who found that little purse. Already the
four girls seemed completely at ease. He spoke to them gently and without contempt
or even condescension” (180-81). This is certainly a different tone than that he takes
with the narrator, suggesting that the Major lays the blame squarely at his grandson’s
feet (and perhaps, to a lesser extent, at the feet of those other boys who “only stood
by, watching”).
The violation the Major sees here is not of sexual mores so much as it is a violation of “manliness,” the virtuous resolve to “overcome one’s impulse” that the
narrator describes himself having when “necking” with a “Ward Belmont girl.” To
Major Manley, to lack this form of self-control in all circumstances is to cede control
over to something, or someone, else. Just as he refuses to permit Forrest’s cadre or
the nightriders of Reelfoot Lake to control him, the Major expects his grandson to
be similarly self-controlled, especially when the agent attempting to gain control over
one’s self is not another person, threatening violence, but merely adolescent lust. By
lacking this kind of self-control and permitting his libido to vitiate his filial responsibility, the narrator again shows his lack of integrity to his grandfather. But again, as
before, Major Manley shows quick forgiveness to the narrator: “When he and I were
alone in the hall, he said, ‘And now I reckon you realize what we’ve got to do. We’ve
got to do something about those sheets,’ ” and both work to clean up the mistakes
of the younger (181). With this gesture, the Major provides his grandson with both
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forgiveness and another opportunity for virtue.
Unfortunately, the narrator cannot understand what it is his grandfather is offering him. Blinded by his own juvenile rebelliousness and a justifiable resistance to his
parents’ bourgeois aspirationalism, the narrator thinks that the more of these experiences he and his grandfather share, “the better he would think he understood me
and the more alike he would think we were” (182). The narrator cannot countenance
this, seemingly understanding his grandfather as his parents’ agent for governing his
behavior and character, just as he understands himself as his parents’ agent in ensuring his grandfather becomes the doting, charmingly ridiculous Confederate veteran.
Taylor makes clear that the narrator desires control over his own identity, just as the
Major does. But what the narrator does not understand is that his grandfather’s
governance is not an attempt at control, but rather a means for pointing the narrator towards integrity. While self-definition, which the narrator deeply desires, is an
aspect of this integrity, he refuses to craft his self-definition with a regard for duty.
The young narrator does not want to be virtuous; he only wants the fulfillment of his
own lusts.
Sensing his grandfather’s presence in his life as a threat to his base desires, the
narrator enacts what he knew he “could do that would show him how different we
were,” liberating him to continue to pursue his youthful hedonism without impedance
(182). This produces the third conflict between the narrator and the Major, when
the younger man sleeps with a Ward Belmont girl in his grandfather’s bed, and hides
her in his wardrobe. Griffith’s reading suggests that the Major sees his grandson’s
sleeping with the lower-class girls as acceptable behavior, while this infraction violates
a proper Southern lady, and is thus unforgivably appalling to the old man. While
Taylor does make a point to illustrate class differences in the women, and while the
Major very likely does possess different means for understanding different classes of
women, he is not undone because his grandson commits some inexcusable violation
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of class-based sexual propriety. Major Manley is not Harriet Wilson. The South’s
tradition does not provide him with a rigid set of social conventions, but rather with
a distinctive means for understanding how virtues like integrity form the core of his
own self. As a significant portion of this integrity consists of living for others and
things outside of the self, and as the Major finds himself in an increasingly atomistic
society, he sees his grandson as a means to both practice and pass on his virtuous
integrity. The Major is thus not undone because his grandson violates the sexual
virtue of a high-class girl, but because his grandson’s final act forms a repudiation of
Major Manley himself.
By despoiling his grandfather’s room, the narrator attacks the core of the Major’s
self, attempting to eliminate the old man’s hindering his libidinal self-indulgence.
Reduced by his family to being either an old man in the way or a quaint relic of
the Old South, Major Manley is denied the ability to show his family his own multilayered, complex self, and his similar conception of the South and its tradition. As
these are the things in which his personal integrity—his virtue—is based, the Major
is existentially broken when he can no longer share in celebrating them and their
dynamism. Left with only two choices, accepting an ossified, ornamental position or
none at all, the Major decides on the former, and becomes the foolish caricature of
the Confederate veteran: “before spring came the next year Grandfather had closed
his house in Hunt County and taken up permanent residence in Acklen Park. He
lived there for the rest of his life, participating in my parents’ lively social activities,
talking freely about his Civil War experiences. . . [and] would even speculate about
whether the whole War mightn’t have been won if President Davis had not viewed
it so narrowly from the Richmond point of view. Or he would raise the question of
what might have happened if Lee had been allowed to go to the Mountains” (195-96).
Being reduced to such an ornament takes away the Major’s self-identity. The narrator
remarks that when he, in the years following, would talk with his grandfather, “I
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would have the uneasy feeling that he wasn’t quite certain whether it was I or one of
the others who was his grandson, whether I was not perhaps merely one of the boys
visiting, with the others, from Sewanee” (197). In this closing statement, the narrator
subtly recognizes the connections between his grandfather and himself. Rejecting the
old man’s instruction in virtue, he can never again have meaningful interaction with
Major Manley, can only see his grandfather as a ridiculous caricature of his former
self, and must recognize that he contributed to this transformation by the pursuit of
his own vice. By noting that he has become interchangeable with “the others, from
Sewanee,” the narrator also recognizes that his acts of rejection have had negative
existential consequences for him as well.
Taylor’s second novel, the 1986 Pulitzer Prizing-winning A Summons to Memphis, reads very much like an expanded version of the great stories of his late period.
While the novel shares concerns over the meaning of individualism in the context of
a changing South, Taylor takes a different approach to this problem than we see in
“Miro District” or “The Old Forest.” In those stories, we see the younger generation pursuing hedonism, and finding themselves needing to contend with the South’s
traditional, socially-bounded notion of individualism as a result of their pleasureseeking. Here, Phillip Carver, the narrator of Summons, laments what he perceives
as his father’s atomism, and its deleterious effect on the lives of the rest of the Carver
family. As the events of the novel force Phillip into reconsidering his own memories, he comes to understand his father not as selfish and manipulative, but rather
as tragic. Mr. George Carver’s life has not been atomistic and self-serving; to the
contrary, it has been Phillip’s interpretation of his father’s life that has exhibited
such selfishness on Phillip’s part. Phil comes to see his father’s life as a navigation of
the viciousness of atomism in pursuit of virtue and integrity, and Phil’s realizations
about both Mr. George and himself show A Summons to Memphis to be Taylor’s
most complex and realized vision of the Southern conservative tradition’s virtuous
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notion of individualism.
As the book opens, Phillip is a middle-aged Tennessean working as a rare books
dealer in Manhattan. There, he lives with his lover, Holly Kaplan, a Jewish woman
from Cleveland who is fifteen years his junior. While his professional and personal
lives seem very distant from the world of Tennessee aristocrats, Phillip finds it impossible to leave that world behind. By-and-large, this impossibility is because of his
older sisters, Betsy and Josephine, whose machinations regularly pull him back into
the familial and social dramas of Memphis. As the novel opens, Holly and Phillip’s
relationship is failing, and they have decided on a trial separation. Before he can
even begin adjusting to living alone, Betsy and Josephine call him to alert him that
their widower father is engaged to be married to a widow, Mrs. Clara Stockwell. Unlike the much younger women who were the object of Mr. Carver’s earlier dalliances,
the never-married Betsy and Josephine see Mrs. Stockwell as a real threat to their
inheritance. Invoking his sense of propriety—they “made it sound as though Mother
were yet alive and perhaps living there in that sprawling one-story suburban house
which Father had had built for their old age” (Summons 12)—Betsy and Josephine
summon Phillip back to Memphis, with hopes that he can talk their father out of the
marriage.
The summons forces Phillip to reflect on the history and reasons behind his sisters’ feelings and schemes, along with why he has intentionally separated—or at least
attempted to separate—himself from Tennessee, his family, and, consequently, the
Southern tradition. The story of flying to, spending less than a day in, and leaving Memphis becomes the vehicle for Phillip’s recalling the interactions between his
father and sisters since his mother’s death, his own youth in Memphis, and, most
importantly, how the Carvers came to live in Memphis. The Carvers were a Nashville
family, and deeply enmeshed into that city’s social life, fashions, and mores. But
after Mr. George Carver’s business partner, Lewis Shackleford, made unscrupulous
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financial decisions with the Carvers’ money, the family is nearly ruined, and move
to Memphis in an attempt to start over again. This move was ruinous for all the
Carvers except Mr. George: the vivacious Mrs. Carver becomes an invalid; Georgie,
the eldest child, becomes morose and volunteers for and dies in World War II;8 Betsy
and Josephine, once beautiful, eligible débutantes, rapidly metamorphose into tragicomic, youth-obsessed spinsters and callow businesswomen; and Phillip is simply
bitter, unable to forgive his father’s interruption of his happy Nashville life.
The first three-quarters of the novel feature the digressive narrative technique
Taylor utilizes throughout much of his best work. Between the call and getting on
the plane to Memphis, Phillip rehearses the entire history of the Carver family’s move
and its consequences. While those memories present some of Taylor’s best writing
and some of his most mature evocations of many different themes, Phil’s shift away
from bitterness, and his all-important reconsideration of individualism, begin on the
plane:
On the plane to Memphis that Monday morning I dozed frequently, trying
to make up for the wakeful periods of the night before. During those
frequent naps I did not dream, and I woke after each nap clearheaded
about where I was and what my mission in Memphis was. I thought
primarily of what lay ahead for me—or of what I thought lay ahead—and
it seemed to me that I did certainly have a mission to perform. I felt all
the enthusiasm of an old-time evangelist. (132)
Phil’s ruminations from the night before have converted him away from his bitterness against his father, and he now envisions his trip as being primarily to help his
father avoid the consequences of the “vendettas” that Phil has “imagined [Betsy and
8
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Josephine] to be preparing” (132). Yet, despite this change of heart, Phil himself
does not seek to forgive his father, thus making the religious language (evangelist of
course recalling the Christian gospel) deeply ironic.
Instead of working toward forgiveness and reconciliation, Phil prescribes a “doctrine of forgetting,” to which he, as evangelist, must convert his sisters. Phil thinks
that forgetting is the only option, as “[i]t was too late to forgive, of course” (134). In
his new vision, forgetting is the height of maturity; it is the “prerogative” of adult
children “to forget the wrongs done us in our youth and childhood, in order to know
ourselves truly grown up” (ibid.). While there is surely truth, and perhaps even wisdom, in this assertion, it is vital to recognize that Phil’s new doctrine is structured
with regard to himself, and himself alone. He forgets, because forgetting is what
allows him to know himself “truly grown up,” and the desire to forget comes as a
result of recognizing that his father could not have understood him:
“How could the man have known the difference [moving from Nashville
to Memphis would make] since the whole action of the little boy’s drama
existed not within the house or within the confines of that little estate
off Franklin Pike but rather at the young people’s events of the annual
horse show and at Miss Cecilia Wright’s dancing classes. How could he
understand the disappointment and shock the boy would experience at
having the important transition to puberty and adolescence so abruptly
interrupted? How could he have known, being the sort of man he was or
not being, rather, a more intellectual and perceptive man than he was,
not a man, that is, who could look back at his own adolescence and by
so doing comprehend what his son was experiencing? (133, emphasis in
original)
Phil’s doctrine of forgetting is thus not a gospel of reconciliation, but rather one of
mere settling, and even condescension. For him, the height of maturity, it seems,
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is not an empathetic connection with others, but a recounting of the wrongs he has
suffered, followed by a self-righteous recognition of others’ lack of understanding. As
a result, Phil’s “conversion” largely serves to reaffirm his own atomistic conception of
self—the very sort of selfishness of which he has long accused his father of harboring
and that Phil now condescendingly commits to forget.
The viability of Phil’s doctrine of forgetting is quickly challenged, as he sees his
father waiting for him on the tarmac of the Memphis airport. This is a surprise, as
normally one of his sisters normally retrieves him on his visits home. But here is Mr.
George Carver, waiting not by the gate or baggage claim, but on the tarmac itself,
ready to pick up Phil as he descends from the plane. As he considers the power his
father had to display in order to gain such access, Phillip thinks that Mr. George
seemed not at all the old man my sisters had been describing to me in their
letters. Rather, he was the father I remembered from my early boyhood,
a commanding figure very much in charge of events. . . He appeared as he
had appeared to me when I was a very small boy in Nashville, a person of
great power and stature. I saw a flash image of him on horseback, dressed
as master of hounds and holding the horn to his lips. I saw the man of
iron will and courage and perfect skill and limitless intelligence that I had
believed in as a small boy almost without knowing what it was I believed.
(138)
So determined simply and forcefully to “forget, forget” only a few moments earlier,
Phil now finds himself returned to the boyish awe of his father, and is flooded by
childhood memories.
These memories, however, almost immediately shift in an intriguing way. After a
night spent ruminating on his own life, the presence of Mr. George requires Phillip to
give similar consideration to his father’s life; he begins to think through the consequences of his father himself not being a “Nashville-born man,” but rather the scion
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of a West Tennessee family (139). Rather than recalling his own life and the ostensible injustices done to him, Phillip begins to consider his father, and his father’s past.
Though Phillip has mentioned his father’s past before this point, it has always been
in terms of his own personal history. Here, Phillip begins to consider his Mr. George
on his own terms, as a complex individual with his own set of existential quandaries,
demands, and duties. This is an important departure from the ways in which Phillip
recounted memories in the first many pages of the novel, wherein the past was always
recalled as something explicitly considered in terms of himself.
As the main plot of the novel nears its (heartbreaking and anticlimactic) conclusion, Phil ceases to think about the specific “injustices” done to him by his father,
but rather mediates on his father’s past and person. When he does return to his
“recently articulated theme of forgetfulness,” he intriguingly articulates its necessity:
“It was impossible to look upon [Mr. George’s] radiant face and not forget real or
imagined injuries he had done me” (145). Gone is the self-pitying and condescending
notion that his father simply could not understand him. Instead, Phil looks upon
his father as he is, as another complex human being himself, and sees in this other
person’s “radiant face” the sheer impossibility of not forgetting. Phil again notes that
the maturing process is profoundly connected to forgetting—“A certain oblivion was
what we must undergo in order to become adults and live peacefully with ourselves”
(146)—but there is a significant shift in emphasis; forgetting must be in terms of the
other, not in terms of ourselves.
In the aftermath of the novel’s climax—the aborted wedding between Mr. George
and Mrs. Clara Stockwell, orchestrated by Betsy and Josephine—the two Carver
daughters move back in with their father, and Phillip retreats to Manhattan. Soon
afterwards, Holly and Phil reconcile, and the couple began to talk “of almost nothing
but our two families and of the problems of looking after aged parents in particular”
(156). These conversations soon take on a much more pressing character, as Holly’s
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father falls gravely ill. As Holly is herself forced to examine her own past, she begins to
develop her own perspective on the mutual obligations of parents and adult children,
and encourages Phillip to reconsider his doctrine of forgetting:
[S]he began teaching me at this point to seek a still clearer understanding
of my own father. She wished me to do more than forget the old wrongs.
She wished me to try to see him in a light that would not require either
forgetting or forgiving. She frequently urged me to talk about him, as she
certainly had not urged me to do in years, and to try to give her a whole
picture of what his life had actually been. . . (159)
Holly’s challenges to Phil’s doctrine are significant in the continuing evolution of his
thinking about the past and individualism. Somewhat ironically, Phil does continuing
forgetting—but it is his own self he forgets, as his meditations on his own life cease,
and he becomes “able to imagine more about Father’s life than I had in the past
ever had any conception of. . . his inner life, his inmost, profoundest feelings about
the world he was born into and in which he was destined to pass his youth and most
of his adult years” (ibid.).
Phillip’s newfound ability to conceive of his father in a revelatory, intimate way
leads him to a lengthy consideration of Mr. George’s life. Phillip explains the peculiar
circumstances of his father’s birth, noting that in commemoration of this event,
the bells in nearly all the churches of Thornton [the Carvers’ ancestral
west Tennessee village] were rung. Guns were also fired on the courthouse
lawn at that hour, as well as at various intersections of streets in the town.
[Mr. George’s] mother—my grandmother—who died within an hour of his
birth, must have heard those bells and heard that gunfire during the last
moments of her life. . . the arrival of no royal heir, or perhaps of no ducal
heir, or at least of no squirearchical heir was ever celebrated with more

162

warmth in any town or countryside. He was the first and only child
of his parents’ union, and his mother was past forty at the time of her
confinement. Word has not come down as to whether or not the church
bells tolled her passing with a unanimity equal to the ringing on the heir’s
arrival. (160)
From his earliest moments, Mr. George was implicitly instructed to understand himself as “a little prince” and a “born hero” whose life was of significantly greater
worth than that of others, even that of his mother (160-61). In short, Phillip’s reflection causes him to recognize how his father was profoundly affected by an atomistic
notion of the self. Taylor clearly points to the ridiculousness of this situation, by
having Phillip describe his father as an “heir” of some sort—if not royal, and if not
even ducal, then certainly squirearchical—a description that recalls the worst sort of
nostalgic excesses of Southern conservatism, particularly its obsession with mythic
genealogy.9
In Phillip’s presentation of his father, Mr. George recognizes the ridiculousness
of this situation, and desire a different vision of the self than that which this world
grants him. Even as a boy, “George Carver yearned for an individuality and personal
attainments that could be in no way related to the accident of his birth. . . He aspired
to an individuality that could not be accounted for by the components of his own
character and his own identity.” (162) Mr. George ultimately aspires for a vision of
individualism not defined only in terms of himself. This nascent desire is, however,
fundamentally circumscribed. As a young man, George Carver can only understand
this vision of individualism in one way—as not being subject to his past and its
circumstances. Thus, despite his desire to be his own man, he cannot escape from
9
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under the atomistic notion of the self provided him at birth. He pursues personal
greatness and willfully transgresses the limitations imposed by his father in service
of this desire: he chooses Vanderbilt over Princeton or Charlottesville, enters both
law and politics against his father’s will, and marries into Nashville, instead of west
Tennessee, society (176-77).
Phillip recognizes his father’s struggle to become his own man, stating that Mr.
George “at last became a heroic figure in my eyes. It was his very oppositeness from
me that I could admire without reservation, like a character in a book.” (177) While
Phil’s newfound admiration for his father is real, and its basis in “oppositeness” deserves consideration. Mr. Carver left west Tennessee willfully and defiantly, while
Phil begrudges his forced removal to Memphis; Phil followed in his father’s footsteps
at Vanderbilt, while the elder Carver defied tradition by choosing Vanderbilt in the
first place. These facts, alongside Phil’s comfort in Nashville and its social world
and the unease he felt in Memphis (demonstrated by his narration of his early acquaintance with Alex Mercer, his first—and only enduring—Memphis friendship),
indicate an individual who is unable to understand his individuality as unrelated “to
the accident of his birth.” This is a real and significant difference between father and
son, and Taylor, in a masterful stroke, suggests that these men of opposite natures
both still arrive at a selfish, atomistic notion of the self. Phil is dependent upon the
accident of his birth precisely because it is his birth and defines his self ; Mr. George
rejects his circumstances because they interfere with self-creation.
Phil discusses his new-found realizations with Holly, and she again challenges
them. It is through his interactions with her that Phil comes to the necessarily
nuanced and complex vision of his father’s life that will disabuse him of his own
notion of the self, moving him closer to a more virtuous form of individualism. He
tells Holly that
All of Father’s earlier aspirations and ambitions had required him to con164

sider only the risk that might be entailed for himself, but when he uprooted his family in Nashville and took us to Memphis he was morally
bound to consider the risks there were for the psyches of five other people. . . I believe it is a maxim beyond all contradiction—and I said so to
Holly at that time—that high ambition and worldly aspirations are all
very well and even commendable so long as other persons are not asked
to share the risks created and confronted by the protagonist. (180)
In examining his father’s life, Phillip comes to the conclusion central to the logic of
the social-bond individualism provided by the Southern conservative tradition: the
individual must consider his own self, desires, ideals, and aspirations in terms of the
effects of these upon others, especially others to whom one is intimately responsible.
Having already begun to reinterpret the move from Nashville to Memphis in terms
of his father’s experience rather than his being wronged, Phillip’s realization here
points to his own continued move away from atomism. Though he does not say it
explicitly, Phillip has come to understand his father’s starting over in Memphis not as
Mr. George pursuing some new set of aspirations for himself, but rather a recognition
that his family could not continue on in Nashville, and thus his family needed to
start over. To do this, Mr. George was willing to “begin life over in early middle
age,” something Phil finds “admirable” and a reflection of his father’s “courage and
stamina” (180). But despite his intentions and his own preparedness, Mr. George did
not realize that as a father, “it came too late" to start over. Having arrived a new
understanding of his father, Phil accepts that “Father’s altogether human blindness
could not be held against him” (180-81).
Holly expresses profound disagreement with Phil’s new assessment of the situation,
though he notes that the disagreement very likely “had something to do with the
remorse or guilt she was feeling about her own father at the time” (181). This
disagreement is put to rest after significant moments in each person’s life: Holly’s
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father’s illness takes its inevitable final turn (“there had been two operations, and
it had been decided that there would be no more”), precipitating her own summons
to Cleveland, and Phil witnesses the unexpected reunion of his father and Lewis
Shackleford at the resort town of Owl Mountain. Mr. George unhesitatingly embraces
and forgives the man who betrayed him those many years ago, producing indignation
on the part of Phil. Soon after his return from Owl Mountain and Holly’s return
from Cleveland, Betsy and Josephine again summon Phillip to Memphis. In the
aftermath of this summons, he and Holly again consider together the relationship
of adult children and parents, and arrive together at a re-articulation, and even
perfection, of Phillip’s doctrine of forgetting.
Just as Betsy and Josephine had wanted Phil to come and stop Mr. George’s
marriage to Clara Stockwell, they now want him to prevent their father from moving
back to central Tennessee and living with a convalescent Lewis Shackleford. Though
Phil had initially been indignant at how easily the two men had reconciled, Holly
encourages him to go to Memphis to assist his father’s moving. Phil shows some
lingering inner conflict, expressing that he himself did not know “what my own intentions were” during the flight back to Memphis. Nevertheless, further discussion
with Holly leads to a final revelation:
I accepted Holly’s doctrine that our old people must be not merely forgiven
all their injustices and unconscious cruelties in their roles as parents but
that any selfishness on their parts had actually been required of them if
they were to remain whole human beings and not become merely guardian
robots of the young. This was something to be remembered, not forgotten.
This was something to be accepted and even welcomed, not forgotten or
forgiven. (194)
This itself differs from the earlier “doctrine” Holly articulated, wherein forgiveness
is to be given if “called for, but forgetting was another matter altogether” (181).
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Phil’s doctrine of forgetting and Holly’s doctrine for appropriate forgiveness have
been tested against and sharpened by each other. Phil’s conversations with Holly,
alongside his reconsiderations of his father’s life, have led him to a new doctrine:
while there is maturity in both forgiving and forgetting, these mean nothing without
also remembering—remembering that the injuries we strive to forgive and forget were
done unto us by complex, flawed human beings. To remember this requires that we
consider our own identities in terms of the identities of others, and the messiness of
reciprocity and duty. Thus, a central virtue of the Southern conservative tradition—
its notion of individualism—is something that Phillip ultimately realizes he must
remember, accept, and translate for integration into his own life.
Despite engaging these considerations on the plane, Phil’s incredulity toward
Lewis Shackleford continues to muddle his thinking about the situation—should he
help his father make the move or not? While Taylor has suggested that Phil himself
as converted to a new doctrine, it would be too pat for this to mean that the son
will simply help his father fulfill his own wishes, as that would simply mean forgiving
and forgetting the palpable wrongs done to Phillip as a young man, wrongs that have
continued to have significant effects on his adult life. Taylor is here requiring readers
to accept the truth and complexity of Phil’s new doctrine, as we must remember the
complexity of Phil’s character, and the myriad sufferings Lewis Shackelford’s actions
visited upon him. As a result, we must recognize that Phil’s indignation toward the
older man is by-and-large justified, and that Taylor is suggesting that our desire to
see Phil help his father reconcile with Shackleford is based in a naive desire to witness
an act of unequivocal forgiveness. This is perhaps the saintly ideal, but the Southern
conservative tradition, as posited by Weaver and others, is suspicious of naive idealism. Taylor is here engaging that tradition, pointing out the complexity of Phil’s
own identity and the various forces pulling at it at this moment in life, and asking us
to understand Phillip’s actions with a charitable regard for his past, just as he has
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come to see Mr. George’s actions from such a perspective.
Phil’s complex feelings are resolved for him when a phone call announces that
Lewis Shackleford has died. Returning to New York for the last time, Phil’s transition
away from atomistic individualism is completed. He recognizes, for the first time, that
Holly’s past was very likely as complex as his, even considering the reality of her past
lovers, something he surely knew, but nevertheless consciously denied. Phil recognizes
that he and Holly are now “well beyond such petty jealousies,” and the threats to
their relationship that existed off-page at the outset of the novel have now dissipated
because Phil is able to recognize and remember that Holly is herself a complex, messy
individual, just as he is (206). And as Phil begins to consider Holly in a way that
shows a renewed, non-atomistic vision of his own individualism, this continues in his
relationship with Mr. George during the rest of the old man’s life.
Phil ends the novel no longer living in the South, and with no indication he will
ever return. Phil’s newly-developed sense of individualism certainly has its roots in
the Southern tradition, but he is only able to arrive at this at a remove. The end
of the novel suggests that Phil has many happy and loving conversations with Mr.
George up until his father dies; yet these are as always done by telephone—“On the
long-distance telephone we were able to speak of things we had never been able to
talk about face to face. . . The calls were indeed such a tremendous satisfaction for
me that sometimes I would stay home from the ballet or the theater or from an
exhibition at the Morgan Library, for instance, because I had the premonition that
Father might telephone while I was out that evening” (207). Thus, while Taylor uses A
Summons to Memphis as an exploration of how Phil moves from atomistic to social
bond individualism, he intriguingly translates this traditional aspect of Southern
conservatism by having Phil engage social bond individualism at a distance. Taylor
has not written a novel of nostalgic return, but rather one in which the virtues of the
old order impact and shape Phillip Carver in his present world as a Southern expat
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in New York.
Taylor, still suspicious of nostalgia and its ossifying effects, thus closes perhaps his
greatest work with the protagonist obviously changed by encounters with the South
and its traditions. The fact that Phil comes to recognize and make sense of these
encounters—to be actually changed by these encounters—only through engaging the
South at a distance and debating its demands with a Jewish woman from Cleveland suggests two things. First, what we have in A Summons to Memphis is one
of the great story tellers of the changing midcentury South laying bare the region’s
abandonment of its own traditions, and its sliding into the warped, existentially destructive hyper-individualism of 20th century America broadly. This destructiveness
is exacerbated by the region’s long-standing, equally toxic nostalgia. But this pessimistic feeling is counterbalanced by the second suggestion—Taylor shows us that
despite these issues, the South’s traditions continue to possess significant existential
utility, precisely because the South’s traditions provide a challenge to the dominant
American notions of self-definition and identity. Phillip Carver, like Nat Ramsey and
the narrator of “In the Miro District,” comes to terms with that different version of
identity, uncovering it from underneath the veneer of the flawed Southern present.
As Taylor insists that the great vice of the South is its nostalgia, he shows us that its
great virtue is in the interconnectedness of complex human individuals, and in recognizing the necessity of duty, obligation, and remembrance that results from these
interconnections. Taylor illustrates that cultivating such a virtue brings Southerners
ever closer to the “metaphysic of place” Weaver insists they need, and takes from
that “hall hung with splendid tapestries” truly something of how to live.
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Chapter 5
Walker Percy’s Metaphysical War Against
Southern Gnosticism
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“This is one of the painful conditions of existence which the bourgeoisie
like to shut from their sight. I see no reason to doubt that here is the
meaning of the verses in Scripture: ‘Suppose ye that I am come to give
peace on earth? I tell you, Nay; but rather division’ and ‘I bring not peace,
but a sword.’ It was the mission of the prophet to bring a metaphysical
sword among men which has been been dividing them ever since, with a
division that affirms value.” Richard Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences
In an essay connecting Walker Percy’s fiction to the thought of Eric Voegelin,
Cleanth Brooks asserts that Percy’s chief intellectual interest is the malaise of modern
man. According to Brooks, this malaise is a direct product of Gnosticism. Though
Percy only rarely uses the term, Brooks argues that the novelist’s work is nevertheless
full of assessments of the victory of a gnostic view of Creation, and man’s place within
it. Unlike the Judeo-Christian notion of Creation as essentially good and man as the
hopelessly flawed, but nevertheless most vital member of this good Creation,
the ancient Gnostics held that the Creation was the work of a demon—a
cruel demiurge. The world—with its mutability, sexuality, wickedness,
and violence—is woefully imperfect, but man has the potentiality to be
perfect if he does not confound himself with this imperfect world. . .
Two crucial aspects of Gnosticism are worth emphasizing here: (1) Man
the creature is not responsible for the evil in which he finds himself. He
has a right to blame it on someone or something else. The assumption
that “In Adam’s fall / We sinned all” is to the Gnostic pure nonsense.
And (2) Man’s salvation depends on his own efforts.
Brooks goes on to explain that these “two traits, Voegelin points out, continue to
characterize Gnosticism, even in its present-day secularized form” (Brooks 56). As I
noted in the introduction, Voegelin’s assessment of modern, secularized Gnosticism
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points to modern man’s rejection of the old organic unity of the immanent and the
transcendent. Gnostic man attempts to save himself not simply by breaking this
unity, but rather by performing two separate, yet related, acts of rejection. First, he
rejects the very existence of an infinite, transcendent, metaphysical order outside of
his own self. Such an order suggests standards against which man would be required
to understand himself; in turn, man may be forced into an awareness of his own
brokenness. Second, gnostic man rejects the notion that the immanent—that world
of which he is a part—is finite and limited. Rather, it is through his attempts at
liberating immanence from the limitations imposed by its ostensible finiteness (a
liberation effected via his cultivation of gnosis) that gnostic man finds salvation.1
Percy’s work diagnoses the errors of Gnosticism in the postmodern South and,
in some cases, provides a solution to Gnosticism’s existentially destructive consequences. These consequences of gnostic logic are, for Percy’s characters, the loss of
what Richard Weaver thinks of as a theory for living, which is replaced merely by
the uncritical practice of life. We should recall that “theory” is taken from a Greek
word (θεωρια) that suggests a proper perspective for seeing, understanding, and contemplation; appropriately, our word “theatre” shares the same root. For Weaver,
a “theory for living” is the sum of perspectives that show the individual man as a
meaningful participant in things outside of himself, allowing him to transcend mere
animal existence—the “uncritical practice of life.” Percy mercilessly (and hilariously)
wars against the gnostic logic that reduces Southerners to an uncritical practice of
life; he diagnoses the errors of Southern Gnosticism, and, in some cases, provides a
solution to its existentially destructive consequences. In Love in the Ruins and The
Last Gentleman, these solutions are based in critical recoveries of certain aspects of
the South’s conservative traditions.
1

Voegelin’s famous indictment of attempts at “immanentizing the eschaton” is a description of
attempts at enacting this same sort of “salvation” on a global, rather than individual, level.
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In other words, Percy is illustrating the ways in which Southern conservatism
can provide individuals with a sense of their own placement and participation within
something beyond themselves and their own acts of consumption. Reflecting on their
placement within a transcendent order—marked by notions of mutual obligation, a
sense of finitude, and other characteristics of Southern conservatism—Percy’s characters find ways to avoid the snares of gnostic alienation, and overcome their deep
feelings of malaise. Stated differently, part of Percy’s project in these novels is to
show how a reevaluation of the Southern conservative tradition provides a means for
developing the theory for living Weaver discusses.
Weaver’s language of theory and practice is found in a brief passage in the introduction to Ideas Have Consequences. There, Weaver asserts that modern Western
man’s “life is practice without theory,” a statement that provides a concise summation
of the book’s underlying principles, and suggests that Gnosticism is the functional
norm of modernity (Weaver, Ideas 7).2 In Weaver’s presentation, the logic of modernity asserts that existence is understandable through mechanistic rationality. Man is
simply an entity within existence, and is thus to be understood in these same terms.
This amounts to a rationalist dismissal of transcendent Truth, from which logically
follows the Gnostic divorce of the immanent and the transcendent. In this account,
there is no meaningful mystery in life, but rather only the mechanistic interplay of
biological, economic, and environmental factors. As these can be logically analyzed,
modernity emphasizes life’s empirically-understandable problems and their rational
solutions. Modernity thus gives no place to a large-scale theory of how to live—to
a macroscopic perspective on life and its significance based outside of the self—as
empirical analysis and rational solutions view such perspectives as unnecessary. Man
2

Weaver arrives at this statement through briefly tracing how the nominalism of William of
Occam leads directly to the rationalistic individuality of Hobbes, Locke, and Bacon, which in turns
leads to positivism, materialism, Deism, and other features of Enlightenment and modernity. He
spends the rest of this slim, dense volume by-and-large diagnosing the existential, social, political,
and artistic consequences of this fact.
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is reduced to the unreflective, self-concerned existence of a beast, trapped in the
Hobbesian state of nature, rather than being liberated from it.
The Gnostic South of Percy’s novels cannot provide the theory—the perspective—
necessary for the practice of life, as it has replaced Truth and external authority with
the banal pursuit of bourgeois comfort. As a result, the individuals who populate
Percy’s fictive South merely practice animalistic existence, marked by consumption,
lust, and self-satisfaction. Such existence is marked by an uncritical, and often superficial, loyalty to certain symbols and ideals. These include the Old South, Southern
history, the practices of cultural Christianity (rather than devout commitment to the
Faith), high culture, and even virtue itself. These, in turn, are not actually significant
in themselves, inasmuch as the South’s superficial and uncritical treatment of them
serves only to perpetuate the necessary social, political, and economic contexts in
which an individual can maximize his own consumption, lust, and self-satisfaction.
This gnostic situation of Percy’s fictive South is seen most clearly in his third novel,
Love in the Ruins.
In Love in the Ruins, Percy shows Gnosticism overcome through the protagonist,
Dr. Tom More, recovering a part of Weaver’s “fourfold root” of Southern conservatism,
the South’s “older religiousness.” The novel takes place in Paradise, Louisiana, a city
that is both a stand-in for and a neighbor to New Orleans (which gets a few passing
mentions in the book). The setting is sometime in the late 20th century; a 15-year war
in Ecuador (an obvious stand-in for Vietnam) has recently ended, and an unexplained
series of “Christmas Riots” has taken place five years before the events of the novel.
The Ecuadorian War and Christmas Riots wrought destruction on Paradise—and
seemingly the rest of America as well.3 Bombed-out cars and buildings litter the
landscape, and nature has begun the process of reclaiming the large swaths of land
3

More tells us that “Vines sprout in sections of New York. . . Wolves have been seen in downtown
Cleveland.” (17)
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once part of suburban sprawl. Against this burned-out backdrop, a sort of civilization
has rebuilt. The novel is centered on the golf-course community of Paradise Estates
and a vast government-academic research facility referred to as Fedtown. In these
locales, the business district of Paradise proper, and the swamp that stands between
Paradise Estates and Fedtown, Percy has created an uncanny vision of the New South
and its familiar suburban landscapes.
In this uncanny South lives Dr. Tom More, the narrator of the novel, who describes
himself as “a not very successful psychiatrist; an alcoholic, a shaky middle-aged man
subject to depressions and elations and morning terrors, but a genius nevertheless
who sees into the hidden causes of things and erects simple hypotheses to account for
the glut of everyday events” (Percy, Love 11). More’s self-description suggests that he
is very much Weaver’s modern man, engaged in the practice of life without a theory
for living. More’s alcoholism, anxieties, and “simple hypotheses” illustrate both a
desire to craft a theory for life, and his inability to do so. Part of More’s response to
the chaos of post-apocalyptic life is his creation of what he calls the MOQUOL—the
More Qualitative-Quantitative Ontological Lapsometer. This machine analyzes brain
function to illustrate causes of malaise, showing an individual to either suffer from
angelism (an excess of abstraction produced by elevating the transcendent over the
immanent) or from beastialism (an excess of brutish physicality produced by elevating
the immanent over the transcendent). The MOQUOL’s analysis clearly points to a
consequence of the victory of Gnosticism in the postmodern South, inasmuch as
beastialism and angelism are both products of rupturing the old, stable order of
immanence and transcendence.
The futuristic, science-fiction-like satire of Love in the Ruins proves vexing for a
critic like Walter Sullivan, who, in his 1976 A Requiem for the Renascence, argues
that the novel reveals profound weaknesses in Percy’s overall artistic project. That
Percy felt the need to “set his novel in the future and traffic with scientific magic—
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even in a satirical vein—is indicative of his divorce as an artist from his own culture”
(Sullivan, Requiem 69). Sullivan is unable to recognize that the novel shows Percy
deeply invested in asking after certain aspects of “his own culture,” and how these
can diagnose and correct the existentially-destructive excesses of suburban American
modernity. Against Sullivan’s assessment, we should consider critic Gary M. Ciuba’s
statement that “Percy’s most overtly eschatological novel is as much antiapocalyptic
as it is apocalyptic. Only after exposing the possible perversions of the eschaton and
comically undermining the very tradition in which it is written does this dire fantasy
end by affirming love amid the ruins” (Ciuba 131). Ciuba recognizes the richly ironic
character of the novel, and such considerations should direct our reading of Love in the
Ruins. Through examining its ironies, we see Percy using this novel to argue for the
necessity of the traditional Southern notion of religiosity for recovering community
and resisting the painful self-divisions produced by the postmodern South’s petty,
bourgeois materialism.
Perhaps chief amongst the novel’s ironies is a self-admitted “not very successful
psychiatrist,” with his own deep-seated psychoses, finding himself able to “cure”
others of their malaise. It is also ironic that while these psychic maladies are products
of the Gnosticism that follows from Descartes’ inauguration of dualistic modernity,
More’s analysis and “cure” is effected through modern, mechanistic solutions. More
seems to relish in this irony, valiantly describing his lapsometer as “the first caliper
of the soul and the first hope of bridging the dread chasm that has rent the soul
of Western man ever since the famous philosopher Descartes ripped the body loose
from the mind and turn the very soul into a ghost that haunts its own house” (191).
The negative consequences of this “dread chasm” are readily apparent in the lives of
Paradise Estates’ residents.
Dr. More describes his neighbors as generally falling into two broad categories:
secular, liberal scientists and academics who work in Fedtown, and religious, conser-
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vative businessmen who own the shops and businesses in town. Paradise Estates also
contains a large number of medical professionals, who seem equally divided between
liberal and conservative viewpoints. More notes that this golf course community is
“that rare thing, a pleasant place where Knothead [the right-wing political party]
and Left—but not black—dwell side by side in peace” (18). He notes that while
his liberal and conservative neighbors “make much of their differences—one speaking of ‘outworn dogmas and creeds,’ the other of ‘atheism and immorality,’ etcetera
etcetera—to tell the truth, I do not notice a great deal of difference between the
two” (15).4 The lack of difference is largely a consequence of both groups’ being fully
modern. That is, that they practice a life of petty comfort and consumption, without
developing a substantial theory for living. Such a theory would be based in something beyond themselves, and would thus force them to view their own self-satisfying
life practices critically. So great is the hold of Gnosticism over these individuals,
then, they are unable to even conceive of the existential limitations of a life of bestial
self-satisfaction.
Stated plainly—what matters most to both Knothead and Left are creature comforts and having their pieties reaffirmed. These pieties allow both groups to envision
themselves as concerned with significant, meaningful ideas and principles, while not
requiring them to deal with the consequences of these ideas and principles. In reality, these pieties simply provide the residents of Paradise Estates with affirmative
intellectual cover for the petty, materialist practice of their lives. A clear example
of this is seen in both Knothead and Left attitudes towards African-Americans. In
explaining the differences between these groups, Dr. More notes the overlap in their
racial attitudes:
The Negroes around here are generally held to be a bad lot. The older
4
Writing in 2015, forty-four years after this novel’s publication, I am struck by the sad hilarity
of how accurate this statement continues to be in our own day. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même
chose.

177

Negroes are mostly trifling and no-account, while the young Negroes have
turned mean as yard dogs. Nearly all the latter have left town, many to
join the Bantus [a group of black revolutionaries] in the swamp. Here the
conservatives and liberals of Paradise agree. The conservatives say that
Negroes always have been trifling and no-account or else mean as yard
dogs. The liberals, arguing with the conservatives at the country club,
say yes, Negroes are trifling and no-account or else mean as yard dogs,
but why shouldn’t they be, etcetera etcetera. So it goes.
Our servants in Paradise are the exceptions, however: faithful black mammies who take care of our children as if they were their own, dignified
gardeners who work and doff their caps in the old style. (17)
While their various perspectives may lead them to interpret the condition of AfricanAmericans differently, this is a difference without real significance for how they interact with blacks. Both Lefts and Knotheads are glad that Paradise Estates is
lily-white, and both equally enjoy the ways in which the labor of “faithful black
mammies” and “dignified gardeners” enable them to practice life in the pleasant environs of the country club. More further elaborates on how minor their differences
in action toward blacks are: “When conservative Christian housewives drive to town
to pick up their maids in the Hollow, the latter ride on the back seat in the old
style. Liberal housewives make their maids ride on the front seat” (15). While their
respective pieties and political leanings may produce different symbolic gestures, the
actuality of their treatment of and expectations about blacks are virtually identical.
While a Left may put her servant in the front seat to assuage white guilt and a
Knothead stick hers in the back out of loyalty to the old order, both ultimately see
African-Americans as servants to be utilized when necessary and hidden from view
when not.5
5

The novel provides no indication of either faction viewing the novel’s black characters as any-
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Such inconsequential differences in action and ideology help explain why Paradise
Estates stands as “an oasis of concord in a troubled land” (17). Elsewhere, America
has largely split along factional lines. More tells us that “[t]he center did not hold;”
importantly, he immediately follows this revelation by pointedly stating that, despite
this seeming dissolution, “the Gross National Product continues to rise” (18). In
expressing the non-existence of the center, Percy lays bare the place where the pieties
of Left and Knothead coincide—in the bourgeois pursuit of material comfort. This
is the signal issue for residents of Paradise Estates, surpassing all belief, and perhaps
even implying that beliefs themselves are to be treated as merely epiphenomenal and
unimportant. In so doing, the attitudes of Paradise Estates denigrate the soul of
man, and undermine possibilities for real, complex human community.
In place of complex community based in working out competing theories of life, the
community of Paradise Estates rises from its denizens’ shared consumption patterns.
Percy illustrates this by pointing out how readily Northern transplants adopted to life
in the South. Being a Southerner in Paradise Estates does not require confronting the
complexity of the South’s history and traditions, but simply in making the proper
consumer choices. Dr. More tells us that his Northern neighbors “have taken to
Southern ways like ducks to water. They drink toddies and mint juleps and hold fish
fries with hush puppies. Little black jockeys fish from mirrors in their front yards.
Life-size mammy-dolls preside over their patios.” Adopting these consumption-based
markers of Southerness ironically leads these ersatz Southerners—many of whom
are Lefts—to embrace other attitudes of the Old Southern order. These individuals
employ “servants” from “Happy Hollow,”6 to whom they grant “totin’ privileges” and
thing more than servants. When the Bantus revolt and seize Paradise Estates as a site for building
their own civilization—a civilization that, in the novel’s epilogue, comes to ironically mirror the
white world it has replaced—they see neither Left nor Knothead as allies, claiming their homes
equally.
6
Percy chooses this name carefully, with its obvious echoes of the figure of the “Happy Darky,” the
gross caricature of marginalized African Americans as contented children we also see in embodied in
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give “Christmas gifs,” signs of the petty paternalism of the Southern racial order.
In this consumption-based New South, in which being a Southerner consists of
little more than decorating your yard in appropriately “Southern” ways, we see the
old order denuded—the outward signs of the traditional South are on display, but
separated from the demands of its foundational logics. We should recall that John
Randolph of Roanoke, the individual I’ve suggested is perhaps the archetypal Southern conservative, not only manumitted his slaves after his death, but also provided
them with land, tools, and livestock in the free state of Ohio, because his understanding of community’s mutual obligations demanded he do so. In his essay “Stoicism in
the South,” Percy’s discussion of Faulkner’s Colonel Satoris illustrates the novelist’s
awareness of the Randolphian ideal in the Southern tradition:
The Colonel Satoris who made himself responsible for his helpless “freedmen,” and the Lucas Beauchamps who accepted his leadership, formed
between them a bond such as can only exist between one man in his
dignity and another. It was a far nobler relationship than what usually
passes under the name of paternalism. [The obligations demanded by this
bond were fulfilled] because to do [African Americans] an injustice would
be to defile the inner fortress which was oneself. Whatever its abuses,
whatever its final sentimental decay, there was such a thing as noblesse
oblige on the one side and an extraordinary native courtesy and dignity on
the other, by which there occurred, under almost impossible conditions, a
flowering of human individuality such as this hemisphere has rarely seen.
(“Stoicism in the South” 85)
However one might criticize the potential naïvete and romanticism of Percy’s presenthe figures of the mammy-doll and lawn jockey—Flannery O’Connor’s “Artificial Niggers.” However,
unlike their influence on the boy and his grandfather in O’Connor’s great story, these figures provide
no vision of suffering and mercy to the denizens of Percy’s Paradise Estates.
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tation of the relationship between blacks and aristocratic whites in this passage, there
is nevertheless a central point that has significant consequences for our reading of Love
in the Ruins. The obligations elite whites once felt toward blacks—obligations born
out of recognizing the servitude and degradation southern blacks experienced because
of the actions of elite whites themselves, rather than the actions of blacks—has been
subject to “sentimental decay.” In the post-apocalyptic South of this novel, the aristocratic white Southerner (and his Left-leaning, Northern-transplant neighbor) are no
longer what Percy, in the same essay, identifies as “the champion of Negro rights. . . of
fair-mindedness and toleration in general” (83). The significance of obligation and a
commitment to “fair-mindedness and toleration” has been replaced by the banality
of “totin’ privileges” and “Christmas gifs.”
All in all, many of the residents of Paradise Estates—both Left and Knothead—
have adopted a practice of life that meets their physical needs and fills them with
pleasures, while insulating them from any awareness of the myriad ironies that limit
their existential maturity. In short, their practice of life is marked by the Gnostic
split that readily accompanies the bourgeois order of postmodern America. In his
work as a psychiatrist, Tom More is placed in a position to observe several other
means by which this Gnostic split plays out, each serving to arrest the patient’s
existential stability and happiness. In very different ways, patients P. T. Bledsoe
and Ted Tennis are oppressed by “angelism, that is, excessive abstraction of the self
from itself” (Love 37). Bledsoe’s life is consumed by his paranoid fantasies of being
persecuted by “Negroes and Communists. . . as well as a Jewish organization that he
called the ‘Bildebergers’ and that he had reason to believe had taken over the Federal
Reserve system” (31). Ted, meanwhile, is a neurotic whose tendency to over-analyze
every aspect of his life makes him unable to have sex with his wife. Bledsoe retreats
into fantasies of moving to the Australian outback, fantasies he knows he will never
fulfil. For his part, Ted wants More to provide him with a “Bayonne-rayon training
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member,” a sex toy that will serve in place of his own penis. This abstracted, idealized
substitute for his penis will thus permit the excessively-transcendent Ted to “have
sex” with his wife, while nevertheless avoiding an encounter with his immanent self.
Tom More’s assessment of his neighbors thus presents him with two different,
but equally destructive, existential consequences of the postmodern South’s Gnostic
character: the bestialism of uncritical material comfort, and the angelism of excessive,
obsessive abstraction. These exist in equal measure for both secular liberals, like
Ted Tennis and the housewives who put their maids in the front seat, and religious
conservatives like P. T. Bledsoe and the housewives whose maids ride “in the old style.”
Importantly, both angelism and beastialism naturally result from understanding the
individual self as the measure of all things; the postmodern South’s Gnostic character
not only divides man from himself, but from others as well. Such notions stand in
contrast to the vision of life displayed on a ruined Rotary Club banner. It is a further
irony of the novel that this banner, with its connections to the civic boosterism that
greatly contributed to the bourgeois character of the New South, becomes for Dr.
More a totemic symbol of a theory for life. Hanging in the dining room of motel
in one of the novel’s abandoned districts, the banner asks three questions of vital
importance for Dr. More: Is it the truth? Is it fair to all concerned? Will it build
goodwill and better friendships? More tells us that “the banner is rent, top to bottom,
like the temple veil,” suggesting that late apocalypse has perhaps invalidated these
questions (9).
Even if those particular questions have, indeed, lost their practical power, More
is profoundly taken with them. If considered seriously and critically, these questions
require an individual to produce a theory of life, and judge his practice accordingly.
By having the banner ripped in half, Percy illustrates that theory and practice have
been separated from one another, paralleling Gnosticism’s division of soul and body.
Taken alongside Dr. More’s general comments in the novel’s opening pages, the refer-
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ence a self-confessed “bad Catholic” here makes to the Crucifixion points toward the
myriad existential divisions present in his world. In More’s Paradise, spirit is separated from body, the individual is separated from community, and man is separated
from the Divine. The rending of the temple veil in this New South leads More to
reflect on a felt reality of his time and place: the “old Christ died for our sins and
it didn’t work, we were not reconciled. The new Christ shall reconcile man with our
sins. The new Christ lies drunk in a ditch” (153). The peace and unity that reign in
Paradise Estates are not indicative of existential divisions being undone, but rather
of some individuals engaging in uncritical, and even dishonest, denials of the existence of such divisions, while others are simply lost and profoundly confused about
the source of their malaise. All the while, More tells us, the new Christ is drunk
in a ditch. Just as Brooks points out in his description of Gnosticism, for man in
Paradise, his “salvation depends on his own efforts.”
With this image, Percy suggests that religious faith has not been cast off in this
post-apocalyptic New South. But though it exists, faith has been neutered of any
of its power. The faith practiced in Paradise Estates does not demand anything of
its practitioners, but has rather been remade in order to accommodate the Gnostic
pieties of New Southerners. As an example, More tells us that the Catholic Church
“has split into three pieces: (1) the American Catholic Church whose new Rome is
Cicero, Illinois; (2) the Dutch schismatics who believe in relevance but not God; (3)
the Roman Catholic remnant, a tiny scattered flock with no place to go” (5-6). In all
American Catholic Church parishes stands a “blue banner beside the crucifix [showing] Christ holding the American home, which has a picket fence, in his two hands”
(181). This ikon of a middle-class, Americanized Christ illustrates a faith remade to
meet the pieties of Knotheads. The Dutch schismatics’ denial of God makes faith
meaningless, while their concern for “relevance” makes their beliefs, whatever they
may be, palatable to many liberals. Protestantism is in its own vexed position, as
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illustrated by More’s estranged wife Doris, “a cheerful Episcopalian from Virgina.”
In his account, their marriage dissolves after she succumbs to what he thinks of as
a “typical” weakness for cheerful Episcopalians—eventually, they “fall prey to Gnostic pride, commence buying antiques, and develop a yearning for esoteric doctrine”
(64). Doris, who takes up with a gay English conman masquerading as a Hindu divine, leaves More and sets out “in search of myself. . . To the lake isle of Innisfree”
(65). Taken together, such demonstrations of faith either deny transcendent Truth
(the Dutch schismatics), replace it with idolatry (the American Catholic Church), or
imagine it to exist in an ever-retreating horizon (Doris and her “yearning for esoteric
doctrine”).
None of these forms of faith are indicative of what Weaver calls the South’s “older
religiousness.” However, this sort of belief is present in both the Roman Catholic
remnant to which Dr. More remains committed, as well as the unorthodox Presbyterianism of his nurse, Ellen Olgethorpe. More admits his faith is imperfect, and tells
us that he has “stopped eating Christ in Communion, stopped going to mass, and
have since fallen into a disorderly life. I believe in God and the whole business but I
love women best, music and science next, whiskey next, God fourth, and my fellowman hardly at all” (6). Ellen, meanwhile, “though she is a strict churchgoer and a
moral girl, does not believe in God. Rather does she believe in the Golden Rule and
in doing right” (157). Ellen’s atheism is distinct from that of the Dutch schismatics
in that she has no interest in or need for “relevance.” Even though she denies the
actual existence of the Divine, she nevertheless recognizes the reality of transcendent
Truth, and accepts its strictures for governing her conduct. Ellen’s unorthodox, atheistic Presbyterianism is a significant instance of how the South’s “older religiousness”
need not promote, nor even accede to, religious dogma to have its power.7 Ellen
7

We should once again be reminded of God Without Thunder, the “unorthodox defense of orthodoxy” penned by one of Weaver’s mentors, John Crowe Ransom.
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Olgethorpe, the Godless Calvinist, is the most sane and moral character in this rich
novel, and her sanity and morality are due to her ironic affirmation of the South’s
traditional notion of religiosity.
More’s further comments on his and Ellen’s convictions points us toward the end
of the novel, where the eventual recovery of traditional Southern religiosity helps
facilitate More’s overcoming the postapocalyptic South’s Gnostic split. Immediately
after discussing Ellen’s unorthodox faith, More notes that she simply
does right. She doesn’t need God. What does God have to do with being
honest, hard-working, chaste, upright, unselfish, etcetera. I on the other
hand believe in God, the Jews, Christ, the whole business. Yet I don’t do
right. I am a Renaissance pope, an immoral believer. Between the two of
us we might have saved Christianity. Instead we lost it. (ibid.)
The two final sentences of this passage present a challenge to readers: in what way
might More and Ellen have saved Christianity, and how did they lose it? To make
sense of what Percy is doing here, we need to consider the narrative technique he
employs in the novel. The main events of Love in the Ruins take place on July 1-4
of an uncertain year, and are followed by an epilogue occurring “Five Years Later.”
Percy opens the novel with the events of July Fourth, goes back to narrate the
First through the Third, and then returns to the events of the Fourth. Importantly,
each day is narrated in the present tense, and More’s relating of the events of the
First, Second, and Third are not presented as flashbacks. By paying attention to the
narrative technique Percy employs, we realized that More’s comments about he and
Ellen having “lost” Christianity are amongst his earliest ruminations in the novel’s
interior chronology, even though they come about a third of the way through the text
of the book.
This recognition provides us with related ways for understanding More’s comment.
In their different forms of belief, More and Ellen mirror the Gnostic division of their
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postapocalyptic South. Traditional, orthodox Christianity expects both belief in a set
of doctrines and pious living as a result of accepting those doctrines. More and Ellen
each present half of that vision of faith. He recognizes this, and this recognition is
behind his remark that, between the two of them, they might have saved Christianity.
In other words, if More and Ellen could come together in some way, their individual
beliefs could combine into a unity of both the transcendent and immanent aspects of
faith. This would overcome the petty shadows of Christian faith we see, for instance,
in Doris on the one hand and the American Catholic Church on another. This
union would save Christianity. More’s proclamation that he and Ellen had “lost”
Christianity follows from his recognition that they could have “saved” Christianity
through their union. On July First, he is convinced that his Renaissance popery and
Ellen’s atheist Calvinism are separated by an unbreachable gulf. As a result, the
needed union of his metaphysical belief and her practical piety is impossible. Yet as
the novel progresses towards July Fourth’s cataclysmic events, we see Ellen and More
increasingly joined together. By the time of the epilogue, we see constant instances
of both literal and figurative union on their part; ultimately, they come together and
“save Christianity,” and through that find a theory for life that rescues them from
the existential destructiveness of Southern Gnosticism.
More and Ellen’s union is a direct result of the events of July Forth. That day’s
cataclysm is produced by the Bantus’ revolution and the malappropriation of More’s
lapsometer by the twisted scientist and businessman, Art Immelmann. These events
are themselves at least indirectly the products of Paradise’s Gnostic logic. Immelmann wants to use the MOQUOL to exploit the existential weaknesses produced
by self-division, thus providing him with power over others. Meanwhile, the Bantu
leader Uru is actively revolting against the racism of Paradise Estates, racism that
I’ve asserted results from the Gnostic logic of Paradise Estates’ residents. Having
witnessed the Bantus’ conquering of Paradise Estates and facing the victory of the
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“evil-minded son of a bitch” Immelmann, More finds himself alone with Ellen, who
asks “Now what?” When More replies that he thinks he’ll have a drink, Ellen’s answer
is firm, decisive, and intimate—“‘No you won’t. Let’s go home,’ she says, spitting on
me and smoothing my eyebrows” (376-77).
However poorly he lives it, Dr. More’s adherence to orthodox Catholic dogma has
placed him firmly at odds to both the many instantiations of Paradise’s Gnosticism
and both Uru’s and Immelmann’s reactions to it: the enthusiasm for euthanasia and
we see in Fedville’s geriatric clinic, the reduction of sex to passionless mechanics on
display in Fedville’s “Love Clinic,” Paradise Estates’ mindless consumption and materialism, the Bantus’ revolutionary fervor, and Immelmann’s demonic lust for power.
More may recognize himself at odds with Gnosticism, but he is himself bewildered by
how to respond to it. Fortunately, Ellen’s practical piety provides her with stability
in the face of chaos, allowing her to provide succour to More and other characters.
Her steadiness also forces More into a recognition of the ways in which his philandering and drinking are destroying him, undermining his own disagreements with
Paradise’s Gnostic excesses, and thereby separating him from his beliefs. Thus, as
the novel’s world falls apart, their seemingly incompatible notions of faith have joined
them together in the face of chaos and cataclysm.
More and Ellen are still joined together when we encounter them in the novel’s
epilogue, five years later. They now have children and are presumably married, and
are living in old slave quarters. There, they eke out a meagre existence through
gardening and Dr. More taking on the odd client. In a situation very different from
his early country-club existence, More still believes that his “lapsometer can save
the world—if I can get it right. For the world is broken, sundered, busted down
the middle, self ripped from self and man pasted back together as mythical monster,
half angel, half beast, but no man” (382-83). Here, we see More recognizing that an
undoing of the gnostic split is not itself a means for the creation of a theory for living
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(even if it is perhaps a precondition). But even though More recognizes the essential
problem—that a “pasted together. . . half angel, half beast” is not a man in any real
sense—he continues to believe in his lapsometer above all else. This continued belief in
the tool’s ability to cure the gnostic malaise he so well defines points to the ultimate
irony in this heavily ironic novel: here, near the end of Love in the Ruins, More
seemingly remains largely unaware of the role he and Ellen’s adherence to forms of
the South’s older religiousness had in helping them survive the end of the world. The
events of the brief epilogue, which are appropriately on Christmas Eve, force him to
recognize his faith’s role in his overcoming the still-extant Gnosticism of his South,
and the way in which the transcendent concerns of the South’s “older religiousness”
point to a nascent theory for living.
More finds a solution—a theory for living—after making his Christmas Eve confession. Importantly, on this night, Ellen has decided to go to mass with him. When
he goes into the confessional, More initially finds himself unable to be contrite, and
seemingly takes an ironic pleasure in his continued malaise. The priest recognizes
that More is trapped by the very Gnosticism he ostensibly rejects, inasmuch as his
understanding of sin is excessively abstract—and thus not really his fault. As a result,
he cannot be contrite:
“Very well. You’re sorry for your sins.”
“No.”
“That’s too bad. Ah me. Well—” He steals a glance at his watch. “In
any case, continue to pray for knowledge of your sins. God is good. He
will give you what you ask. Ask for sorrow. Pray for me.”
“All right.”
“Meanwhile, forgive me but there are other things we must think about:
like doing our jobs, you being a better doctor, I being a better priest, show-
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ing a bit of ordinary kindness to people, particularly our own families—
unkindness to those close to us is such a pitiful thing—doing what we can
for our poor unhappy country—things which, please forgive me, sometimes seem more important than dwelling on a few middle-aged daydreams.”8
“You’re right. I’m sorry,” I say instantly, scalded.
“You’re sorry for your sins?”
“Yes. Ashamed rather.”
“That will do. . . ” (Percy, Love 399).
This conversion and moment of contrition come on perhaps too quickly, and this is
arguably a flaw in Percy’s composition. But despite what we may feel about the
suddenness of More’s change of heart, what the priest is doing here neatly complements Percy’s overall purpose in the novel. The priest’s remarks, which More will
describe as “scalding” immediately thereafter, force More to face the necessity of both
abstract doctrine and practical piety in genuine faith; this is the very kind of union
that More had earlier thought would “save Christianity.” The presence of Ellen, the
exemplar of practical piety, at the mass subtly mirrors the union the priest forces
More to recognize.
In the closing moments of the novel, donning sackcloth and ashes, Dr. More has
been disabused of his own Gnosticism, and finds in traditional Southern religiosity
an effective cure for what he has spent the entire novel diagnosing.9 The priest says
8

More had admitted to sins including “lusts, envies, fornication, delight in the misfortunes of
others” (397). He knows these are “sins,” but because they are mere abstractions, he cannot make
out why he is responsible for them, why God would judge him for them. The sins and evils inside
Tom More are not the result of the brokenness of Tom More himself; this is, then, a definitively
Gnostic notion of sin.
9

Of course, this is a somewhat unusual manifestation of Southern religiousness, inasmuch as
Roman Catholicism is not a faith normally associated with the South; Ellen’s heterodox Presbyterianism is also a very atypical Southern faith. Nevertheless, they both point to the core of the South’s
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mass, and More tells us that “I eat Christ, drink his blood” (400). This is profoundly
significant, as while the novel is full of mentions of eating Christ and references to
the Host, this moment is the first mention of both Elements. Importantly, this is also
the first time in the novel we see More participating in the Eucharistic feast, placing
himself in literal Communion with the Divine. There are further instances of union
in the novel’s last pages. More has told us that he and Ellen sleep in separate twin
beds, furniture left over from his marriage to Doris. Yet as the novel closes, a new,
large bed that they will jointly share has been delivered. The final scene is More
and Ellen making love on this bed, “twined about each other as the ivy twineth”
(403). Thus, the epilogue presents us with myriad references to unity and wholeness.
Through the joining together of the immanent and the transcendent, the abstract and
the practical—all of which are constituted in Weaver’s notion of the South’s older
religiousness—the divisions and rifts of Southern Gnosticism are undone, and More
begins to enact a theory for life. The confusion and pain seen in the ripped Rotary
banner has been replaced by the beauty and existential wholeness seen “at home in
bed where all good folk belong” (ibid.).
Faith points Tom More to recognizing his own brokenness not as something to
be transcended through heroic action and human ingenuity—his MOQUOL cannot
repair Gnosticism’s mighty schisms. Rather, those are repaired by union with others,
most especially God, but also community and family. Will Barrett, the protagonist
of Percy’s second novel—1966’s The Last Gentleman—finds himself oppressed by a
malaise similar to that suffered by Tom More. In this novel, Percy has Will overcome this malaise through engaging another traditional aspect of Southern culture:
memory, which provides a means for structuring existence and understanding oneself
older religiousness, an “attitude toward religion [that was] essentially the attitude of orthodoxy: it
was a simple acceptance of a body of belief, an innocence of protest and schism by which religion
was left one of the unquestioned and unquestionable supports of the general settlement under which
men live” (Weaver, “Older Religiousness” 135).
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as a part of an order that depends on concepts—like community, obligation, and
history—greater than the self. By having Will figuratively travel back into both his
personal and the communal of various Southern communities past, memory becomes
empowering. As a result, memory allows Will to overcome his existential paralysis.
The Last Gentleman is an immensely complex and often bewildering novel, as
Percy moves back-and-forth from dreamy questing to high satire to moments of nearmythological profundity. But if, in places, the novel produces a sensation of bewilderment and confusion in its readers, it is an appropriate sensation, inasmuch as it
mirrors Will’s experience. Will suffers from a myriad of psychological confusions,
including fugue states and déjà vus, as well a debilitating need “to know everything before he could do anything” (The Last Gentleman 1). Through combining
Will’s crippling need for knowledge—for gnosis—with his fugues and déjà vus, Percy
presents us with a character burdened by an essentially Gnostic vision of time, about
which I will say more momentarily. This vision of time traps Will, placing him in “a
state of pure possibility, not knowing what sort of a man he was or what he must do,”
leading his “supposing therefore that he must be all men and do everything” (ibid.).
Throughout the, Will moves back towards the South that produced him and
towards a critical reassessment of Southern conservative notions of memory. Though
the novel is divided into five volumes, it is helpful to conceive of it as arranged in three
sections, each of which presents a different vision of Will’s relationship with both the
South and the Vaughts. The first section shows Will in New York, alienated from the
South and from himself. After meeting the Vaughts, Will agrees to accompany them
back South as a tutor for their terminally-ill teenage son Jamie (he has also fallen
in love with with the Vaughts’ beautiful daughter, Kitty). This arrangement leads
to the second section of the novel, in which Will returns to a South very different
from the one he left, enrolls in the University of Mississippi, courts Kitty, and faces
the bourgeois thinking of the Vaughts and their ilk. Though he now feels more at
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home, Will still finds himself oppressed by the same sorts of alienation he felt in New
York. The third and final section shows Will recovering memory after visiting his
ancestral home. Ultimately, it is this recovery of memory that helps Will overcome a
destructive, Gnostic vision of time.
Edward J. Dupuy discusses Gnostic time in his study of the autobiographical
elements of Percy’s fiction, Autobiography in Walker Percy.10 Drawing on the work of
religious historian Henri-Charles Puech, Dupuy contrasts the Gnostic conception of
time with Classical Hellenism’s emphasis on “eternal return” and Christianity’s focus
on “irreversible” events that are “full of significance” (Dupuy 93):
The Gnostic attitude toward time is neither historical nor cosmic, neither
a straight line nor a circle. Instead, Puech argues, it is best viewed as
a “broken line.” Whereas Hellenism proffers a continuity between the
temporal and the atemporal, and Christianity posits a movement in and
toward fullness,11 Gnosticism proposes a radical bifurcation between the
temporal and the atemporal, between fullness and history. The Gnostic
view is primarily dualistic. . . The Greek either stands in awe of time or
grows weary of it, and the Christian waits in eager anticipation, but the
Gnostic “condemns, rejects, [and] rebels.” Time is, “in the last analysis,
a lie.” (94)
While the cyclical integration of Hellenistic time and the move from the weakness
of the flesh to the perfection of the spirit in Christian time both indicate a unity of
the transcendent and the immanent, Gnostic man understands time as broken, frag10

This excellent study provides a strong reading of Percy’s interest in Gnosticism, especially in
Lancelot, and considers the ways in which Percy uses considerations of Gnosticism to respond to the
spectre of fascism.
11

While this is certainly the case in Western Christianity, the Eastern Church seems (unsurprisingly) to understand time in a way heavily influenced by Classical Hellenism. For a beautiful
exploration of Eastern Christianity’s conception of time, see the Russian writer Eugene Vodolazkin’s
2013 novel Laurus.
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mented, and ordered incoherently (if at all). Time, in this view, is a “lie” inasmuch
as it proves to be epistemologically empty; Gnostic man, obsessed with cultivating
secret knowledge, thus “condemns, rejects, [and] rebels” against a concept he understands as a false episteme. The practical consequences of this conception of time
are that Gnostic man must either repudiate the meaningfulness of history or find
the past and present as inseparably permeating one another. In both situations, a
properly-ordered vision of history and temporality is impossible; this produces severe
existential consequences in light of the South and its historical contexts.
This Gnostic vision time figures significantly in The Last Gentleman, and is an
essential feature of Will’s overwhelming sense of alienation. Yet early on, Percy
intimates that such a vision of time haunts the South itself. In assessing Will’s
malaise, the narrator notes that he is like many other young Southerners, and that
such malaise is not uncommon precisely because
Southerners have trouble ruling out the possible. What happens to a
man to whom all things seem possible and every course of action is open?
Nothing of course. Except war. If a man lives in the sphere of the possible
and waits for something to happen, what he is waiting for is war—or the
end of the world. That is why Southerners like to fight and make good
soldiers. In war the possible becomes actual through no doing of one’s
own. (The Last Gentleman 7).
This juxtaposition of infinite possibility and war recalls Faulkner’s famous assessment
of Pickett’s Charge in Intruder in the Dust—that for “every Southern boy fourteen
years old, not once but whenever he wants it, there is the instant when it’s still
not yet two oclock on that July afternoon in 1863. . . [and] it hasn’t happened yet,
it hasn’t even begun yet. . . ” In essence, Faulkner recognizes that the Southerner’s
understanding of defeat results in a rebellion against and a rejection of that defeat,
accomplished through a refusal to accept time as definitive and coherent. If time
193

is not coherently fixed and stable—if it is understood Gnostically—all things are
still possible. Yet instead of being liberated by infinite possibility, the individual
Southerner finds himself existentially overwhelmed. Thus, as Percy recognizes, the
Southerner is trapped by his sense of time, and he passively waits “for something to
happen.”
The Gnostic conception of time, and the overwhelmingly infinite sense of possibility that follows it, are in profound tension with many other aspects of the Southern
conservative tradition, specifically its Christianity and those Burkean aspects that
deal with limits, restraint, and acting within contexts. The 20th -century Southerner
may commemorate the South’s past with the ostensibly Christian cry of Deo Vindice,
but his understanding of the incoherence of time—especially the perpetual intrusion
of the past into the present—is essentially Gnostic. If the past, in Faulkner’s phrase,
isn’t dead, not even past, then time is incoherent, perhaps even oppressively so.
The individual Southerner is unable to understand when he is within history, as the
South’s past is not truly in the past, but rather wherever the individual Southerner
finds it to be useful and necessary for the past to exist.
This understanding of Southern history is deeply alienating and existentially limiting to the individual Southerner. While it often produces petty nostalgia—here, we
should recall Uncle Jake from Peter Taylor’s “The Scoutmaster”—in other situations
the consequences are significantly more destructive. As the past perpetually intrudes
upon the lived experience of the present, memory itself becomes existentially dangerous. To return to Faulkner, there is a strong argument to be made that his most
famous character, Quentin Compson, is undone largely by Gnosticism’s “bifurcation
between the temporal and the atemporal,” finding himself trapped by inescapable
slippages between memory—both his personal memories of Caddy and the communal memory around Thomas Sutpen—and his lived experience of the present. For
Quentin, the only way out is suicide. But even though Percy admits that Will Bar-
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rett is “the Quentin Compson who ‘didn’t commit suicide”’ (qtd. in Ginés 163),
Will faces many of the same slippages between memory and experience. Nevertheless, the contexts of his very different South alter the consequences of such slippages
significantly.
In addition to the contexts of his postmodern fictive South, Percy’s treatment of
memory is also an important consideration here. In this novel, Percy clearly pushes
against the passive experience of memory that leads to either petty nostalgia or an
apathetic lack of critical engagement with the past; for memory to be existentially
useful, it must be actively considered and engaged. Yet even an active, critical engagement with memory and its consequences can be existentially ruinous if it fails
to consider that memory has consequences for not just the individual, but also those
others that surround him. To return again to Will’s literary antecedent, Quentin
Compson—while Quentin is doing nothing if not critically engaging the communal
memory of Yoknapatawpha County and the South as a whole in Absalom, Absalom!,
his is ultimately a self-serving engagement. This is arguably what Shreve is trying
to force Quentin to recognize at the end of Absalom, Absalom! (“You cant [sic] understand it. You would have to be born there.”/“Would I then?” Quentin did not
answer. “Do you understand it?”). However active and critical it may be, Quentin’s
engagement with memory fails to help him make sense of the South, and, as his
famous response to Shreve’s ultimate question suggests, perhaps even his own self.
For memory to have existentially utility, it must actively consider the self in terms of
things larger than the self, rather than the other way around.12
The peculiarities of Will’s South, and the ways in which these exist in tension with
both his personal and the region’s larger, communal memory, are made manifest in
12

Percy’s treatment of memory is thus essentially Proustian. This is ironic considering Percy’s
distaste for Proust—something exemplified by his letters with his friend Shelby Foote. Even if, as
he claims in the letters, Percy never made it past the first few pages of À la recherche du temps
perdu, Foote’s evangelism about the book’s greatness and perspectives perhaps had some effect on
Percy’s thinking about memory.
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his interaction with the Vaught family, especially in the second and third sections
of the novel. Upon his return South in the second section, Will faces a changed
South: “The South he came home to was different from the South he had left. It was
happy, victorious, Christian, rich, patriotic, and Republican” (The Last Gentleman
144). Defeat is not so much memorialized—as it is in Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha
County—as it is emptied of meaning. An example of this is Mr. Vaught’s huge
“Confederate Chevrolet” car dealership, in which salesmen walk around in “Rebcolonel hats and red walking canes” (206). We thus see the Confederate soldier no
longer as a valorized symbol of communal memory, but a kitschy, petty symbol of
mere regional identity and affiliation. This is a different sort of Gnosticism, in which
significance and meaning are disconnected from symbols, exacerbating the confusion
someone like Will faces.
Montserrat Ginés notes that “for all [Faulkner’s Quentin and Percy’s Will] have in
common, there is one fundamental aspect that sets them apart: Quentin’s obsession
with honor, role playing, and virtue finally undermines his life. Will’s preoccupation
with the same abstractions are much less agonizing, probably because the old code is
far more removed from his experience; he is in fact baffled by it” (Ginés 164). Ginés
goes on to remark that Will is “eventually able to settle his debt with the past and
rebuild his life, thus avoiding Quentin’s tragic fate” (ibid.). The way in which Will
settles “his debt” is through an active recovery of memory, something which he needs
to return home in order to effect.
This recovery begins with another instance of the déjà vus that haunted Will in
New York. The narrator notes that, as Will drives through Carolina, he realizes that
even
though he was hundreds of miles from home and had never been here and
it was not even the same here—it was older and more decorous, more
tended to and a dream with the past—he was home.
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A déjà vu: so this was where it all started and which is not quite like
home, what with this spooky stage-set moss and Glynn marshes which is
familiar nevertheless. It was familiar and droll and somehow small and
curious like an old house revisited. How odd that it should have persisted
so all this time and in one’s absence! (126).
Will’s return “home” thus takes him first to the seaboard South, that “older and
more decorous,” and even “droll” and “curious” antecedent to his South. He is here
faced with an inverse of the disorienting déjà vus of his time in New York, sensations
that, according to a previous conversation referenced by his therapist, emphasized
Will feeling “hollow” (26). Though Carolina presents Will with a sense of uncanny
familiarity, it nevertheless provides him with a feeling of wholeness. Here, even though
“it was not even the same here,” as his native Ithaca, Mississippi, Will reenters the
flow of Southern history.
While this moment of déjà vu shows Will as facing a nascent awareness of his
existence within the flow of time, it does not point toward a recovery of real existential
stability, nor a means of escape from the Gnostic notion of time that affects the
South generally. Time here is no more coherent and orderly for Will than it is for
Faulkner’s “every Southern boy fourteen years old.” Will may have left the ahistorical,
hollow déjà vus of his life in New York, but they have been replaced by the uncanny
temporality one feels in “an old house revisited.” Will is here experiencing little more
than a passive sense of time, rather effecting an active engagement of it through
memory, critically considered. That this passive sense of history is of little existential
utility to Will is demonstrated by his retreat into the same sort of abstract dreaminess
that controlled him in New York. Soon after these reflections on being “home,” Will
“unlimbered the telescope and watched a fifty-foot Chris-Craft beat up the windy
Intercoastal. A man sat in the stern reading the Wall Street Journal. . . What about
cotton futures, [Will] wondered” (126). Here in Old Carolina, just as back in New
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York, Will suffers from the Gnostic impulses of alienation (his encountering others
mediated through a telescope) and a desire to know everything (“what about cotton
futures”).
Percy’s juxtaposition Will’s reentry into history and his continued Gnostic confusion helps to illustrate the author’s recognition of the South’s flawed relationship
with time. Even though Percy’s fictive South does not memorialize the defeated Old
South, it nevertheless utilizes it; Percy shows us characters that are still deeply affected by the Old South, with various forms of existential confusion resulting from
their inability to process the Old South’s significance. This inability is itself due to
the Gnostic character of Percy’s fictive South, in which the experience of time is broken and incoherently ordered. The “spooky stage-set moss and Glynn marshes” of
Old Carolina are uncannily familiar to Will precisely because they are recognizable
as spiritual antecedents to the golf courses of the New, patriotic, rich, Republican
South where the Vaughts and their ilk live (and the plantation houses that would
have dotted those Glynn marshes and been covered by that moss are definitive precursors to the large suburban mansions owned by the Vaughts, et. al.). While the
actuality of place and the conditions of existence have seriously changed, the denizens
of Percy’s New South still find utility in the symbols of the Old—thus the logic of
a “Confederate” Chevrolet dealership staffed by “Reb-colonel” stereotypes. Through
these abstracted symbols, Percy’s New Southerners open themselves up to infinite
possibility; the Southern past can be interpreted in whatever way they want, to serve
whatever purposes they need it to serve in the Southern present. Because these New
Southerners are rich and victorious, rather than poor and defeated, they find ersatz
solace and comfort in such open-ended possibility rather than feelings of regretful
nostalgia.
In other words, the Vaughts, the Thigpens, and the numerous other victorious, Republican New Southerners who populate The Last Gentleman are Gnostics employing
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a flawed vision of time and Southern history to arrive, ultimately, at a justification for
a consumer culture in which meaning and notions of the individual self are largely created through consumption. While there is nothing particularly nasty or toxic about
these individuals, they have lost sight of the metaphysics that ordered the traditionalist Old South, the symbols of which they now appropriate and reinterpret in the
pursuit of bourgeois, individualistic comfort—something that the traditionalist South
of “social bond individualism” would have found perplexing. In this, they are much
like those individuals whom Richard Weaver describes as having failed to “realize
the presence of something greater than self and see the virtue of subordinating self
to communal enterprise—that is, see the virtue and not simply respond to coercion”
(Weaver, Ideas 115). Whereas a Gnostic logic of time made Faulkner’s Southerners
subject to the Southern past, that same logic, applied to different circumstances, now
places the Southern past in thrall to the whims of these postmodern New Southerners. Stated differently: whereas a previous generation saw “something greater than
the self” and stood paralyzed in awe of it, Percy’s New Southerners see that “something” not as “greater,” but rather as merely existing to serve their own notions of
self. While the relationship of the Southern past to present has been inverted, it
nevertheless retains its essentially Gnostic character.
As Will continues his journey, he is presented with two significant alternatives for
responding to this metaphysical lack in the postmodern South. These alternatives
are embodied in the two oldest Vaught children, Val and Sutter. Both of them
recognize the existential failures that follow from this lack—from no longer being able
to recognize the “presence of something greater than the self.” The tension between
these characters, and Will’s navigation between the two different poles represented
by their very different responses to the South’s existential failures, largely drives both
the final third of the novel and points toward the resolution Will ultimately finds.
For her part, Val becomes a Roman Catholic nun working with poor black children
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in south Alabama. Because of her totally giving herself over to something greater—
the church and the welfare of black children—Val becomes estranged from her family.
The Vaughts do not so much reject religion or show themselves as crass racists as
simply being unable to comprehend the fullness of Val’s metaphysical submission.
The world of Confederate Chevrolet dealerships cannot make sense of such a radical,
self-giving emptying of self; her practice of kenosis (the theological term for the
emptying of self in service to the will of the Divine) is insurmountably distant from
the Vaughts’ worldview.13 Val’s act of kenosis is seen both in her rejecting a life
of stability and upper-middle-class privilege for one of service, as well as her name
change. After becoming a nun, she is no longer Val Vaught, but rather Sister Johnette
Mary Vianney. Percy has chosen her religious name with great care, as it is a feminine
form of St. Jean-Baptiste-Marie Vianney, the patron saint of priests. An early 19th century French parish priest, St. John Vianney (as he is known in English) worked
selflessly to restore the fullness of the Catholic faith—and its metaphysics—in the
aftermath of the French Revolution. While the bourgeois complacency of the New
South is certainly far removed from the anarchic violence of the French Revolution,
Percy would assert that both are representative of a divorce from metaphysics based
in a Gnostic misordering of the place of man within time itself.14 Like her namesake,
“Sister Vinney” finds herself presenting piety, devotion, and pastoral care as solutions
to the negative existential consequences of this Gnostic misordering.
Sutter, the eldest Vaught child, is nearly the exact opposite of Val. A de-licensedphysician-turned-drifter, Sutter is a nihilistic enfant terrible. Where his sister empties herself into world around her, Sutter sees that same world as already empty
13

The relevant passage for this Christian doctrine is Philippians 2:vii, in which Paul reflects on
the consequences of Christ’s Incarnation. This verse is rendered in the English Standard Version
as “but emptied [ἐκένωσεν, ekenōsen] himself, by taking the form of a servant, being born in the
likeness of men.”
14
We should recall the creation of the calendrier français révolutionnaire, which, among other
things, attempted to impose a hyper-rationalistic order upon Creation; this was a Gnostic project
indeed, providing an illustration of the perceived “lie” of the natural movement of time.

200

of all but the most base, animalistic meaning. Despite their vital differences, Sutter, like Val, also recognizes that modern man has lost his way, and suffers from
a profound existential malaise. Sutter recognizes this malaise as characteristically
Gnostic, a recognition we see made explicit in his medical article, “The Incidence of
Post-orgasmic [sic] Suicide in Male University Graduate Students,” which is divided
into two sections, “Genital Sexuality as the Sole Surviving Communication Channel
between Transcending-Immanent Subjects,” and “The Failure of Coitus as a Mode
of Reentry into the Sphere of Immanence from the Sphere of Transcendence.” As the
title of the work indicates, Sutter accepts sex as “the Sole Surviving” means of engaging an otherwise meaningless, animalistic vision of existence marked by a Gnostic
separation of immanence and transcendence. And while sex momentarily overcomes
the malaise produced by Gnosticism, the title of the article’s second section indicates
that sex provides only a temporary reprieve. Sutter finds that the fleeting nature
of the good of sex portends an ultimate attempt at escaping the meaninglessness
of modern existence, finding a relationship between sex and suicide after examining
“the urethral meatus of some thirty male suicides for the presence of spermatozoa”
(50). The “presence of spermatozoa” in the “urethral meatus” indicates that the
men Sutter studied chose suicide soon after sex. While suicide may not overcome the
Gnostic confusions of life, it does escape them and render them powerless. Before he
even meets Sutter, Will is made aware of the dark conclusions of Sutter’s academic
work. For their part, the Vaughts worry that Sutter will take his nihilistic principles
to their logical—and ultimate—conclusion.
In the final third of the novel, Will finds himself caught between the conventional,
bourgeois Vaughts, and their very unconventional eldest children, in the family drama
surrounding Jamie’s terminal illness. As this family drama moves us toward the
novel’s conclusion, we see Will situated between Val, Sutter, and their two very
different responses to the South’s Gnostic shortcomings. This final section of the novel
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is inaugurated by another of Will’s déjà vus, portraying the James Meredith riots at
the University of Mississippi through Will’s confused, dreamy perspective. Although
several minor characters have mused on the the integration of the university, Will
has been typically oblivious to the concrete reality of the situation under discussion.
When integration actually occurs, his confusion is acute. Upon encountering a woman
on campus yelling “He’s here” and “Kill him!,” Will can only wonder “Who?” (227).
He follows this woman to the Confederate monument, where he sees “a group of
students. . . carrying a long flagstaff. The flag was furled—he could not tell whether
it was United States or Confederate” (228). Will tries to engage the group, but
they, pursuing their single-minded goal, ignore him; as the group rushes past, they
accidentally hit him in the head with the long flagpole. As he falls to the ground,
Will experiences a sudden rush of confusing clarity: “The dawn of discovery, the
imminent sense of coming at last upon those secrets closed to one and therefore most
inaccessible, broke over him. ‘But why is it–?’ he asked aloud, already knocked out
cold but raising a forefinger nevertheless, then lay down under the dark shrubbery”
(228).
This is a blackly-comic act of violence with ironic consequences. Will becomes a
victim of his ostensible confreres, white Southerners, who are dead-set on maintaining
the old racial order through violence against a black man. As he loses consciousness,
Will is presented with a key for making sense of his own self, the South, and his
place within it: memory, actively engaged. Even his confusion (“But why is it–?”) is
instructive; why is this act of violence occurring, why does it reveal “those secrets”
most necessary for understanding? These are questions for which Will must seek an
answer, or at least seek to confront their moral and existential challenges. Violence
here produces a fugue state in Will, as he finds himself sometime later in the cab
of his truck, unclear as to how he got from underneath the “dark shrubbery.”15 In
15

The contexts here—the beginning of a journey and amnesiac placement in a “dark shrubbery”—
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experiencing an act of violence intent upon black disenfranchisement, Will is clearly
within the tragic flow of Southern history, which he has felt ever since driving through
Old Carolina. But here, he is not just experiencing the abstract, transcendent flow of
a region’s history and its regrettable consistency with regards to race-based violence.
Rather, Will is confronted with an “imminent sense of coming” face-to-face with the
ways in which he himself is a part of that flow of history. The unfinished “But why
is it–?” shows Will attempting to make sense of why he finds this violence both
uncanny, disorienting, and revelatory. Will answers this question when he recovers
memories of his personal past, memories that point him to a means for resisting the
South’s Gnostic vision of time.
Soon after waking, Will finds himself traveling towards Santa Fe, New Mexico,
in search of Jamie, who has disappeared. While this journey confronts Will with
Val’s faith and Sutter’s nihilistic embrace of sex as ways out of the existential ruination of Gnostic time, he cannot embrace either. Instead, Percy shows Will pursuing
the memories inaugurated by the flagpole-induced fugue state, with Will making a
beeline to his home town of Ithaca, Mississippi. Through confronting the ways in
which violence, racism, and personal tragedies connect his own personal history with
the communal history of the South, Will is able to overcome the South’s Gnostic
time, which divides history from the self. Through an essentially conservative act—
remembering—Will finds his long-awaited existential stability.
What Will remembers first is place, and Percy here engages the ur-trope of Southern literature with deftness and sophistication. As he comes ever-closer to Ithaca,
Will is confronted with the exceptional differences between the South that produced
him and the one to which he had initially returned:
There had been the sense ever since leaving New York and never quite
have obvious echoes in Dante. At the beginning of the Comedy, the poet finds himself “in a gloomy
wood, astray / Gone from the path direct.” These echoes will continue to mark Will’s journey.
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realized until now of tarrying in upland places and along intermediate
slopes and way stations (My Lord, where had he stopped? Where had he
spent the last month? He cudgeled his brain) and now at last of coming
sock down to the ultimate alluvial floor, the black teeming Ur-plain. . . It
was a heedless prodigal land, the ditches rank and befouled, weeds growing
through the junk: old Maytags, Coke machines, and a Hudson Supersix
pushed off into a turnrow and sprouting a crop all its own. . .
Straight across the Delta he flew and down into the tongue of the Yazoo
plain to Ithaca, so named by a Virginian who admired Pericles more than
Abraham and who had had his fill of the Bethels and the Shilohs and the
Scotch-Irish. Yonder in the haze rose the brownish back of the Chickasaw
Bluffs, and just beyond, the old wormy concrete towers of the Vicksburg
battlefield. (239-40)
This South is not happy, victorious, and rich; to the contrary, scars of defeat, poverty,
and misery are omnipresent. It is significant that Percy uses “Bethel” and “Shiloh”
as the typical Bible-based names of Southern towns, inasmuch as they are both also
locations of Civil War battles. These generic names thus retain a connection to
Vicksburg, site of another battle. Thus, with regard to both the martial and religious aspects of the South’s mythos, Ithaca—not named after a Biblical locale or
battle site, of which Bethel and Shiloh are both—is isolated and idiosyncratic. But
the town’s name is also pregnant with meaning. Will has been driving a vehicle
the Vaughts affectionately named Ulysses, and thus the return to Ithaca recalls the
Odyssey and the long, tortuous process of homecoming—and its necessity. Will’s
observations while driving “down into the tongue of the Yazoo plain” also make clear
that this South is also vastly distant from that of the Vaughts’ suburbia. Percy thus
subtly disconnects Ithaca from the South’s Gnostic flow of time—from both the nostalgic Southern myth-making that is arrested by the past, as well as the bourgeois
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consumerism that arrests the past for its own purposes—and also emphasizes Will’s
profoundly meaningful, Odysseus-like homecoming.
Ithaca clearly exists within the flow of Southern history.16 But here, Will not
only faces the reality of the South’s history, but the ways in which his own personal
history intersects with this larger story; Will’s history within Ithaca is profoundly
connected to his memories of his father, a suicide. “Here [Will] used to walk with his
father and speak of the galaxies and of the expanding universe and take pleasure in
the insignificance of man in the great lonely universe. His father would recite ‘Dover
Beach,’ setting his jaw askew and wagging his lead like F.D.R.” (243-44). Leaving
the bank where he has gone to put a stop order on a lost check, Will is overwhelmed
by memories of Ithaca and his connection to it, and feels an instance of genuine
nostalgia:17
Here’s what I’ll do, thought the engineer who was sweating profusely and
was fairly beside himself with irritable delight. I’ll come back here and
farm Hampton, my grandfather’s old place, long since reclaimed by the
cockleburs, and live this same sweet life with these splendid fellows [that
he has encountered when leaving the bank].
“You gon’ be home for a while, Will?” they asked him.
“For a while,” he said vaguely and left them, glad to escape this dread
16

For example, the South’s historical legacy of racism and racial violence is on display in Ithaca,
something acutely illustrated by Will’s bizarre re-encountering of a troupe of “actors” led by a
“pseudo-negro” whom he had met at the beginning of his journey south. This group has been arrested
on what is obviously a racially-trumped-up charge, and Will serves as their de facto advocate,
assuring their freedom and urging them to lay low at his Uncle’s place across the Mississippi River
in Louisiana.
17

I say here genuine nostalgia as that word has the Greek word for homecoming at his base.
There is an element of dreamy romanticism to Will’s musings, but they differ from the hollow, petty
nostalgia of Taylor’s Uncle Jake inasmuch as Will’s nostalgia is connected to his own specific and
definite connection to place. Further, as I’ve already noted, Percy is clearly making connections to
the Odyssey—a story explicitly based on the notion of nostos, and the very work that introduces
the concept to our literary history.
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delight. (246)
Will recognizes the irony of his nostalgic fantasy, calling it a “dread delight.” Will
knows nothing of farming, and the “splendid fellows” are individuals with whom he
shares nothing in common and who would likely be at best uneasy acquaintances. A
return to Ithaca would thus be certainly dreadful.
Yet there would be delight in such a homecoming as well, as it would finally
give Will something he lacks—place, and the existential stability that comes with it.
Immediately after his nostalgic musing, Will experiences a realization that prefigures
one of the novel’s pivotal moments:
It came over him suddenly that he didn’t live anywhere and had no address. As he began to go through his pockets he spied a new outdoor
phone in a yellow plastic shell—and remembered Kitty. Lining up quarters and dimes on the steel shelf, he gazed down Kemper to the old city
jail at the corner of Vincennes. Here on the top step stood his great-uncle
the sheriff, or high sheriff, as the Negroes called him, on a summer night
in 1928. (246-47)
In this moment, two things happen: first, Will recognizes that he is placeless—
that he “didn’t live anywhere and had no address.” Will’s lack of place is the very
thing that has produced his existential confusion and unmoored him from the flow
of time. Secondly, in this moment, Will experiences a collapse of time into a single
moment. While thinking about Kitty and his present obligations, he also thinks
about a moment that occurred before he was born—his uncle’s staring down a mob
and preventing violence. Will “remembers” his uncle’s actions while the “telephone
was ringing in the purple castle beside the golf links;” Percy narrates this atavistic
memory in the present tense: we are told that “[t]he sheriff put his hands in his
back pockets so that the skirt of his coat cleared his pistol butt,” and that he tells
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the assembled crowd to “go on back to your homes and your families. There will be
no violence here tonight because I’m going to kill the first sapsucker who puts his
foot on that bottom step” (247). That Will is attending to his present obligations
while recalling his ancestor’s past performance of duty and talking on a “new outdoor
phone in a yellow plastic shell”—a shiny example of newness and the invading forces
of technology and bourgeois modernity—points to the future that will soon come to
Ithaca, just as surely as it has already overtaken the upper-middle class world of the
Vaughts.
In this moment, Will suddenly finds time as coherent and meaningful—and his
fugue states cease. Never again in the novel does he he suffer from these gaps in
memory that remove him from the flow of time and produce a profound sense of
alienation and existential confusion. At this point, Will begins an active engagement
of his memories of Ithaca. That is, he begins to reconsider them, with a critical
eye towards the ways in which the past has both limited him and provided him with
sources for meaning-making. Will’s memories thus begin to have utility for his crafting
a theory for life. We see this acutely a few pages later, when Will returns to his
childhood home. Will walks there from the levee, recalling his path from memory and
the interrelationships of places to one another. Will walks the “Illinois Central tracks”
past the high school, and his “muscles remembered the spacing of the ties” that will
eventually take him past “the Chinaman’s” and “a better Negro neighborhood of
neat shotgun cottages,” eventually depositing Will “in the inky darkness of the water
oaks” where he looks “at his house” (258). Having just reflected on his placelessness
(“he didn’t live anywhere and had no address”), Will has followed memory to home
itself—that place he went to New York to escape from.
While his desire for escape, and his need to abandon a place that contains so much
tragedy, is understandable, we should note that Will’s self-alienation and neuroses
began well before his father’s suicide. As a child, Will “had had ‘spells,’ occurrences
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which were nameless and not to be thought of.” These “spells” would produce in the
young Will “the strongest sense that it had all happened before and that something
else was going to happen and when it did he would know the secret of his own life”
(7). From childhood, then, Will has wrestled with a Gnostic sense of time. For the
young Will, time was broken and fragmented, and he felt past, present, and future all
coexisting in bewildering incoherence. But after his father’s suicide, these incoherent
experiences—these “spells”—become the fugues and déjà vus that reinforce Will’s
sense of alienation and loneliness throughout the novel. Having just overcome the
power the fugues held over him, Will realizes he must finally deal with their source;
to do this, he must finally come to terms with his father’s suicide through recovering
his memories of that night.
On the night Ed Barrett killed himself, Will was with him. Having dropped out
of Princeton several years before the opening of the novel, Will had returned home to
clerk in the family law firm. Mr. Barrett, like his father and grandfather before him,
was a Southern conservative of the old sort, deeply concerned with noblesse oblige,
and thus much like Faulkner’s Colonel Satoris (or like Percy’s own ancestors). Will
remembers his father’s holding court on many evenings that summer:
Here under the water oaks or there under the street light, he would hold
parley with passers-by, stranger and friend, white and black, thief and
police. The boy would sit on the front steps, close enough to speak with
his father and close enough too to service the Philco which played its
stack of prewar 78’s. . . From the open window came Brahms, nearly always
Brahms. (259)
His father’s catholic respect and consideration for those with whom he “parleys” is
deeply affecting to young Will, and hearkens back to a description of generations
of Barrett men made earlier in the novel. There, we are told that Will’s greatgrandfather “once met the Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan in a barbershop and
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invited him then and there to shoot it out in the street.” Will’s grandfather was also
brave, but “he gave much though to the business of being brave. He too would have
shot it out with the Grand Wizard if only he could have made certain it was the thing
to do. [Will’s father] was a brave man too and he said he didn’t care what others
thought, but he did care. More than anything else, he wished to act with honor and
be thought well of by other men. . . In the end he was killed by his own irony and
sadness and by the strain out living out an ordinary day in a perfect dance of honor”
(6).18 We can thus understand Mr. Barrett’s “parleys” as both a fulfilment of his
inherent duties as an aristocratic white Southerner of the old sort, and as a last-gasp
holding to that identity.
I doubt I am making a novel critical assessment in noting that Mr. Barrett is
perhaps a more fitting candidate for the novel’s eponymous “last gentleman” than
Will himself. But whatever the provenance of this idea, it is a useful one for making
sense of what Percy is doing with regards to Ed Barrett’s suicide, its effect on Will,
and Will’s general existential confusion. Here, in the middle of the Civil Rights
era, Will sees his father attempting to hold onto an identity that is increasingly
untenable. He cannot be the Colonel Satoris-like paternalistic friend of the black man,
as that “friendship” nevertheless continues black disenfranchisement. Yet Ed Barrett
nevertheless feels obligated to continue to pursue some form of this old arrangement,
inasmuch as he is too “brave” to stand down and let the reactionary violence of poor
whites upset the public peace; he, too, would have issued a challenge to the Grand
Wizard of the Klan if he could have. Ed Barrett thus finds himself in a state of
exceptional superfluity: while he has a theory for life, it no longer makes sense in
the contexts and conditions of his life. While his senses of duty and obligation are
strong, they are ultimately not to people, but to an aristocratic abstraction that no
18

It is hard for us to not see Percy writing a version of his own family history here, what with
his own father being a suicide and the stand LeRoy Percy took against Vardaman and the Ku Klux
Klan, something I’ve discussed in Chapter 2.
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longer exists—and can no longer exist. Not knowing how to translate these virtuous
urges into new contexts, Ed Barrett can only lament his metaphorical placelessness.
Will, standing underneath the water oaks in the present, remembers the conversation that he and his father had had in the moments before Ed Barrett killed himself,
perhaps the most important moments in Will’s life: “It was on such an evening. . . that
his father had died. The son watched from the step, old Brahms went abroad, the
father took a stroll and spoke to a stranger of the good life and the loneliness of the
galaxies” (259). Reaching out his hand and touching “the sibilant corky bark of the
water oak” (259), Will finds himself actively remembering that evening, plumbing it
for meaning that will help him understand his own sense of alienation. He remembers
asking his father about his sense of loneliness and sadness when, it seems, they had
“won” against the reactionary violence of poor whites, the same sort of disruption to
the social order Barrett men had warred against for generations:
“But they’re gone, Father.”
“Why shouldn’t they leave? They’ve won.”
“How have they won, Father?”
“They don’t have to stay. Because they found out that we are like them
after all and so there was no reason for them to stay.”
“How are we like them, Father?”
“Once they were the fornicators and the bribers and the takers of bribes
and we were not and that was why they hated us. Now we are like them,
so why should they stay? They know they don’t have to kill me.”
“How do they know that, Father?”
“Because we’ve lost it all, son.”
“Lost what?”
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“But there’s one thing they don’t know.”
“What’s that, Father?”
“They may have won, but I don’t have to choose that.”
“Choose what?”
“Choose them.”
This time, as he turned to leave, the youth called out to him. “Wait.”
“What?”
“Don’t leave.” (260)
Asserting that he is “just going to the corner,” Ed Barrett ignores his son’s pleas.
But Will senses the dark intentions of his father, and feels in in the Brahms as well;
it had “gone overripe, the victorious serenity of the Great Horn Theme was false, oh
fake fake. Underneath, all was unwell” (260). Ed Barrett tells his son that “[i]n the
last analysis, you are all alone,” prompting Will to beg: “‘Don’t leave.’ The terror
of the beautiful victorious music pierced his very soul” (261). Ominously placing his
hand on Will’s shoulder as he passes, Ed Barrett walks up to his room and shoots
himself in the chest with a shotgun.
Standing by the water oak, Will remembers this conversation vividly, as reflects
on its implications. Ed Barrett recognized that his small victory was irrelevant in the
face of the loss of aristocratic sensibilities amongst whites of his class, that his victory
was as hollow as the “victorious serenity of the Great Horn Theme” was “fake fake.”
While the reactionary violence of poor whites may have been defeated, their vices—
fornication and bribery—have found their way into the South’s upper class. As the
last gentleman, Mr. Barrett cannot bear to live in a world in which his courage and
sense of duty are without meaning, and he chooses suicide over superfluity. Will’s
memory thus also provides a compelling perspective for the situation in which he
finds himself. The younger Barrett comes to realize that the pursuit of aristocratic
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virtue and noblesse oblige exemplified by generations of his family has been replaced
by the bourgeois banality of the Vaughts and their ilk. Confederate Chevrolet dealerships and casual country club misogyny are little more than fornication and bribery
sanitized by the presence of money and privilege. Just a few short years after his
father’s suicide, Will is living in a South very different from his father’s, and yet one
that had been uncannily prophesied by Ed Barrett.
Will’s reflections on these memories help him to make sense of his father’s choice,
but also help to provide him with his own perspective for living in the shiny, happy,
Republican South of the Vaughts. Just as he recognizes that his father chose suicide
rather than superfluity, Will also realizes that he has never known anything but
superfluity, thus explaining his lifetime of déjà vus, fugues, and “spells.” If Will has
always eerily sensed “it had all happened before,” it is because it—an unsettled sense
of how to live in a changed and changing South—had been occurring with each new
Barrett man over the past several generations. The aristocratic courage and sense of
noblesse oblige that his great-grandfather had so valiantly exemplified became, as the
years moved on, little more than an abstract ideal held by subsequent generations.
As the contexts of the South changed, the Barretts’ holding to this ideal uncritically
foisted them into their own Gnostic alienation, dividing the transcendence of virtues
from the the immanence of the contexts in which they could be realized. Once such
a division between theory and reality reached a particularly radical distance, all Ed
Barrett could do was kill himself in defiant loyalty to the ideal. Once we reach Will
himself, even this feeling of defiant aristocratic courage is gone.
Just as perplexed by the changing South as his father, and without even the feeling
of his ancestors’ bravery, Will long understood himself as alienated from his past and
bewildered by his present. Yet as Will’s journey South has re-inserted him into the
flow of time, his active recovery of memory in Ithaca has helped him make sense of
his alienation, and ultimately rectifies him to his own past. As he continues to stand
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under the water oaks and contemplate his father’s suicide, his “hand went forth,
knowing where it was, though he could not see, and touched the tiny iron horsehead
of the hitching post, traced the cold metal down to the place where the oak had grown
around it in an elephant lip” (261). An unconscious memory of place, physicality,
and the immanent thus follows on the heels of an actively-remembered, conscious
memory of his ancestry and the transcendent ideals at its core. This juxtaposition
produces the novel’s most profound moment, presaging Will’s ultimate recovery from
the divisions of Gnostic time and self-alienation.
What Will comes to realize is this: perhaps time reconfigures the exact appearance
of the relationship between immanence and transcendence in particular contexts, but
it does not invalidate the need for their coexistence and balance. The tree may eventually grow completely around the tiny iron horsehead, but this inevitable change in
context does not invalidate the perpetual truth of the tree and the iron’s coexistence.
Will’s realization of this fact, effected by his reentry into the flow of Southern history
and his embrace of memory, reveals once and for all his father’s error and a way out
of the Gnostic alienation he has been warring against for the entire novel:
Wait. While his fingers explored the juncture of iron and bark, his eyes
narrowed as if he caught a glimmer of light and the cold iron skull. Wait.
I think he was wrong and that he was looking in the wrong place. No,
not he but the times. The times were wrong and one looked in the wrong
place. It wasn’t even his fault because that was the way he was and the
way the times were, and there was no other place a man could look. It was
the worst of times, a time of fake beauty and fake victory. Wait. He had
missed it! It was not in the Brahms that one looked and not in solitariness
and not in the old sad poetry but—he wrung out his ear—but here, under
your nose, here in the very curiousness and drollness and extraness of the
iron and the bark that—he shook his head—that— (ibid.)
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As with the the final moments before blacking out from being hit with the flagpole,
Will cannot fully articulate his thoughts here; perhaps precise articulation of such
a significant realization is impossible. But what Will finally comes to see is that it
is neither the transcendent theory for living nor the immanent contexts of life that
provide man with meaning and existential stability. Rather, such meaning comes
from the interaction of the immanent and the transcendent, even if this interaction is
as strange and droll as an iron horsehead being swallowed by the bark of a water oak.
In terms of his immediate, proximate contexts, Will cannot simply turn his back on
the duties and obligations he owes to the Vaughts any more than he can accept their
bourgeois banality.
In this, Will here escapes what Brooks identifies as Gnosticism’s emphasis on the
individual’s “salvation depending on his own efforts” (Brooks 56). In the aftermath
of his visit home, Will’s desire to “know everything” ceases, and he finds stability in
that cessation. While he ends the novel confused about faith—the Roman Catholic
baptism of Jamie on his deathbed is deeply confusing to Will—he nevertheless finds
a form of salvation, and is saved from the cruelness of infinite possibility. His active
recovery of memory points Will toward recognizing that he is not an isolated, atomistic individual, but is rather connected to things larger than himself; among these
are history, tragedy, community, and a sense of duty. These are things that are not
only exterior to him, they are anterior; Will cannot—and does not—exist as the man
he is without his connection to these. Brooks notes that Gnostic man, “[d]issatisfied
with the nature of reality,” becomes convinced that “he can remake the world to suit
himself” (56). Having reflected on his father’s suicide, Will cannot countenance such
hubris, and must simply bring to bear those things larger than himself in the world
in which he finds himself as best he can. In this, Will stands in stark contrast with
Sutter.
For much of the last third of the novel, Will is challenged by his reading of Sutter’s
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casebooks, records of medical histories in which Sutter rehearses his Gnostic theories
of sex and the pursuit of meaning. These books illustrate a man who is actively
attempting something like reconfiguring the ways in which an individual man interacts
with the world. Sutter examines how a frank, crass acceptance of the immanence of
sex can save an individual from a sense of transcendence as oppressive, as presenting
the self with the terror of infinite possibility. But even this becomes untenable. As
the books metamorphose into one-sided dialogues with Val, Will witnesses the logical
end of Sutter’s Gnostic attempts:
You [Val] say don’t worry about [issues of theodicy and God’s justice],
first stop fornicating. But I am depressed and transcendent. In such a
condition, fornication is the sole channel to the real. Do you think I am
making excuses?
You are wrong too about the sinfulness of suicide in this age, at least the
nurtured possibility of suicide, for the certain availability of death is the
very condition of recovering oneself. But death is outlawed now as sin
used to be. Only one’s own suicide remains to one. My “suicide” followed
the breakdown of the sexual as a mode of re-entry from the posture of
transcendence. (293)
Sutter is here defending an earlier suicide attempt. As an intractable Gnostic, Sutter sees existence as an irredeemable tension between transcendent unreality and
immanent reality; one must be one or the other. Wishing to escape the infinite oppressiveness of the unreal, Sutter first uses sex “as a mode of reentry from the posture
of transcendence.” When that fails to reorder the nature of reality—Percy is here insisting that existence is both/and with regard to transcendence and immanence, not
either/or—Sutter resorts to suicide and the nihilistic embrace of nothingness as the
ultimate form of reality.
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Throughout the latter portions of the novel, Will often genuinely seems to fear
Sutter, and we’re also given a sense that what Will most fears about Sutter is that
he might become him. Will spends the majority of the novel overwhelmed by infinite
possibilities; his conversations with Sutter reflect this anxiety and are thus deeply
unsettling. But through Will’s recovery of memory—his re-entry into the flow of
time, and his critically-remembered connection to history, tragedy, community, and
duty—he comes to the fundamental recognition that he cannot remake existence, and
the connections between the individual and world that surrounds him. That is, he
recognizes the immanent reality of the here and now, as well as his connection to
transcendent things outside of himself, and that both of these are of equal importance in the creation of meaning and existential stability. In a significant moment
near the end of the novel, this recognition helps Will overcome the siren song of Sutter’s nihilism. After Sutter announces his attention to kill himself (“If I do outlive
Jamie. . . it will not be by more than two hours”), Will is, for the first time in his life,
“astonished.”
“You won’t join me, Barrett?”
“What? No. No, thanks.”
Sutter nodded cheerfully, dropped the pistol in the side pocket of the
jacket, and hurried down the path after the last of the dudes.
Perhaps this moment more than any other, the moment of his first astonishment, marked the beginning for [Will] of what is called a normal
life. From that time forward it was possible to meet him and after a few
minutes form a clear notion of what sort of fellow he was and how he
would spend the rest of his life. (306-307)
Will is astonished by Sutter’s ready admittance of his intentions, his invitation for
Will to “join him,” and perhaps most tellingly, Sutter’s active disengagement from
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duty and things outside of his own atomistic self. After all, this conversation comes on
the heels of Will discussing how to announce Jamie’s imminent death to the Vaughts
and plan for the young man’s funeral—issues about which Will, quite understandably,
thinks that Sutter, as the eldest brother, should take the lead.
Further, recollections of his own father’s suicide, and its deleterious effects on the
lives of so many, are also surely on Will’s mind in this moment. That he has only
recently processed these memories in a mature, active manner is important here.
While we can only speculate about how different his reaction would have been, it is
certain that had Sutter presented Will with this announcement and invitation prior
to Will’s return to Ithaca, he would have not experienced “his first astonishment” and
it would have been impossible to “form a clear notion of what kind of fellow he was
and how he would spend the rest of his life.” But here, we can come to a reasonably
confident idea of the rest of Will’s life: he will recognize the proper relationship of
immanence and transcendence, something based in a proper ordering of time.19 While
Will cannot embrace the faith of Val, he has found salvation, and is rescued from the
existential quagmire of Gnostic time and its oppressive, infinite possibilities.
In the novel’s closing moment, Will attempts to call Sutter back into the flow of
time, away from the Gnostic impulse to remake existence and the nihilistic embrace
of death that follows from this project’s inevitable failure. As he pleads with Sutter
“to come back” to the South, rejoin his family, and recognize that time itself is not a
lie—not a transcendent unreality only undone by a destructively exclusive embrace
of the immanent—Percy’s neurotic, dreamy engineer reverses Sutter’s invitation to
suicide and nothingness, and instead calls Sutter to family, duty, and those things
that exist beyond the hyper-immanence of self. In its last moments, The Last Gentle19

Whether or not the Will Barrett of this novel’s ostensible sequel (I say ostensible, inasmuch as
the connection between the two novels seems largely tenuous, based mostly in names and plot points
rather than a consistent thematic unity), The Second Coming actually lives up to this expectation
is another matter, and one I do not have room to consider here.
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man’s dreamy confusion, satirical indictment of the postmodern South, and complex
treatment of the deleterious existential consequences of Gnostic denials of time’s necessary blending of immanence (who I am now, in this moment) with transcendence
(what is anterior to me, how does it shape me, and what do I owe to that which
comes after?) appropriately gives way to joy. As Will calls after Sutter and Sutter’s
car slows down, we are told that “[s]trength flowed like oil into his muscles and he ran
with great joyous ten foot antelope bounds,” as Sutter’s car ultimately “waited for”
Will (323). The language here suggests that Will successfully calls Sutter away from
suicide for at least a moment. There are significant echoes of the night Ed Barrett
killed himself, as Will pleads with Sutter to “come back” and “wait,” just as he had
with his father a few years before. As Ed Barrett passes Will on his way upstairs to
shoot himself in the chest, Sutter passes Will on his way to end his life. But unlike Ed
Barrett, Sutter does yield to Will’s pleadings; Sutter does “wait.” Will’s recovery of
memory, and his active reengagement with the flow of time, has thus not only saved
him, but has also put (an at least temporary) stay on the execution Gnosticism has
foisted upon at least one other human soul. Truly, this is serving something greater
than the self.
In concluding this discussion, Richard Weaver’s thought again proves useful.
About midway through Ideas Have Consequences, Weaver discusses the “split in
the theory of knowledge which took place at the time of the Renaissance.” In the
medieval world, scholarship and learning formed “a path to self-deprecation, and the
philosophiae doctor was one who had at length seen a rational ground for humiltas.”
In early modernity, the theory of knowledge abandoned “self-deprecation” and humilitas, and comes to see the aim of knowledge as domination, a notion summarized in
the Baconian maxim, “knowledge is power” (Weaver, Ideas 72). Weaver thus articulates two competing versions of knowledge: an older version governed by an awareness
of human frailty and limitation, and a modern version—the “forbidden knowledge”
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of “the useful rather than the true and the good, of techniques rather than of ends”
(ibid.). Weaver argues that if we are convinced—as he is, and as Walker Percy seems
to be—that the problems of modern man are “philosophical, we cannot expect a return to selflessness without an epistemological revision which will elevate the study
of essences above that of particulars and so put in their proper modest place those
skills needed to manipulate the world. Nothing can be done until we have decided
whether we are primarily interested in truth” (72-73).
Percy’s “wayfarers” and “pilgrims,” to use those terms so often associated with
his protagonists, find themselves facing the quandary Weaver sketches out, and are
attempting to decide if they are “primarily interested in truth.” As we see in the
two deeply novels I’ve discussed, each of which is deeply concerned with Gnosticism,
Percy’s protagonists recognize that they are living in worlds—in Souths—in which
immanence has been elevated over transcendence, and in which the of knowledge of
transcendent truths has been denigrated by desires for power, domination, and crass
consumption, and thus the cultivation of the “useful” knowledge of “techniques.” Will
Barrett and Dr. Tom More are each tasked with figuring out what a proper knowledge
of the truth looks like, and how it can help them survive the existentially limiting
consequences of Southern Gnosticism. Each man decides that he is, in fact, “primarily
interested in truth,” and each draws on the Southern conservative tradition—and its
various articulations of community, duty, faith, transcendent order, memory, and
history—to recover this truth, a truth that ultimately saves these characters from
the tragic existential consequences of self-division.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion: Further Possibilities for and
Consequences of Southern Conservative
Superfluity
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This dissertation has explored two propositions: first, that “Southern conservatism” exists as a set of beliefs about community, transcendence, and the nature of
the self, and that all political and social manifestations of Southern conservatism—for
good and for ill—are based in these beliefs. These beliefs are ultimately anti-gnostic,
ante-modern, and are manifested in response to the particularities of the South’s interrelated historic, socio-cultural, and economic experiences. Secondly, this dissertation
has argued that some Southern artists have engaged the core beliefs of Southern conservatism, rather than its socio-political manifestations, and their critical engagement
of the South’s conservative tradition allowed them to find existential stability in times
of bewildering social, cultural, economic, and demographic change. I’ve explored the
interplay of these two propositions in the work of William Alexander Percy, Peter
Taylor, and Walker Percy.
I originally chose these writers for reasons outlined in the introduction; they are
representative of the concepts I’ve set out to explore, and I am convicted than any
such exploration would necessarily need to consider Taylor and the Percys. Yet as I’ve
moved forward, I found myself constantly thinking of other writers whose work would
be useful to an expanded version of this project. The process of a critical, existentially useful reevaluation with the Southern conservative tradition is at work in some
predictable places; one certainly feels it at work in the poetry and essays of Allen
Tate, for instance (although his sole novel, The Fathers, seems to treat Southern conservatism in the epiphenomenal mode I ascribed to Faulkner, Welty, and O’Connor in
the introduction). Jack Burden, from Robert Penn Warren’s All the King’s Men, is a
clear predecessor of characters like Taylor’s Nat Ramsey and Phillip Carver, especially
in Burden’s closing realization. But lest we think this project could simply include
all of the literary-minded members of the Twelve Southerners, the type of critical
engagement with the South is clearly not at work in the literary output of Donald
Davidson, who seems most interested in expressing a Southern superiority based in
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the region’s conservatism, nor that of Andrew Lytle, whose fiction fits into the exploratory, conservatism-as-representative-feature of the broader Southern experience
we see in most Southern authors.
The critical, re-evaluative engagement with the Southern conservative tradition
I’ve explored in this dissertation stems from individuals feeling a profound sense of
alienation from the South, yet a recognition of some quality or qualities in the South
that makes these individuals reticent to decry or reject it tout court. I’ve shown
how this works in William Alexander Percy’s memoir, Lanterns on the Levee, as well
as how Peter Taylor’s fictive œuvre presents a long journey towards making peace
with the South, and the ways in which reengaging Southern traditionalism undoes
the existential alienation and self-division felt by Walker Percy’s Dr. Tom Moore and
Will Barrett. As just stated, Tate and Warren would be necessary, and obvious,
additions to an expanded version of this project inasmuch as we see similar dealings
with alienation in All the King’s Men and “Ode to the Confederate Dead.”. Yet if
this sense of alienation from, but a reticence to abandon, the South is the hallmark of
the works this project has explored, an expanded version of it would need to consider
the work of two less-obvious writers: Booker T. Washington and George Washington
Cable.
Inasmuch as Southern conservatism has often provided the intellectual basis for
black disenfranchisement (something I’ve tried to point out, when appropriate, in
this dissertation), including Booker T. Washington, a black man born into slavery,
in this conversation might seem strange. But just as William Alexander Percy engages and reinterprets the possibilities Southern conservatism provides for him in
order to make a means for a gay aesthete to exist in the inter-war Mississippi Delta,
so does Washington enact a similar process, critically engaging the South’s conservative traditions to provide African Americans with a theory for living in the Jim
Crow South. Of course, scholars have long recognized Washington as a “conserva-
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tive,” especially vis-à-vis his intellectual rival W.E.B. DuBois. Yet what we see in
Washington’s memoir, Up From Slavery, is not simply promoting hard work, personal
responsibility, and useful trades—though he is, to be certain, promoting these. But
beyond his promotion of this pragmatic conservatism, Washington is claiming many
of the aspects of the Southern tradition that produced the racialist paternalism that
provided intellectual and moral validity to black marginalization. Through shrewd
rhetorical maneuvering, Washington is cleverly reconfiguring these very notions to
produce authentic and empowering forms of black community. A careful study of Up
From Slavery, paying especial attention to how social bond individualism, notions of
duty, and a resistance to the gnostic pull of “immanentizing the eschaton,” would
provide for nuanced understandings of Washington’s social and rhetorical project,
including his infamous Atlanta Compromise speech, in which he seems to advocate
for a passive acceptance of segregation.
George Washington Cable is one of the 19th century South’s foremost liberals,
whose racial attitudes made him a pariah. Ultimately, Cable left the South in selfimposed exile, moving to Northampton, Massachusetts in 1885, never to return. Yet
Cable’s work, both before and after 1885, shows a conscientious engagement with the
South’s conservative traditions, and an attempt to use these traditions to show the
South its own errors, inconsistencies, and the myriad ways the South fails to exist
in a manner consistent with its own foundational logics. Richard Weaver, whom I
have positioned as perhaps the most significant interpreter of Southern conservatism,
seemingly recognizes this aspect of Cable’s work, including him in a group of “artists
who loved the Old South, and the remnants of it still surviving, for its color, romance,
charm, and unreasonableness, but who were continuously disturbed by an inner voice
of social justice. One finds in their work sympathetic pictures of the vanishing order
and a general endorsement of those virtues on which the South prided itself, but
he finds also many uneasy questions, either direct or implied.” Cable, Weaver re-
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marks, “was the first” of these writers to “discover the basic inconsistencies in the
conventional Southern attitude” (Weaver, Southern Tradition 308).
While Cable’s invocations of many of the “virtues on which the South prided itself”
are evident throughout his fiction, perhaps his most important work for understanding
how he utilizes aspects of the Southern conservative tradition to point out the “basic
inconsistencies” and moral failings of the South is his 1889 novel of Reconstruction,
John March, Southerner. Penned in the North during his self-imposed exile, it is a
complex and ambitious novel that reflects what Louis D. Rubin describes as Cable’s
recognition that “the South had no intention of permitting the freedman to retain
the rights of citizenship granted him during the Reconstruction period, and that
‘enlightened’ opinion in the North was willing to acquiesce in allowing the South the
do what it would with its Negro citizens” (Rubin, Cable 212). John March, Southerner
shows “the limitations of the New South ideology of industrialism and development
as a solution for the region’s troubles, [demonstrates] why the Negro must be fitted
into Southern plans instead of being disenfranchised and set off by himself. More
than that, [Cable wants] to describe the South as he knew it, to show how narrow
evangelical religion was failing to bring out the best in Southerners. . . to strike out
against lethargy and complacence,” and other other hardy critiques of the late-19th
century South (213). Much of what Cable is doing in John March, Southerner is
thus a predecessor of what Walker Percy would do some 80 years later in Love in
the Ruins and The Last Gentleman. Cable, like Percy, effects this largely by drawing
on many of the principal ideas of the South’s conservative traditions to show how
his “New Southerners” have lost their way, much as Percy does with his postmodern
Southerners. As Rubin perceptively remarks, Cable ultimately “wanted to show how
the Confederate tradition was being misused by so many Southern politicians and
economic entrepreneurs for purposes of profit and power, and how the cloak of genteel
respectability was masking, throughout the South, economic and political rapacity of
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the most unbridled sort” (216). The result was a novel of mixed aesthetic successes,
but which shows how Cable, now supremely alienated from the South, could not quit
it, and continued, even in exile, to see how a different theory for living existing at the
core of the South’s conservative traditions.
An expansion of this project would thus explore how Southerners in a more
obviously vexed position with regard to their place in the South nevertheless still
find some utility in the South’s conservative traditions. But the utility of Southern
conservatism—as critique, corrective, and alternate vision of possibilities for living—
may ultimately be limited. The experiences of Booker T. Washington and George
Washington Cable would surely bear this out, just as we have seen in William Alexander Percy, Walker Percy, and Peter Taylor’s work. And this brings us back to another
core idea of this project: superfluity. This project has continuously dealt with the
need to think through the usefulness of ideas that may very well be antiquated, not
obviously applicable to current realities, and perhaps fundamentally useless in the
face of those current realities.
This has become an especially relevant, and especially troubling, thought process
because of the realities of the moment in which we currently live. Significant portions
of this dissertation were written (and all of it was edited and revised) in late 2015
and early 2016, in the shadow of Dylan Roof’s murderous rampage at Charleston’s
Emanuel A.M.E. Church and its consequences for how we understand the South,
its traditions, and its traditional symbols. Last summer saw the removal of the
Confederate battle flag from the grounds of the South Carolina Statehouse (a short
walk from my university office), and the removal of Confederate symbols generally
throughout the South.1 A wide ranging cross-section of Southerners—white and
1

Alabama, for instance, has five flag poles at its state highway welcome centers, bearing the
state flag and the flags of the four nations that have claimed ownership over Alabama: the United
States, the Crown of Castille, the Kingdom of France, and the Confederacy. While the state flag,
the US flag, and the royal standards of Castille and France fly high, the flagpole that once held the
Confederate flag is conspicuously empty.
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black, men and women, rich and poor, Left-wing and Right-wing, immigrant and
long-time resident, urban and rural—are questioning the persistence and presence
of traditional Old South and Confederate symbols with a more unified voice than
has previously ever been seen. To hear conservative, small town Southern white
men (like members of my own family) questioning the prudence of public displays of
Confederate and Old South symbols would have been unthinkable as recently as ten
years ago; and yet I have witnessed this very thing over the last several months.
Such realities have not been lost on me, and have troubled me as I continued to
write and revise this analysis of the uses of Southern conservatism by great literary
artists; after all, this dissertation is, I must admit, also a sort of apologia for Southern
conservatism itself. Of course, it is always appropriate for the scholar to analyze—
but should he defend, be something other than a dispassionate interpreter of ideas,
especially when these are certainly superfluous, perhaps useless, and maybe even (as
some would certainly argue) wrong-headed ideas? These are serious considerations,
and I have struggled with their implications for my own place within the South; I
have sometimes felt that I, too, am one of these “last gentlemen” of whom I have
written.
But despite these struggles, my ruminations on these artists and Southern conservatism has consistently lead me back to the same place: the work these artists
have done is commendable, and is commendable inasmuch as it is artistic. That is, it
effects an attempt to apply some perspective—some theory—to the art of living, and
explores the myriad, multifaceted consequences of utilizing this perspective. In 2016,
attempts by the jurist, politician, or policy-maker to utilize some past instantiation
of Southern conservatism as a political program would be naïve romanticism at best,
and at worst, an attempt to re-inscribe upon the South those very things the writers
I’ve examined so vehemently criticized. The policy maker or politician is perhaps
incapable of the critical reinterpretation this tradition both invites and needs. But
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private citizens certainly can enact this reinterpretation, and the artist, who explores
both how we live and how we might live, is the individual to show us how to enact
that critical move—and to show us that this is a theory for living that deserves serious consideration. The literary artist in the South thus fulfills his mission as the
Carlylean hero, exploring possibilities for meaning, purpose, and the good, inviting
us to go on this journey with him.
Ultimately, William Alexander Percy, Peter Taylor, and Walker Percy all perform
this heroic role, exploring an aspect of their cultural inheritance—the Southern conservative tradition—to help them make sense of how they exist within a particular
time and place, however seemingly superfluous that aspect of their cultural inheritance might be. These are individuals who do not attempt to free themselves from
the restraining burden of the past and tradition. In this, they represent an alternative vision to the one put forth by those whom Weaver identifies as the “American
frontiersman” who “emancipated himself from culture” (Weaver, Ideas 24). Weaver
goes on to note that the frontiersman’s “emancipation left him impatient of all symbolism, of indirect methods, and even of those inclosures of privacy which all civilized
communities respect.” (ibid.) Weaver quotes de Tocqueville’s observation that the
frontiersman’s “disposition of mind soon leads them to contemn forms, which they
regard as useless and inconvenient veils placed between them and the truth” (qtd.
in Weaver, Ideas 25). The work done by Taylor and the Percys suggests a radically
contrary view of these “forms,” the myths, symbols, and principles of Southern conservatism. For these artists, such aspects of the South’s conservative tradition are
not “inconvenient veils placed between them and the truth,” but rather heuristics
for making sense of Truth, perspectives that prevent them from being undone by the
overwhelming, disorienting facts of raw human experience. Faced with the bleakness
of crass materialism and the hyper-individualism of (post)modern America, these
artists have found something of real utility in their cultural inheritance. Their exam-
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ple suggests that this seemingly superfluous cultural tradition, treated with proper
critical engagement, may provide us with our own means of surviving an even more
crass, lonely, and bewildering moment in the South in the second decade of the 21st
century.
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